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I propose a nuanced theoretical approach to understanding leader identity 
development in organizations.  Past identity work has ignored or tangentially 
addressed phases of development that I term ‘leader identity stagnation’ and 
‘leader identity destruction’.  Analysis of survey and network data examining 
West Point cadets’ identities and friendship, leadership, and trust networks 
adds insight into the leader identity development process.  Ethnographic 
research of the institution offers further understanding and helps confirm the 
new theoretical model of the phases of leader identity development.  A 
concluding chapter examines the application of new social networking 
technologies and mixed-media interaction to enhance organizational leader 
identity construction.  A gap exists in management literature pertaining to the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND    
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
“In the past I’ve felt challenged in a good way by academic 
courses and having a leadership role in the company, but now it 
seems like I’m always complaining to anyone who will listen about 
how much we hate it here.”  -Cadet John Pritcher1 
 
The above quote captures some of the topics addressed in this dissertation.  First, I argue 
that leader identity development is not a continuous upward progression.  At a point in time, 
Pritcher held a formal leadership role within the organization, and was pressed developmentally 
by the additional academic and physical challenges of life at West Point.  But then his 
identification with the organization and his role as a leader changed.  His developmental 
progression as a leader stagnated.  He became pessimistic about his leadership development and 
college experience, and he is cynical toward all those whom he perceives to impose their will 
upon him.   
Second, I examine network impacts on leader identity development.  While not wishing 
to read too much into semantics, Pritcher interestingly comments in the quote above that he 
complains to, “anyone who will listen about how much we hate it here.”  The use of the word 
“we” indicates the influence of a peer network.      
This dissertation begins by addressing the topic of leader identity development in 
organizations, and then proposes a nuanced developmental model in Chapter 2.  DeRue and 
Ashford (2010: 641) advise that empirical tests of a leader identity development model should, 
“capture the individual, relational, and organizational factors that influence the leadership 
                                                          
1
 Pseudonyms are used throughout this dissertation to maintain anonymity. 
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identity construction process.”  This study attempts to do exactly that, but with a greater 
theoretical understanding of the leader identity development process.  In Chapter 3 I examine the 
primary data source, a study of West Point cadet leadership, trust, and friendship networks and 
their impact on leader identity.  I also take an ethnographic approach to uncovering vital 
organizational influences on identity construction.  Chapter 4 addresses the use of web and 
mobile networking technologies for identity development, and theorizes propositions from 
management and sociology perspectives.   
 Fundamental to this research is a belief that organizational members are embedded in a 
social system that impacts identity development.  I examine the impact of social ties (friendship, 
leadership, and trust) on leader identity development through a multiple methods approach (Jick, 
1979).  Practically, this dissertation contributes to the empirical and ethnographic works on 
organizational identity development.   
 Why is this research important?  Military leaders are delegating combat power and 
decision making authority to increasingly lower levels.  General Raymond Odierno, Chief of 
Staff of the Army, writes, “Small unit leadership will be at a premium in this potential 
environment of dispersed, decentralized operations… The complexity of this environment 
requires a deliberate investment in our leaders.  The need to adapt to rapidly changing situations 
and identify underlying causes of conflict calls for mental agility and strategic vision,” (Odierno, 
2013: 5).  The focus of my research is on a subset of these future leaders: cadets at the United 
States Military Academy in West Point, New York, who will be commissioned as second 
lieutenant Army officers upon graduation. 
Though only 18-24 years of age and struggling with many of the same social and societal 
issues of their civilian college counterparts, these men and women will bear this burden of 
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leadership in surprisingly short order.  Less than a year after graduation from West Point, second 
lieutenants are placed in charge of organizational units of up to 40 soldiers.  Within six years of 
graduation, most who remain in the military are commanders of approximately 100 soldiers.  The 
identity that these organizational members form while at the academy can have tremendous 
influence over the efficiency and effectiveness of the units they command.    
A second reason this research is important is that it translates to organizations outside of 
the U.S. military and West Point, as leader identity development and its relationship to networks 
have broad application.  Third, a network approach to understanding leader identity development 
is an under-researched area of study.  And finally, communities of practice are growing in use.  I 
define a community of practice as a group of people with common interest who connect 
informally and responsibly to promote learning, solve problems, or develop new ideas.  
Addressing their impact on identity development is worthy of study.    
  4 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION    
The Progression of Modern Organizational Leadership Studies 
 Modern organizational leadership research has progressed significantly since Thomas 
Carlyle’s (1841) “Great Men” studies.  Early leadership research followed this model in focusing 
on a leader’s individual characteristics.  Rapid industrialism and the rise of a professional 
manger class in the late 1800s created the market for leadership theory that moved beyond heroic 
idealism, propagating rational managerial coordination.  With a focus on leadership stemming 
from the proper administration of large bureaucracies, many studies drew upon the railroad 
industry, the military, and civil service organizations.  In translating these studies for the private 
sector, a focus on rigorous process and accountability led to the scientific management school of 
thought, as exemplified by Frederick Taylor (1911), and often referred to as Taylorism.  Under 
scientific management, the leader is an engineer of the organization, and directs the further 
division of labor and rationalization of the workplace (Barley & Kunda, 1992).   
 From around the time of the great depression until the mid 1940s, the rational leadership 
perspective would yield to the normative findings of Elton Mayo (1945) and others in the human 
relations school.  If viewed as members of a group with individual needs, workers form identities 
with the organization, and are better able to work toward achieving organizational goals.  While 
not denying many of the efficiencies advocated by scientific management, human relations does 
stress the necessity of leader involvement in fostering upward communication and the social 
needs of group members (and led to many current practices in human resources management).  
Concurrent with the research of the human relations school was a returned focus on charismatics 
and traits of the individual leader, arguably attributed to the sociocultural influences of the time 
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(Grint, 2011).  The cultural focus on powerful political figures and the rise of mass movements 
influenced leadership and organizational studies; rational inquiries ceded to examinations of the 
leader as a central character.    
 A rigorous examination of leadership theory followed World War II and the related 
economic prosperity of the West.   Analysis of America’s newfound industrial prominence, 
combined with a cultural focus on the individual, yielded the self-actualization movement, 
namely Maslow’s (1954, 1962) characteristics of the self-actualizer and hierarchy of needs.   
This transition can also be seen in McGregor’s (1960) development of Theory X (heavy-handed 
leadership exercised through hierarchical control is the best means of motivating an inherently 
lazy workforce) and Theory Y (employees are motivated through the satisfaction of completed 
work, and will best develop when managers set conditions through communication and positive 
relationships).  Together with the human relations school, these agendas contributed much to 
modern human resources practices, but fell out of favor in the 1960s. 
 Institutionalization of the human relations program led to criticism that organizations 
were damaging the independence of employees and even democratic traditions.  Furthermore, 
negative assessment of the school’s economic advantages mounted.  Janis’ (1972) work on 
groupthink is representative of both critiques, arguing that allegiance to the organization 
hampered creativity and individualism, thus limiting adaptability of the firm.  This turn of 
opinion paralleled the growth of technology in the workplace and a call for added rigor in 
business schools.  Management and leadership theory saw a return to rationalism, most notably 
with contingency theory.  Rather than a strict set of structural characteristics being preferred 
above others, contingency theory held that organizations must balance differentiation and 
integration to best fit their environments (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967).  Fiedler’s (1967) 
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contingency theory carried this into leadership research and helped discredit trait theories, 
asserting that good leadership entailed rationally analyzing the environment and executing the 
proper response.      
  This more systems-oriented approach to leadership faded in favor of a return to 
normative, trait-focused proposals such as emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990; 
Goleman, 1998) in the 1990s.  Though still popular in business press and some leadership 
research, little evidence has empirically secured the soundness of these ideas.   
 
Leader Identity 
Leadership studies continue to evolve, and some researchers have attacked the field for 
this very reason (Meindel, et al., 1985; Pfeffer, 1977).  The lack of a distinct definition of the 
term leadership (and furthermore ‘leader development’), discredits for some the nature of 
leadership science.  Others view this as a strength of the field; Day and Harrison (2007: 360) 
conclude that, “The complexity and multidimensionality of the very nature of leadership mitigate 
the possibility of a simple or unitary definition.”  Leadership has more recently become viewed 
as a process of reciprocated influence: a social construction that relies on relationships between 
leaders and followers and not requiring a formal hierarchical position (Collinson, 2005; Uhl-
Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007).  Table 1.1 identifies some of the progression in leadership 
studies.   
DeRue and Ashford (2010) theorize that leader identity is comprised of three 
components, those being individual internalization, relational recognition, and collective 
endorsement.  While this work has added significantly by providing a model of leader identity 
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Table 1.1: Summary of Evolvement of Thinking Around Leadership,  
From Day and Harrison (2007)  
 
 
construction through a process of claiming leadership and granting followership (see Figure 1.1), 
it fails to address the social network impact on member identity.   
This dissertation proposes a further advancement to leader development that focuses on 
self-identification as a leader, and the importance of not just leader-follower relationships, but 
networks within the organization.    
 
 
Table 1.1 summarizes the progression of leadership science, to 
include the increasing level of complexity, changing definition of 
leadership itself, and level of self-concept.  This dissertation 
addresses the individual and collective self-concept, with the 
further advancement of incorporating a network approach to leader 
identity development.   
  8 
  
Figure 1.1: The Leadership Identity Construction Process, from DeRue and Ashford (2010) 
 
 
Academic work in the field of self and self-identity largely began with the early works of 
William James (1890) and continues to flourish as one of the most heavily investigated aspects 
of social psychology (Baumeister, 1999).  Experiencing a similar evolution as leadership studies, 
self-identity has migrated away from an exclusive focus on the individual to a more social 
consideration of the relational self and the collective self (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001).     
Drawing on social psychology, I define identity as the union of an individual’s values, 
experiences, and self-construal (Baltes & Carstensen, 1991).  Identity development transpires 
through identification with persons of influence as well as groups (Weinreich & Saunderson, 
2003).  A plethora of authors have worded and reworded identity, even causing Taylor (1989: 
29) to remark, “But in fact our identity is deeper and more many-sided than any of our possible 
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articulations of it.”  After surveying the literature I find the Baltes and Carstensen (1991) 
definition most relevant to leader identity development in the context of organizations. 
In developing a theory of the leader identity construction process, DeRue and Ashford 
(2010) argue that a leader identity is both an internal cognition and a socially constructed 
cognition that builds on the interplay between leader and follower.  Those who grant leadership 
status to others develop a follower identity.   Leadership is therefore a social process which 
changes over time.    
Tajfel and Turner (1979) define social identity as the aspects of an individual’s self-
image that are derived from that individual’s perceived social groups.  People may classify 
themselves or others into social categories, such as gender, race, age, and religious affiliation 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  The classification into these categories serves several functions.  First, 
it gives individuals a clear way to define others, based on their classification.  Second, 
classification gives the individual a sense of self in the social environment.  While possessing the 
means to define others within a social space can help individuals deduce patterns of interaction, 
the associated stereotypes are not necessarily reliable, as discussed in depth in other studies (see 
Hamilton, 1981).   
Social identification is the “perception of oneness with or belongingness to some human 
aggregate,” (Ashforth & Mael, 1989: 21).  Social identification literature suggests principles that 
are relevant to leader identity.  First, to identify with a social group, an individual needs only to 
see herself as sharing the fate of the group (Foote, 1951).  Second, socially identifying with a 
group means that the individual is personally affected by the successes and failures of that group 
(Foote, 1951; Tolman, 1943).  Both of these principles indicate that if an individual identifies 
  10 
  
with a group, that individual will have a vested interest in the functions and actions of the group.  
Third, social identification is clearly distinguished from internalization (Kelman, 1961).   
Internalization is when an individual accepts influence because it aligns with his values, 
whereas identification is an individual adopting behavior that may be derived from another 
person or group because such behavior acts to fulfill a sense of self identity (Kelman, 1961).  An 
individual self-identifying as a leader in an organization might positively identify with the social 
category “leader” within the organization.   
Finally, an individual can identify with a group or with an individual, however, Ashforth 
and Mael (1989) find that these types of identification are complementary, meaning that although 
the entity that the individual is identifying with is different, the process is similar.  This 
identification with an individual person, or the classical identification of Kelman (1961), may be 
the most applicable to this dissertation, as individuals emulate another person in order to appease 
them or gain their qualities (Ashforth & Mael, 1961). 
In building a theory of leadership process focused on follower self-identity, Lord and 
Brown (2004: 17) define the working self-concept (WSC) as, “the highly activated, contextually 
sensitive portion of the self-concept that guides action and information processing on a moment-
to-moment basis.”  Markus and Wurf (1987) first proposed the term “working self-concept,” and 
argued that a person’s self-concept was a collection of selves with particular activation 
dependent upon the environmental context.  The WSC is the particular self-concept that 
predominates at a specific time.  A specific self-concept is chosen, which facilitates the cueing of 
appropriate reactions and behaviors, thus simplifying the mental processes necessary to navigate 
a given situation.  Self-identities operate at one of three levels: individual, interpersonal, or 
collective.  The WSC has three components: self-views, current goals, and possible selves (Lord, 
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et al., 1999), as depicted in Figure 1.2.  Lord and Brown (2004) expand these concepts to 
encompass leadership and leader identity.    
 




Lord and Brown (2004) define self-views as an individual’s 
perceived possession of prominent attributes, which can change 
dependent upon the particular context.  Current goals are focused 
and short-term in nature.  Possible selves hold a longer time frame 
and are focused on the future.  Current goals and possible selves 
serve as comparative standards to self-views.    
 
 
The three internal components of the working self concept can engage proximal 
motivation (meaning closer to the current situation) or more future-focused distal motivation.  
Organizational members differ in their time perspective, but leaders can often help subordinates 
form an integrated self identity by bridging their self-views and possible selves with current 
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goals (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1986).  A simple strategy for this is demonstrating the connection 
between pertinent current issues or potential behaviors and a more distant desired future state. 
Leaders, as defined by Hogg (2001), are individuals who have disproportionate influence 
(through power, prestige, or both), that allows them to guide the actions, goals, and outcomes of 
a group.  Based on this definition, it follows that leadership is a group process, as a leader 
requires followers to influence.  This definition highlights the connection between individuals 
undergoing a self-identification process (Kelman, 1961) and the presence of a prototypical 
leader.   A prototypical group member is likely to be a leader of the group as members conform 
to and are influenced by that individual who resembles the prototype of the in-group (Hogg, 
2001); however, Hogg goes on to say that leadership is not only being “passively prototypical,” 
but also exhibiting a high degree of social attraction.   
For leadership positions, group members are more attracted to a prototypical member 
than a non-prototypical member (Hogg, 1992).  The prototypical leader, therefore, has influence 
over the followers in their group, granted that both the leaders and followers support each others’ 
self image.  DeRue and Ashford (2010) present a theory that is based on informal and formal 
leaders and followers claiming and granting the roles of leader and follower to one another.  An 
important aspect of this theory is that social identification is an individual assuming a specific 
image and others in the group mirroring or reinforcing that image (Hatch & Schultz, 2002).   
This “collective endorsement” leads to being seen in the social environment as a leader or 
a follower (Brewer & Gardner, 1996), which DeRue and Ashford  (2010) use to support their 
theory that the more a leader or follower is collectively endorsed, the more those images will be 
reinforced and the stronger those images will become.  Collective endorsement within an 
organization amplifies the effect of the claiming and granting process.  Patterns of claiming and 
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granting can form “deviation-amplifying” loops (Masuch, 1985) in which a change in one 
variable alters a second variable.   
A positive spiral occurs when the claiming and granting of leader and follower identities 
mutually support one another (DeRue, et al., 2009).  Claiming and granting of leader and 
follower identities can be used to explain how a prototypical group member is found socially 
attractive by the group, claims a leader image, and is granted that image by the followers of the 
in-group.  This process perpetuates and strengthens both leader and follower images.  Leadership 
is seen as an identity construction tied to the claiming and granting process. The self image of 
being a leader is therefore a social construction that is based on the interaction of leaders and 
followers (Helgø & Karp, 2008). 
As newcomers in an organization are concerned with their roles and apprehensive about 
their status, they undergo an organizational socialization process that builds a situational self 
definition (Katz, 1980).  This self definition is largely based on the self identity, as studies have 
shown that the sense of who one is complements the sense of where one belongs and what is 
expected (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  Applying the claiming and granting process of leader 
identification to organizational socialization of newcomers, the newcomer gains a sense of self 
definition through interactions with the in-group that resolves ambiguity (Ashforth & Mael, 
1989).  I discuss this further in Chapters 2 and 3.   
Van Maanen (1979) argues that the interpretation of these interactions with the in-group 
determines the conceptions of the self.  This implies that socialization indirectly affects 
internalization through identification, that an individual can identify with or be loyal to an 
organization despite particular interpersonal relationships within that organization, and that 
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symbolic leadership helps to foster organizational loyalty and salient membership (Ashforth & 
Mael, 1989). 
Balkundi and Kilduff (2006) propose that interpersonal relationships, or connections 
between actors, can identify leaders.  They posit that an individual patterns her social ties with 
other individuals with congruent expectations, which complements Hogg’s (2001) theory of 
prototypical leaders.  A prototypical leader would be connected to the actors within the network 
or organization as the actors would want to associate with the prototype of the in-group.  This 
ego network is not the sole determinate of a leader’s effectiveness, as the organizational network 
that controls the flow of social capital and the interorganizational network that is formed by 
interpersonal ties are also important (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006).  Network theory suggests that 
individuals who are able to move toward the center of these networks and bridge to other 
networks in their environment are likely to gain control of resources and power (Burt, 2005).  I 
discuss Burt’s (1987, 1992, 2005) work further in the Network Analysis section of Chapter 4.  It 
is not always possible for a leader to increase her connectedness in multiple networks, as 
building social capital in one may endanger social capital in another (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006). 
It is conceivable that the organizational leader may not be in the center of every network 
within his organization (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006), yet research suggests that individuals who 
are prototypical or conform to the ideals and values of the in-group are likely to become leaders 
and build social capital within their networks (Hogg, 2001).  As individuals build a social 
identity, they tailor their image to the group they perceive themselves belonging to (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979).  The leaders of these networks build social capital as they make claim to and are 
granted the leader image, strengthening their self image as a leader (Ashford & DeRue, 2010).  
  15 
  
This leads to a further discussion of network research and its impact on the field of leader 
identity. 
 
Network Research and Organizational Leader Identity 
Reicher, et al. (2005) argue that modern leadership studies are attempting to recapture 
elements of Weber’s (1947) charismatic leadership.  The shift away from ‘Great Man’ theories 
discussed earlier in this review moved too far toward scripted contingency theories of leadership, 
leaving something missing.  Researchers have broadened the focus to encompass two noteworthy 
features.  First, leaders are able to modify collective norms and goals (Shamir, et al., 1993).  
Second, rather than focusing exclusively on the leader, research examines followers, as well as 
the leader-follower relationship (Hollander, 1995).  This latter approach in particular has led to 
even more recent accounts of broader relationships, and a social network approach to leader 
scholarship (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006). 
The network form of organizational structures is part of the open system approach to 
organizational theory, one that treats the firm boundary as being permeable, and therefore open 
to environmental influences.  Open system researchers are generally concerned more with 
process than structure.  Organizations are impacted by the cognitive and cultural dimensions of 
their social environment, from which they garner, but also contribute to, knowledge and 
resources.  Following World War II, sociological interest in the open system emerged as a means 
to counter the economic-based open system theories (agency theory and transaction cost 
economics) and to take into account the growing academic interest in general system theory 
(Scott & Davis, 2007).  Theories of note were institutional theory, structural contingency theory, 
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resource dependence theory, organizational ecology, and network theory, the latter of which will 
be the focus of this section.   
  Network theory encompasses a number of methods for analyzing structures and 
relationships.  Many of these methods originate in the work of Harrison White and several of his 
students.  Some of White’s original research developed the basic concepts of network structures 
and created a base upon which later quantitative network analysis would build (White, 1965).  
Prior to White, the work of Georg Simmel is also cited as instrumental in the development of 
sociological network perspectives.  Simmel wrote of affiliations creating web-like structures, and 
the ability of individuals to act as arbitrators, brokers, or instigators between two other people in 
a triad (Simmel, 1955 trans.).  Some of Simmel’s network essays date as early as 1908.  
Granovetter’s (1985) work on embeddedness contributes much to the advancement of 
social network theory.  He proposes that behavior is embedded in a network of social 
relationships, and that observing action under such a premise avoids taking an under- or over-
socialized view.  This line of research focuses on economic action, although it can be applied 
elsewhere.  Granovetter (1985: 506) writes, “Managers who evade audits and fight over transfer 
pricing are acting nonrationally in some strict economic sense, in terms of a firm’s profit 
maximization; but when their position and ambitions in intrafirm networks and political 
coalitions are analyzed, the behavior is easily interpreted.”  These managers are concerned with 
factors beyond the optimization of firm profit; their behavior is dependent upon other dynamics, 
such as status, power, and social approval.  Economic action is impacted by ties within the social 
network, and such ties have greater influence than abstract notions of self-interest.  A wide range 
of behaviors can be affected by an organization’s relationships with other firms, to include 
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performance, organizational structure, and strategies.  The importance of this research in relation 
to leader identity research is that relationships between individuals matter. 
Granovetter (1973) explores large social structures that are able to diffuse information 
quickly among a multitude of nodes.  He faults earlier sociological theory for failing to connect 
“micro-level interactions to macro-level patterns in any convincing way” (Granovetter, 1973: 
1360).  The small-scale interactions of dyadic ties are explored, and the cohesive power of weak 
ties is described.   
Recent work has been important to expanding network theory.  Stark and Vedres (2006) 
propose a future for network structures, though they alter the conventional means of network 
analysis.  They criticize conventional network analysis on three grounds.  First, as other critics 
have agreed, they fault the theory’s static nature.  Second, they believe it often forces 
organizations to be grouped into separate communities unnecessarily.  Third, they view 
entrepreneurism as existing not in structural voids, but in intercohesive positions.  They 
introduce new analysis tools from contemporary physics to uncover temporal network traits, and 
note that sociology has a long tradition of emphasizing the strength of groups over time, but that 
recent network analysts have focused far more on network structure (Vedres & Stark, 2008).  Of 
particular interest is the concept of trust.  They make the effective criticism that many 
researchers focus on trust within their network computations, but duration of the networks are 
not considered.  When trust is built upon repeated interactions, how can you avoid considering 
time?  This dissertation gathers friendship, trust, and leadership (both formal and informal) 
networks and analyzes leader identity development from a social network perspective.   
Burns (1963) offers a slightly different take on organizational design via an analysis of 
the flux of industrial design and his categorization of such into mechanistic systems, appropriate 
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during stable conditions, and organismic, appropriate in changing conditions.  Referring to the 
rational bureaucracy of Weber (1968 [1921]) as the “social technology which made possible the 
second stage of industrialism,” Burns (1963: 42) places mechanistic systems firmly in the 
outdated realm of early industrialization.  Excited by his then-current research into the British 
electronics industry, he lauds the benefits of the highly adaptable organismic form, an approach 
with numerous parallels to some modern sociological research dedicated to heterarchy. 
 This concept is similar to the heterarchical (flat-structured) arbitrage trading room of 
Beunza and Stark (2004), whose analysis succinctly bridges the ideas of other performativity 
authors, while providing evidence of the effectiveness of multiple human-machine interactions in 
a heterarchical organizational structure.  Galison (1999: 157) adds later, “It is the disunification 
of science- the intercalation of different patterns of argument- that is responsible for its strength 
and coherence.”  His concept of the trading zone seems to support the findings within 
heterarchies as described by Stark (2009), which are able to take advantage of having diverse 
entities and a variety of network ties between organizational members.  The distributed 
intelligence form taken by the heterarchy generates lateral accountability.  The technology 
enables a mechanistic organization to draw from organismic structural benefits, such as “the 
contributive nature of special knowledge and experience,” and, “knowledge may be located 
anywhere in the network,” (Burns, 1963: 46-47).  This dissertation comments on the use of such 
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Theoretical Contribution 
 The theoretical contribution of this dissertation draws primarily on the Leader Identity 
portion of the Literature Review, as well as the work discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.  
The idea that an organizational member can lose her sense of leader identity is largely absent 
from the leader identity literature.  My ethnographic research within an institution that exists 
largely for the development of young leaders confirms that the building of a member’s leader 
identity can languish, and in some cases decline.  I term these two possibilities ‘leader identity 
stagnation’ and ‘leader identity destruction’.  The intended organizational outcome of maturation 
and leader development (which is most common among members), I term ‘leader identity 
construction’.   
Explained in greater detail in Chapter 2, I propose that organizational members navigate 
through phases of identity development over time:      
 
- Leader Identity Construction: the member serves in a leadership role (organizationally 
bestowed or informal) and the leadership claim is reciprocated with collective 
endorsement.  Characterized by positive identification with the social category “leader” 
within the organization and a strong self-image as a current and future leader. 
 
- Leader Identity Stagnation: the member fails to occupy a leadership role (or self-selects 
out of leadership roles) and puts leader development on hold.  Characterized by cynicism, 
neutral identification with the social category “leader” within the organization, and an 
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- Leader Identity Destruction: the member makes no leadership claims, or makes 
leadership claims that are not reciprocated by other organizational members.  
Characterized by cynicism, negative identification with the social category “leader” 
within the organization, and a disparaging attitude toward leadership and self-
development. 
  
 Viewed graphically, as in Figures 1.3-1.5 below, a member’s leader identity development 
can take many paths. 
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Figure 1.4: Proposed Phases of Leader Identity Development, Example B 
 
 
 Figure 1.5: Proposed Phases of Leader Identity Development, Example C 
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In the language of Spradley (1979, 1980), many researchers take it for granted that leader 
identity development is progressive.  Further, most Americans would likely assume that tax 
dollars are being dedicated to continuous upward development of their future Army officers.  It 
is surprising that this is not always the case, as in Examples A and B in the figures above.  Some 
of the nation’s brightest and most ambitious high school students matriculate to West Point to 
become great leaders, yet they stagnate.   
Junior cadet John Pritcher fits the model of Example A above.  He watched the second 
airplane strike the World Trade Center from a television in his 5
th
 grade classroom near Chicago, 
Illinois.  He wrestled in high school and volunteered for more than 100 hours of community 
service at a Boys and Girls Club: mostly because he enjoyed it, though he willingly admits that 
improving his college applications was a motivating factor.  With an average grade point, he 
studied diligently for the SAT.  A good score in his junior year helped earn him a spot at West 
Point’s Summer Seminar, a seven-day immersive experience into life as a cadet.  He remarked, 
“I remember vividly opening the seminar invitation, checking it out online, and deciding that 
night that I wanted to go.  My dad knew a bit about the service academies, and I could tell he 
was proud I’d been invited.  I know he also liked that it was free, but my parents have told me 
for years that they’d help pay for me to go to a good school.  My mom was more hesitant the 
way a lot of parents are, having watched the news for so many years after 9-11.”   
He shares many of the attributes common among cadets.  Drawn to the academy initially 
out of patriotism, practicality, and simple enthusiasm about the possibility of being an Army 
leader, it was his experiences with cadet leaders at the summer seminar that sealed his decision 
to attend West Point if admitted.  Pritcher said, “The cadets leading us through the week were 
really impressive to me.  Looking back, they didn’t really sugar-coat the West Point experience, 
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but I think I had it in my mind early on that I wanted to try this, so I downplayed some of what 
they shared with us.  There was one cadet squad leader who was pretty cynical, and I chose to 
ignore him.  Now that I think about it, that’s pretty funny, because I’m probably a lot like him 
now, three or four years later.”   
The initial shock and lifestyle change of cadet basic training was difficult for Pritcher, but 
he succeeded and maintained his optimism and positive attitude through his sophomore year.  He 
invested time and energy in his own development and leadership abilities.  He read professional 
books and sought leadership opportunities within his company and through external academic 
and military clubs.  In the summer between his junior and senior year his motivation began to 
wane.  A disgruntling experience with poor leadership planted the seeds of cynicism.  He showed 
up to his new academic year company and was not given a leadership position.  He withdrew 
from his outside activities and currently focuses on doing well in class.  He commented, “I see 
the value in most of my courses, and I’m motivated to do well academically so doors open for 
me in the future.  But no, I’m not interested in trying to lead now.  Self-development isn’t really 
a priority for me anymore… my friends feel the same way.”   This dissertation examines leader 
identity development in organizations, and the socially-influenced movement between phases of 
development. 
Leader identity is both an internal cognition, per the Baltes and Carstensen (1991) 
definition of identity as the union of an individual’s values, experiences, and self-construal, and a 
socially constructed cognition (DeRue & Ashford, 2010).  My ethnographic research supports 
that the phases of leader identity development can be driven by either of these concepts, as well 
as the social network surrounding an individual.    
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RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 Character and leadership identity development create uncertainty for many organizations.  
Snook (2004: 17) argues that institutions struggle with four primary questions in this regard: 
“Should we develop the characters of our students, volunteers, or employees?  Can we?  What 
should we teach?  And how should we teach it?”  Carved into granite at the academy and 
memorized by every cadet, the mission of West Point is: To educate, train, and inspire the Corps 
of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of 
Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the 
nation as an officer in the United States Army.  West Point exists, in part, as an affirmative 
answer to the first two of Snook’s questions.   
The creators of West Point, namely George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Henry Knox, 
and John Adams, sought to create an institution capable of providing a disciplined and competent 
officer corps that remained under civilian control.  Cadets would be citizen-soldiers, hailing from 
across the nation and selected by elected political representatives.  America had relied on the 
expertise of many foreign army officers during the Revolutionary War, particularly in the realms 
of artillery and engineering.  West Point would accrue and disseminate the nation’s expertise in 
these fields and supply the leadership necessary to command militia forces if needed, thus being 
an economical answer to many questions surrounding national defense (Ambrose, 1966).  
West Point still serves much the same purpose, though the education and leader 
development process have changed significantly since the academy’s founding in 1802.  
Entering cadets must still secure a nomination from a member of congress (with some 
exceptions) and acceptance from the academy’s Department of Admissions.  Graduates earn a 
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commission as a second lieutenant and a Bachelors of Science degree in any of 40 available 
academic majors.  All cadets complete a broad liberal arts education. 
 Currently, the United States Corps of Cadets (USCC, or the Corps) consists of 4,494 
young men and women from every U.S. state and territory.  More detailed demographic data can 
be seen in Tables 1.2 and 1.3.  West Point trains a maximum of 60 foreign exchange cadets 
(approximately 15 per year are admitted, with no more than three cadets from any one country 
allowed at a time) who complete the full four-year education period and return to the armies of 
their home countries.  This exchange relationship exists with 39 foreign countries.  The academy 
annually sends 35 to 45 cadets to foreign military academies for one semester of training, and an 
additional 65 to 75 cadets to overseas civilian universities or the other U.S. service academies 
(Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard).  A similar number of Navy midshipmen, Air Force cadets, 
and Coast Guard Cadets spend a semester at West Point.  
 
Table 1.2: Cadet Gender by Graduation Year 
 




                                                          
2 Tables 1.2 and 1.3 provided by USMA Institutional Research and Analysis Branch 
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The Corps is organized in a hierarchy for administrative and military training purposes.  
Figure 1.3 displays the structure of the Corps (also sometimes called a brigade), which consists 
of four regiments, each with nine companies.  Highlighted companies are those I surveyed in the 
first round of the network and leader identity study described in Chapter 3.   
 




 Figure 1.4 below displays the organization of each cadet company.  The highest ranking 
positions (commander, executive officer, first sergeant, and staff positions) are held by seniors.  
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Platoon sergeant, squad leader, and assistant staff positions are filled by juniors.  Sophomores fill 
the role of team leaders, while freshman are ‘members of squad’.   
 




Each class has its own historical nickname and Army rank.  Seniors are known as 
‘firsties’, from being first-class cadets, and serve as cadet officers.  Juniors are called ‘cows’, and 
act as cadet non-commissioned officers.  Sophomores are ‘yearlings’, or ‘yuks’, and have the 
rank of cadet corporals.  Freshmen are ‘plebes’, and cadet privates.  Juniors and seniors are 
responsible for training the under two classes during summer military training, and operate in a 
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military hierarchy throughout the school year.  A network diagram of a cadet company hierarchy 
reveals the split chain of authority and communication that also exists in the U.S. Army.  
Hierarchical levels at platoon and above have both an officer and a non-commissioned officer 
counterpart, resulting in this division.   
 
Figure 1.5:. Network Visualization of a Cadet Company Hierarchy 
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CHAPTER 2: ADDING TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF LEADER IDENTITY 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
“Eat up!  I need you sluggish out there today.  There’s no way 
we’re winning.”  -Cadet Kevin Perkins 
  
Perkins, the coach of his company intramural wrestling team, wants to lose.  Though not 
a fervent desire to lose, in examining his attitude and that of others seated around me at lunch in 
the cadet mess hall (cafeteria), it is a pervasive feeling nonetheless.  To this point in their athletic 
season they have competed effectively, and will likely earn a spot in the regimental playoffs.  
Winning means advancing toward the brigade championship and more afternoon competitions, 
while losing means an end to the season and a few additional afternoons of free time.  The cadets 
smile and speak of losing with humor.   
This attitude runs counter to the espoused values of the institution.  During their first 
summer of military training, every cadet memorizes Douglas MacArthur’s quote regarding the 
importance of athletics: “Upon the fields of friendly strife are sown the seeds that on other fields, 
on other days, will bear the fruits of victory.”  As a former Superintendent of West Point from 
1919-1922, MacArthur had this quote inscribed above the entrance to the gymnasium, and today 
it surrounds his statue in the cadet living area (Langford, 1991).  He emphasized the 
developmental strategy that is still practiced today, that of “every cadet an athlete,” in which all 
cadets must participate on a Division I college athletic team, a club sport, or an intramural 
athletic team.     
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MacArthur, and subsequent academy leaders after him, sought to create officers 
possessing mental and physical talents to win on future battlefields.  But here with Perkins and 
his team mates we see the attitude demonstrated by my opening quote in Chapter 1.  These 
cadets see a disconnection between their leader development training (forced participation in 
intramural athletics) and their future roles as Army officers, or perhaps their overall leader 
identity is simply low.  In the following section I will look more closely at leader development 
systems.    
  
A System of Leader Development 
 Returning to Snook’s (2004) discussion of organizational struggles with leadership and 
character identity development, I now address West Point’s attempts to answer the latter two 
questions: What should we teach, and how should we teach it?  In December of 2010, West 
Point’s superintendent, Lieutenant General David Huntoon, ordered a review of the academy’s 
leader development system.  Huntoon felt that the then current system, known as the Cadet 
Leader Development System (CLDS), merely explained the process by which the West Point 47-
month experience created leaders of character.  CLDS was developed and implemented by 
Lieutenant General Dave Palmer, superintendent from 1986-1991, and Colonel Howard Prince, 
head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, in order to “guide and integrate 
all developmental activities over the four-year cadet experience,” (Betros, 2012:66).    
Huntoon sought a system that could better help academy leadership make decisions about 
programs, curriculum, and any other developmental process that one would expect to take place 
in a university and military training program.  The desired end state was a revised CLDS that 
included a larger portion of the West Point community a facilitated implementation of the cadet 
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development system.  Huntoon hoped that the newly named West Point Leader Development 
System (WPLDS) could serve as a functional means of carrying out the West Point mission. 
The creators of WPLDS aligned it with the Army’s Leader Development Program 
(ALDP), which focuses on the integration of training, experience, and education through three 
domains: operational (an organizational position in a standard training and deploying Army 
unit), institutional (Army schools such as Command and General Staff College and the Army 
War College), and self-development.  
 
Figure 2.1: The Army’s Leader Development Model3 
 
                                                          
3 Department of the Army, 2012 Army Posture Statement.  Retrieved June 5, 2013 from 
https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2012/addenda/addenda_m.aspx  
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  Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22 (formerly Field Manual 6-22), 
titled “Army Leadership,” is a product of the Center for Army Leadership (CAL)4.  The 
document describes the role of leaders and the three levels of leadership (direct, organizational, 
and strategic), defines leader attributes (character, presence, and intellect), explains core 
competencies (leads, develops, and achieves), and differentiates the responsibilities of direct, 
organizational, and strategic leaders.         
 
Figure 2.2: The Army’s “Be, Know, Do” Leader Model 
 
 
Introduced in 1983, the Army’s Be, Know, Do system focused on the tactical level of 
leadership, and conveyed how individual organizational members could improve.
5
  Through the 
1990s, organizational leaders throughout the Army placed greater emphasis on the development 
                                                          
4 Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 (2012), Army Leadership, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department 
of the Army. 
5 Field Manual 22-100 (1983), Military Leadership, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army. 
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of training and doctrine in the operational and strategic levels of command (Purvis, 2011).  
Answering a call for greater scrutiny in strategic leader development following the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, researchers at the Army War College reviewed contemporary leadership 
literature and reformulated core competencies of strategic leaders.  Their six metacompetencies 
were: identity, mentality agility, cross-cultural savviness, interpersonal maturity, world-class 
warrior, and professional astuteness for the future Army (Wong, et al., 2003).   
As an organization, the Army continues to apply these concepts, as exemplified by the 
June, 2013 release of “ALDS: Army Leader Development Strategy 2013.”  Crafted by the 
Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Sergeant Major of the Army, 
ALDS highlights the Be, Know, Do framework as well as the Army Leader Development 
Model.
6
  The ALDS is coordinated and driven by seven imperatives (see Figure 2.3 below). 
 
Figure 2.3: The Seven Imperatives of the Army Leader Development Strategy 2013 
 
 
With WPLDS, academy leadership sought to move further beyond the Army’s leader 
development model and Be, Know, Do training structure by incorporating theoretical 
                                                          
6 ALDS: Army Leader Development Strategy 2013 (2013), Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the 
Army. 
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understandings of human learning and education models.  Kegan’s (1982, 1994) theories of 
identity development and Bloom’s (1956) taxonomy of educational objectives were key among 
academic works in this regard.  
Kegan (1982, 1994) proposes that human existence revolves around what he terms 
meaning-making, and that from infancy through adulthood we advance through stages of 
progressive changes in perspective and mental capacity.  These stages impact developmental 
domains, including that of learning.  Developmental stages build upon each other, with the 
individual developing increasingly complex cognitive structures when confronted by an external 
environment too complex for current capabilities.   
Drawing primarily on the works of Maslow (1954), Kohlberg (1976), and Piaget (1972), 
Kegan’s (1982) developmental model comprises six stages.  Incorporative (stage 0) and 
impulsive (stage 1) are generally completed through infancy and early adolescence.  Most 
individuals attain the imperial stage (stage 2) by around age 12, but some adults never depart this 
level of development.  Stage 2 is characterized by self-interest; individuals can understand the 
perspectives of others, but focus on what others can do for the self.   
Subordinate cadets in stage 2 of development will desire a leader who appears to be 
solely concerned with satisfying the individual needs of their sub-organizational members, even 
at the cost of the larger parent organization.  Sophomore cadet Dan Wittaker exemplifies this 
attitude in saying, “[My platoon leader] is great.  He doesn’t volunteer us for anything, and he 
doesn’t make us send up weekly reports.  Things are just really chill, nobody bothers me, and I 
don’t have to waste much time working with my plebe [the cadet Wittaker is assigned to lead].”  
Perhaps Wittaker’s platoon leader is still in stage 2 as well.   
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The interpersonal stage of development (stage 3) is characterized by a focus on 
interpersonal relationships.  College-age adults in stage 3 are concerned with their reputations 
and being recognized for their individual characteristics and skills.  Stage 4 (called the 
institutional stage) is typified by self-authorship and strong identity development.  The identity 
becomes focused around values and principles that can dictate action in the absence of a social 
group.  Cadets in the institutional stage are self-motivated to achieve both their own goals and 
those of their embedded organization.    
 





When asked about self-development opportunities, sophomore cadet Brittany Stephens 
said, “I volunteered to help run the Hudson Valley Special Olympics, and most people thought 
that was cool, but others told me I was being a tool and they’d end up being voluntold [forced to 
                                                          
7 Huntoon, D., B. Keith, et al., Building Capacity to Lead. United States Military Academy   
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volunteer] to help.”   In speaking further with Stephens it was apparent that she had reached the 
institutional stage, and was seeking opportunities to enhance her identity as a leader of character.  
Some of her less developed peers felt threatened by her acts of self-authorship, and worried that 
her achievement might diminish their own reputations (typical of stage 3) or eventually create 
more work for them (a fear for the self-interested stage 2 individual).  
Kegan (1994) proposes that few college-age adults will reach stage 4, and that many 
adults will never progress that far.  Lewis, et al. (2005: 360) write that progression to stage 4 “is 
critical to the growth of autonomous professionals, professionals of the sort capable of exercising 
sounds judgment in the face of the complex, ambiguous, and rapidly changing situations that 
increasingly characterize modern work life.”  As an institution, West Point clearly desires to 
graduate officers who possess such abilities.   
 
Ethnographic Methods 
 The ethnographic research for this dissertation took place over a four year period (April 
2009 through May 2013), with the majority of examination coming through unstructured and 
semistructured interviews from September 2011 through May 2013.  All interview participation 
was voluntary, and informants were not incentivized monetarily.   
 Drawing on Dohrenwend and Richardson (1965) and Gorden (1987), Bernard (2011) 
describes a continuum of interview situations delineated by the interviewer’s desired amount of 
control over a subject’s responses.  Informal interviewing, the least structured, typically involves 
daily interaction with subjects and nearly continuous development of field notes.  While I did not 
commit to executing informal interviews, since May of 2010 I have served a number of roles at 
the academy (instructor, athletic team officer representative, platoon mentor, etc.) that have 
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given me access to, and greater understanding of, cadets, faculty, and administrators.  I do not 
claim to have undertaken three years of strict field research, but I do assert to have a sound 
understanding of the institution.   
Some may view my formal association with West Point as problematic for conducting 
research, and I acknowledge the potential for a variety of biases.  The most likely of these is the 
deference effect when interviewing cadets: subjects telling me what they think I want to hear in 
order to avoid offending me as an instructor and Army officer, or to avoid offending others at the 
academy assuming they would see my research (Bernard, 2011).  I took precautions to mitigate 
the potential of the deference effect: assuring anonymity, interviewing cadets in informal settings 
such as family-style meals in the mess hall, etc.  I have sought to remain objective throughout 
my writing. 
 Unstructured interviews are framed around a plan, but exert little influence over a 
subject’s response to questions.  They typically consume much time, and are designed to allow 
people to, “express themselves in their own terms, and at their own pace,” (Bernard, 2011: 157).  
I conducted 98 interviews in total, the majority being unstructured.  Table 2.1 details the 
interviews by type and subject.  A semistructured interview maintains much of the informality of 
the unstructured interview, but is framed around a series of topics or questions.  Lastly, 
structured interviews ask subjects a strict set of formal questions (Bernard, 2011).  Interviews 
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Table 2.1: Interviews by Subject and Type 
Subject\Interview Unstructured Semi-Structured Structured Total 
Freshman Cadet 8 3 2 13 
Sophomore Cadet 8 4 4 16 
Junior Cadet 14 6 5 25 
Senior Cadet 14 9 7 30 
Administrator 4 5 0 9 
Faculty Member 2 3 0 5 
Total 50 30 18 98 
 
 
The Role of Identity in Leader Development 
 Though focusing on the acquisition of leadership skills, Lord and Hall (2005) take an 
interesting approach by addressing leader identity, and its profound impact on leader 
development.  While traditional accounts of leadership have focused on traits (which most 
researchers treat as being relatively stable over time) or behaviors (implying that leader 
development experiences can be of short duration and focused on mimicking learned behavioral 
styles), more recent leadership research calls for a more intricate combination of social, 
psychological, and intellectual development across varying times (Day & Halpin, 2004).  While 
much of this can potentially be provided for by an organization, it may be incumbent on an 
individual to take action toward leader development (Chan & Dasgrow, 2001).  Hence, to 
maintain a concentrated pursuit of building leadership skills and ability, members may require a 
strong leader self-identity.   
Lord and Hall (2005: 592) write that a leader’s self-identity is critical because it, “(a) 
provides an important structure around which relevant knowledge can be organized; (b) is a 
source of motivational and directional forces that determine the extent to which the leader 
voluntarily puts himself or herself in developmental situations; and (c) may provide access to 
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personal material (i.e., stories, core values, etc.) that can be used to understand and motivate 
subordinates.”  Leader development models must move beyond a focus on surface skills, and 
consider the principles and ethics required of truly effective leaders, even if such characteristics 
may take months or years to develop.   
West Point, like many institutions, acknowledges the roles of identity and self-
development in creating leaders.  The WPLDS handbook, Building Capacity to Lead, states,  
“To prepare commissioned leaders of character for our Nation, we must not only educate and 
train cadets in relevant professional knowledge and skills; we must also facilitate the 
development of their identity as mature, professional adults… Our theory of leader development 
incorporates the BE component into this framework—how we help cadets develop a professional 
identity while simultaneously acquiring professional knowledge and skills,” (Huntoon, et al., 
2012: 15). 
Some of the leader development methodology in practice at West Point appears to fit this 
theoretical framework for leadership skill and expertise development, though clearly there are 
imperfections, as exemplified by Cadet Perkins and some of his teammates sitting with me at 
lunch.  Lord and Hall (2005) propose that surface skills are first acquired via experience and 
observation.  Individuals eventually develop advanced systems to direct their learning and social 
awareness.  These form in concert with a growing leader identity that becomes crucial to the 
member’s self-definition.  This identity, while originally focused on the individual, swings 
toward a more collective interpretation.  Leader development is similar to a maturing process 
where knowledge of the self and one’s social surroundings merge with a strong leader 
identification (Munusamy, et al., 2010).   
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While I agree that this concept of maturing toward a stronger leader identity is largely 
accurate, I argue that the progression is not continually, or in many cases even consistently, 
upward.  Senior Trevor Sikorski said, “I think a lot of times academics, extracurricular activities, 
and our personal lives force us to put leadership development on hold.  I am not saying this is 
right or wrong but it does happen.”  
Some cadets do feel that their development at the academy has been consistently positive.  
Senior Wayne Cook commented, “There are always chances to use leadership styles and test 
your leadership development both professionally and socially.  I'm trying to practice leading by 
example and retaining as much knowledge from officers, NCOs, cadets and other leaders I 
interact with and observe every day.  You need to practice and test leadership styles here at the 
academy while using what you learn from other leaders around you: both good and bad 
leadership styles.”    
Similarly, senior Amanda Person said, “Although at times bad things happened when I 
was either a follower or a leader, I found that I learned something from every event after I 
reflected on it weeks, months, or years later.  I believe there should never be an event that causes 
you to not want to be a leader.  The challenges are out there to make stronger leaders.”   
Organizations vary in their processes of shaping member identity.  Investiture processes 
draw on the existing identities of new members and reinforce them, while divestiture processes 
displace the entering identity with a new organizational identity (Van Maanen, 1978).  A 
stereotypical understanding of the military’s initial entry training, or basic training, is drill 
sergeants in round hats yelling at new recruits in a process designed to break them down and 
then build them back in the image of a soldier, marine, etc.  Changes to initial entry training over 
  41 
  
the past decade negate some such typecasts, though the process can still be described as one of 
divestiture.   
Van Maanen and Schein (1979: 64) define divestiture as processes of socialization that, 
“seek to deny and strip away certain personal characteristics of a recruit.”  They focus on 
organizations that subject new members to harassment, separate them from prior social 
connections, and put them in menial positions.  Such treatment limits the impact of a new 
member’s entering identity while seeking to impart ideals and behaviors desired by the parent 
organization.  Optimally, the rebuilding of the identity leads new members toward a greater 
understanding of themselves and of previously unrecognized capabilities (Van Maanen & 
Schein, 1979). 
When voluntarily undergone, as is the case at West Point under the All Volunteer Force 
(AVF), such a divestiture process functions to bond the individual to the institution.  The success 
of such a process may hinge on the recruit’s desire to be accepted into the organization as a full 
member.  Turow (1977) describes this in a study of first year students at elite schools of law.  
This can be seen at West Point, when following the initial six weeks of Cadet Basic Training, 
cadet candidates are welcomed into the Corps at Acceptance Day.  During a formal parade, the 
new class of cadets stands before the upper three classes and marches into them, joining their 
respective companies.  The individual is henceforth known as “Cadet,” rather than the more 
derogatory “New Cadet.”  This ceremony takes place before friends and family, demonstrating 
their new identities to loved ones.   
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Having completed their initial summer training, the freshman class 
is publically welcomed into the organization before friends and 
family.  During the Acceptance Day Parade they ceremonially join 
the ranks of their companies by marching into the upper three 
classes and joining them on the parade field.  The entire Corps then 




After the ceremony the new class is released to spend time with these connections to their 
old identity, though they must remain in uniform and close to West Point, again bridging the gap 
between their old and new identities.  Sophomore cadet Mark Buit remarked, “Acceptance Day 
was the first time I’d seen my family in six weeks.  I was proud to show them I had made it that 
far, but it was also awkward, because they didn’t really understand this new world I now 
                                                          
8 Photograph courtesy of westpoint.org.  Retrieved May 29, 2013 from http://www.west-
point.org/family/mem2011/pages/aday/index.html.     
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belonged to.  Their questions seemed silly because they weren’t familiar with all these new 
aspects of my life.”   
Buit’s comments echo those of many other cadets who come to West Point from families 
with little or no military experience.  Some cadets do have a parent or close relative familiar with 
the academy and the Army, and for them the transformation of identity is less extreme.  Their 
pre-institutional identity differs less from the organizational identity, and thus the divestiture 
process is less traumatic.  This doesn’t necessarily make the experience less difficult, however.  
Freshman Cadet Paul Cooper, who struggles with the decision to remain at West Point or not, 
said, “My mom was in one of the first classes of women.  She went through hell to make it 
through this place.  It’s just assumed that I’ll make it: that I have it easy compared to them.”  The 
expectations of Cooper’s support network are greater (both of his parents are West Point 
graduates and career Army officers), and he struggles to live up to these prospects.  
Though now made full members of the organization, Acceptance Day does not mark the 
conclusion of the divestiture process for freshman cadets.  Plebe year has just begun, and what 
lays ahead is two semesters of academics coupled with military development, social restrictions, 
plebe duties (memorization of newspaper articles, delivery of mail and laundry, etc.), and other 
measures designed to restrict free time and develop teamwork, discipline, communication, and 
other skills desired in military leaders.  Cadet Candidates are now Cadets, but the initial 
socialization process is not complete.   
  In addition to learning the policies, procedures, and nuances of organizational life, 
newcomers are highly concerned with developing a self-definition through symbolic interaction 
(Ashforth, 1985).  Here, symbolic interaction involves a member applying meaning to both 
verbal and nonverbal exchanges with others or elements of the organization, such as 
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advertisements.  Van Maanen (1979) proposed that self-conceptions are created through 
interpretations of social interactions.  Members attribute socially constructed descriptions to 
themselves and to those around them: motivated, career-oriented, etc.  Cadets certainly do this, 
and have developed their own lexicon to categorize individuals: tool, slug, get-over, bro, good 
dude, etc.  I discuss this further in Chapter 3.     
The creation of these initial self-images can be critical to future leader identity 
development.  Sophomore cadet Blake Ebbins stated, “My first chain of command was pretty 
terrible.  I’m not just saying that because the first three weeks here are rough.  Looking back at 
some of their actions and laziness, I really think they just didn’t put much effort into leading us 
and showing us how to be great.  It took me a long time to get my head up and realize that I 
didn’t have to be like them, that I could be a great cadet, and that I should look forward to 
leading soldiers.”   
Conversely, junior cadet Rashad Brown had strong initial entry leadership that helped 
him overcome future disappointments: “My basic training cadre was tough, yet really 
compassionate.  They showed us what right looks like.  To this day I think back to two of them 
in particular.  I’ve had bad leaders since, and I can just look at these new guys and tell myself to 
focus on how I’ll be better.  I go back to those first two leaders, and I aspire to emulate them.  
That motivates me to be better.” 
  While it does not appear to be a major impediment to leader development, many cadets 
seem disillusioned by a forced distribution military grading system.  Junior cadet Marvin 
Simmons remarked, “I’ve seen many cadets just give up out of frustration.  I think it happens a 
lot as a squad leader, when sometimes you work really hard and still end up with a C because 
your peers are just better and the platoon leader, commander, and tactical officer can only give 
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out so many As and Bs.  Or worse, you work hard and get a C because the other squad leaders 
are buddies with the firsties.  After that you just want to quit.”  Tactical officers are active duty 
captains and majors who formally command cadet companies.  There are parallels here to Van 
Maanen and Schein’s (1979) description of an organization that socializes middle managers to 
continually strive for ascension toward a limited number of upper management positions.   
Though arguably there is no better solution, this type of culture often leads to 
disillusionment, discontent, and high employee turnover.  The military has dealt with high 
turnover rates in the past, as manning cycles tend to be cyclical.  Turnover is less of a concern 
than it was even just five years ago, as the Army is currently facing budget restrictions and 
congressional mandates to downsize, but failing to address organizational policies toward 
retention and the needs of leaders can have negative consequences in later years.  In Chapter 5 I 
discuss leader identity and turnover at greater length. 
 
Proposed Phases of Leader Identity Development 
 I propose that identity development is not a continual upward progression.  DeRue and 
Ashford (2010) hint at this through the concept of failed identity construction due to an 
unreinforced claim or grant on a leader or follower identity.  Weinreich and Saunderson’s (2003) 
concept of contra-identification similarly relates, but in neither instance does the group member 
consciously opt out of leader development.  Analysis of interviews conducted through 
ethnographic research reveals some common themes.  I propose the concept that organizational 
members move through phases of identity development over time, namely:      
 
- Leader Identity Construction: the member serves in a leadership role (organizationally 
bestowed or informal) and the leadership claim is reciprocated with collective 
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endorsement.  Characterized by positive identification with the social category “leader” 
within the organization and a strong self-image as a current and future leader. 
 
- Leader Identity Stagnation: the member fails to occupy a leadership role (or self-selects 
out of leadership roles) and puts leader development on hold.  Characterized by cynicism, 
neutral identification with the social category “leader” within the organization, and an 
impartial attitude toward leadership and self-development. 
 
- Leader Identity Destruction: the member makes no leadership claims, or makes 
leadership claims that are not reciprocated by other organizational members.  
Characterized by cynicism, negative identification with the social category “leader” 
within the organization, and a disparaging attitude toward leadership and self-
development. 
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In the model that I propose, each individual’s leader identity development can take a 
different path over varied durations.  Figure 2.6 above is merely a representation of one 
individual’s potential leader identity development progression, such as Pritcher’s movement 
from initial motivation to be a great leader, to negative experiences which drove him toward 
cynicism and leader identity destruction.  Figures 1.3-1.5 in Chapter 1 show other potential paths 
of leader identity development.  In the following three sections I’ll provide background and 
supporting ethnographic research regarding members in the three stages of leader identity 
development. 
 
Leader Identity Construction 
   While I’ve found cynicism toward the parent organization to be pervasive, there are 
certainly members who fit the mold of what might be desired by the academy’s institutional 
leadership.  Junior Alex Harrel, a catcher on the Division I baseball team, displays behavior 
representative of this phase: “I am always striving to be the best person and leader I can be.  I 
work hard in the classroom and on the baseball field.  While I am not always focused on my 
military development, academics and sports help me become a more developed leader.  These 
people and thinking skills will fold over on my career as an officer.”   
 A theme that emerges among those cadets whom I’d classify as being in this construction 
phase is an overlap of positive identities.  A key element of social identity theory, as discussed 
earlier, is the existence of multiple self-identities within an individual (Turner, 1987; Reicher, 
1982).  The selection of a particular self-identity is context dependent.  Cadets undergoing leader 
identity construction have multiple identities as do cadets in other phases, but the identities of 
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those in construction tend to all involve either an affirmative attitude toward the organization or 
leadership in general.   
When asked, “Do you view yourself differently, or do you take on a different identity, 
when acting in a leadership role versus taking part in other activities?” Cadet Harrel responded, 
“Yes, I am a different person on the baseball field than in the barracks.  While I try to be a leader 
in both areas, I am more committed on the baseball field and I act differently.  I am more blunt 
and intense on the baseball field.”  Whether he is drawing on his self-identity as a formally 
appointed leader within the Corps of Cadets, or as a member of the Army baseball team, Harrell 
views himself as a leader.  Interestingly, he alters his approach to leadership, but self-identifies 
as a leader in either context.    
The parent organization thus benefits from recruiting practices that favor leadership in 
high school and civilian life: Eagle Scouts, Girls State or Boys State participation, captains of 
athletic teams, club leadership positions, etc.  Munusamy, et al. (2010: 150) find this to be true as 
well, stating, “For people whose social identity already comprises aspects of leading others, 
being a role model and being respected, the integration with a leader identity can be relatively 
smooth.”  They cite the example of high status or privileged classes in the United Kingdom often 
viewing leadership and service to others as part of their social identity, and therefore more easily 
merge this identity with a professional leadership role than do members of other classes.    
 The West Point admissions office weights participation in leadership activities through 
evaluation scales.  Applicants are ranked by their Whole Candidate Score (WCS), which is based 
on 10% physical aptitude, 30% leadership potential, and 60% academic capacity (McDonald, 
2012).  Leadership potential is calculated through the Community Leadership Score (CLS).  The 
CLS has three components: faculty appraisal by high school officials (evaluations from math, 
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science, and English teachers who rate characteristics on a 1 to 5 scale), athletic leadership (with 
All-Americans and multiple team captaincies rated at the top and no athletic participation at the 
bottom), and extracurricular leadership (with multiple top positions such as student body 
president and Eagle Scout rated at the top and no extracurricular participation a the bottom).  An 
academy admissions officer said, “Clearly we value demonstrated leadership prior to admission, 
and statistics have shown that these entrants have higher graduation rates and tend to remain in 
the Army at higher percentages than those with minimal early leadership experiences.”  
In their reformulation of social identity theory for the Academy of Management, 
Ashforth and Mael (1989: 35) propose that the feeling of belongingness to a group encourages 
organizational members to “engage in, and derive satisfaction from, activities congruent with the 
identity, to view himself or herself as an exemplar of the group, and to reinforce factors 
conventionally associated with group formation (e.g., cohesion, interaction).”  This is 
representative of the leader identity construction stage I propose.  But what of those members 
who only partially identify with the organization, and perhaps even reject the exemplar? 
 
Leader Identity Stagnation 
 I asked senior cadet Adam Lockard to describe his state of preparedness for entering the 
Army as a lieutenant, which at the time of interview was nine months away.  He responded in 
part, “I’ll be ready when it’s time to lead.  I still have BOLC [the Basic Officer Leadership 
Course] to really learn the skills of an engineer officer.  Right now I just want to get through my 
classes and really enjoy my time with my friends.”  Lockard’s general attitude toward West Point 
is not negative, and he seems to enjoy most of his time during his final year, but he is not 
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investing in his own leader development.  His attitude and actions conform to the proposed 
leader identity stagnation stage of development.     
Some interviewed cadets who wish to succeed in an endeavor but anticipate failure (even 
partial) revert to a performance of cynicism in defense of their self-image.  Thus, the college 
student who wants to earn a 4.0 but fears falling short, will project the image of not caring, and 
may in fact put in less effort and earn poor grades in order to maintain this image, rather than 
perform to his fullest potential and earn something less than perfect.  These students “use this 
cynicism as a means of insulating their inner selves,” (Goffman, 1959: 20).  Such beliefs, I find, 
to be captured in leader identity stagnation as a stage of identity formation.  This can be seen in 
Paul Cooper, the struggling freshman with dual-graduate parents.  Rather than admit that he is 
giving his full effort and only marginally succeeding, he provides a list of complaints as to why 
“West Point just isn’t for me.” 
 Leader identity stagnation clearly runs counter to the institution’s desired developmental 
state.  The WPLDS handbook even states, “Cadets take ownership of their own and others’ 
development to maximize growth, achieve desired outcomes and embrace their future roles as 
commissioned officers,” (Huntoon, 2012: 11).  Cadets such as Lockard are not overly cynical or 
negative toward the institution to the point that their leader development is reversed, but they 
also fail to invest in their growth and that of others.   
 Some interviewed cadets appear to have stagnated from moderate disappointment with 
the institution.  Junior cadet Brett Duval said, “In my experience everyone I’ve interacted with 
around here is honorable.  That’s something I really love about the academy, and I think the 
honor code is a good thing overall, but one of my friends knew about another cadet having a fake 
ID, and he didn’t turn the guy in, and now my friend is up for an honor board.”  While Duval is 
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not in a destructive mindset, he is disappointed with the implementation of organizational policy, 
and the disillusionment has spread into multiple aspects of his life.  The cadet honor code, which 
simply states, “A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those who do,” requires cadets to 
monitor each other for infractions of the code.  This non-toleration clause, as it is known, makes 
cadets not just responsible for their own integrity, but the integrity of anyone in their cadet 
network.       
 Returning to Kegan’s (1982, 1994) constructive-developmental theory of the self, 
cognitive development is unlikely to occur if individuals are not challenged by increasingly 
complex environments.  A cadet in leader identity stagnation often self-selects out of such 
environments, and hinders her own progression toward a higher stage of understanding and 
capacity.  Those cadets occupying Stage 2 are particularly vulnerable to stagnation, and perhaps 
even destruction, as their cognitive focus is self-centered and hinges on their own needs and 
desires.   
 
Leader Identity Destruction 
Cynicism toward the parent organization and the work required of cadets is a consistent 
theme in my interview notes.  Junior cadet Hugh Wagner said, “I think this place is ridiculous.  I 
came here to play lacrosse.  For awhile I was excited about being a lieutenant, but I guess I don’t 
really care about being a leader… When other cadets tell me to do something I tell them to go 
away.  When an instructor or TAC tells me to do something I do just enough to get by.”  The 
level of distaste with the organization demonstrated by Wagner is uncommon.  Most cadets 
express some level of negativity toward facets of the organization or the structure of their 
condition, but few are as cynical as Wagner.   
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Goffman (1959) describes the cynic and a disbelief-to-belief cycle through the example 
of medical students losing their initial naiveté upon facing the mental onslaught of requirements, 
only to be regained later in their careers.  Interviews with cadets reveal a similar pattern of 
experience.  Teenagers holding a post-September 11
th
, 2001, fanciful image of military service 
are quickly faced with the reality of unexpectedly high discipline, perceived or actual unfair 
treatment, and significant mental, physical, and emotional stress.  Upon completion of entry 
training, a return to initial optimism is approached, though rarely met.  This process may explain 
the ambivalent feelings that many veterans hold about their service, or when they watch a 
recruiting commercial: sincerity and cynicism.  There is genuine pride for having served in a job 
that many consider relevant and worthy, yet cynicism in recognition that military service does 
not consist of constant freedom fighting, helicopter flying, and high-tech computer training, all 
conducted with triumphant background music.   
I recognize that attributing failure purely to a display of cynicism is an 
oversimplification, and cadets have multiple and disparate reasons for the lack of success in 
areas of evaluation.  In an interview with Paul Cooper I confronted him with the concept of using 
cynicism in protection of his self image.  He remarked, “I suppose some of my attitude could be 
attributed to a need to project a certain image.  It’s true that I don’t want my peers to think I’m 
working every waking hour to succeed, and yet still fail.  But much of my cynicism is pretty 
genuine.  I have a few terrible leaders, and because of them, I’m bitter about being here.  It’s just 
that simple.”   
Returning to the leadership and self-identity work of Lord and Brown (2004), the 
working self-concept (WSC) and its three components (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1) contribute to 
my understanding of leader identity development.  Senior organizational leaders and subordinate 
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employees may differ in their present and future time distinction, particularly in a training 
environment such as West Point.  Academy leaders see the benefit of rigorous and time-
consuming behaviors designed to instill discipline, values, and the characteristics desired in 
Army officers.  This distal motivation can conflict with the proximal motivation of cadets.  
Junior cadet Aaron Watkins said, “I get that my end state is to be an outstanding leader, and that 
to be outstanding I need to be focused, and have gone through a lot of training and undergrad 
coursework.  But sometimes I just want a break.  I want to sleep in, and have more freedom.  I 
don’t get how some things around here are supposed to make me a better leader.” 
From my interviews and general familiarity with cadets, I believe that the vast majority 
of them desire to be great officers.  In the language of the WSC, they see the connection between 
their self-views and their possible selves.  Cynicism and even leader identity destruction revolves 
around disagreement with current goals.  In order to achieve the possible self, cadets and the 
West Point Leader Development System differ on the implementation of current goals for 
achieving proximal and distal motivation.  Without these motivations the cadet languishes, self-
development falters, and the leader identity withers.   
When the components of the WSC are in alignment, leader identity construction can 
occur.  Senior cadet Dan Miller remarked, “I’m on board with the lifestyle here.  I like it.  I 
thrive in it.  I don’t always enjoy the regimen, and sometimes I don’t feel like going to an 
evening lecture or changing uniforms six times a day so I can get to boxing and back to class and 
then to dinner and what not.  But I know it’s making me stronger, and so I just do it with a smile.  
I want to succeed in the Army, and I think this lifestyle is preparing me to do that.” 
 Becker and Carper (1956) conduct an interesting study of physiology graduate students, 
many of whom entered the program with the intent of moving on to medical school.  Through 
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interaction with professors, engagement in the field, and other social experiences associated with 
schooling, many students developed self-identities of physiologists.  My conceptions of leader 
identity stagnation and destruction are important additions to identity development, as I believe 
that the creation of self-definition is not as straightforward as Becker and Carper (1956) would 
propose.  Simply being immersed in a professional culture is not sufficient for members to self-
identify with the characteristics of that profession or organization.  In the case of destruction, it 
can lead to disengagement with the organization and its espoused values and beliefs.   
 
Initial Surveys and Network Approaches to Understanding Leader Identity Development 
I examine leadership and identity survey results, leadership, trust, and friendship 
associations, as well as prescribed networks mandated by the organization’s command structure 
(the formal chain of command).  Statistical and social network analysis models help identify the 
impact of these associations on variables associated with leader identity development.      
 
Pilot Studies 
 Statistical and network analysis is conducted using Stata 12.0 and Organizational Risk 
Analyzer (ORA) NetScenes 3.0.0.2 software.  I chose ORA for conducting network analysis 




Pilot Study 1 
In the pilot study, I tested two modified organizational identity scales and developed an 
Army Values scale.  Two waves of data were collected from September to December, 2011.  
                                                          
9 ORA is a free statistical package from Carnegie Mellon University’s Center for the Computational Analysis of 
Social and Organizational Systems, available at: http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/index.php  
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Organizational identity scales were reworded to capture cadets’ attitudes towards their own 
company organization. 
The target population for the study was 132 college students within a single cadet 
company.  The unit received the same paper survey two separate times over the course of the 
semester with a participation rate of 100%.  Demographic questions included gender, ethnicity, 
class year, and academic major.  Social network items asked participants to list their friends and 
most respected leaders in the organization in order to map network structure for each unit.  In 
addition, a supervisorial network was constructed using the participant’s self reported level of 
authority within their own unit.   
The age of the participants ranged from 18-26 years with 27% (n = 36) freshmen, 27% (n 
= 35) sophomores, 26% (n = 34) juniors, and 20% (n = 27) seniors.  Factor analysis showed that 
there were eight factors from the organizational identity questions, three of which were relatively 
strong (Table 2.2).  The goal of this factor analysis was to ensure that the scales were meaningful 
for our population.  Factor 1 included five of the six items from Edwards and Peccei’s (2007) 
scale (questions 7-12) plus one of the two newly created questions (question #14).  I call this new 
scale Organizational Identity-Self (or OI-Self).  Factor 2 included three of the six items in Mael 
and Ashforth’s (1992) scale.  Questions #3 and #5 loaded slightly more heavily on factor 1, but 
were still related to factor 2.  Factor 3 included questions #4 and #13, and were later included in 
this scale.  I call this new scale OI-Integration.  These scales are quite distinct, and were 
therefore reworded so that the Mael and Ashworth’s scale focused on West Point identity while 
the second asked about Army identity. 
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  Factor 
2  
  Factor 
3  
Mael and Ashworth’s scale (1992) 
1. When someone praises Company X, it feels like a personal compliment. 0.38 0.60 0.17 
2. When someone criticizes Company X, it feels like a personal insult. 0.35 0.67 0.17 
3. I am very interested in what others think about Company X. 0.51 0.40 0.28 
4. When I talk about Company X, I usually say "we" rather than "they". 0.26 0.19 0.63 
5. Company X's successes are my successes. 0.43 0.39 0.43 
6. If a story in the media criticized Company X, I would feel embarrassed. 0.24 0.49 0.38 
Edwards and Peccei’s scale (2007) 
7. My membership in Company X is a big part of who I am. 0.49 0.51 0.17 
8. I consider myself a Company X person. 0.61 0.30 0.21 
9. What Company X stands for is important to me. 0.79 0.23 0.33 
10. I share the goals and values of Company X. 0.70 0.23 0.33 
11. Being a Company X is important to me. 0.85 0.31 0.15 
12. I feel strong ties with Company X. 0.56 0.45 0.26 
USMA identity scale 
13. I am aware that I represent Company X when I make decisions. 0.46 0.19 0.63 
14. If I had an ethical dilemma, I would always consider the values of 
Company X. 
0.54 0.19 0.38 
 
Further analysis was conducted to explore whether the OI scales are associated with 
demographics, attitudes, and sociometric items.  In a cross-sectional analysis at wave 1, OI-Self 
is associated with liking the company, having attended the West Point prepatory school (a one 
year program focused on mathematics and English skills for cadet-candidates hoping to gain 
admission to West Point), and high friend degree centrality.  Looking at OI-Self longitudinally, 
friend degree becomes non-significant and those who attended prepatory school are more likely 
to have negative OI after controlling for OI at time 1.  Liking the company is consistently linked 
with OI-Self, while degree and prepatory school history seems to be related to OI, but the 
relationship may change over time. 
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Table 2.3: Linear Regression of Organization Identification-Self on 











OI-Integration is associated with liking the company, high betweeness centrality, and low 
degree centrality.  After controlling for Organizational Identity at time 1, OI-Self is associated 
with not liking the company, being male, having no prior college, and low degree centrality.  
Unlike OI-Self, strong OI-Integration corresponds to low degree and high betweeness.  These 
individuals, while not necessarily popular, hold key positions in bridging the network.  Those 
high in betweeness centrality can be viewed in Figure 2.7.  
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In Figure 2.7, nodes are sized by OI-Self such that larger nodes 
indicate higher organizational identitification (OI).  Friendship ties 
are bidirectional. Nodes are colored by class year to show the 
general structure of cadet companies, where freshman (dark blue) 
are isolated from other classes, and juniors (green) generally link 
sophomores (light blue) and seniors (yellow).  Individuals who are 
bridges between groups tend to have higher OI.  This makes sense, 
as members who identify with the company are more likely to be 
friends with other company members.  This is not always the case, 
as someone such as node 118 may identify strongly with the 
company but have few friends.  This could be a good example of a 
‘tool’, which I discuss further in Chapter 3. 
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Table 2.4: Linear Regression of Organization Identification-Integration on 
Demographics, Attitudes, and Network Indices 
 
 
Changes over time show inconsistent effects, where those liking the company go from 
having higher OI to lower OI-Integration.  Data collected in the primary survey (described in 
Chapter 3) helps clarify these relationships.  
In the next scale, I attempted to capture one’s beliefs in the seven Army values (Mackey, 
2008): 
1. Loyalty - Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and 
other Soldiers. 
 
2. Duty - Fulfill your obligations. 
3. Respect - Treat people as they should be treated. 
4. Selfless Service - Put the welfare of the Nation, the Army, and your subordinates before 
your own.  
 
5. Honor - Live up to the Army Values. 
6. Integrity - Do what is right, legally and morally. 
7. Personal Courage - Face fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral). 
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The Army Values scale includes two questions per Army value.  While this study focuses 
on West Point cadets, the seven Army values are taught to all organizational members and held 
in regard as essential characteristics of a soldier.  In concert with social identity theory (Turner, 
1987; Reicher, 1982), the extent to which a person takes ownership of and internalizes the seven 
Army values is hypothesized to be associated with social leadership.  Followers are more likely 
to view someone embodying prototypical leader behaviors (such as the Army values) as an 
organizational leader.  Items loaded consistently on three factors.  Loadings at .40 and above are 
shown below in Table 2.5.  Questions 3, 7, 12, and 13 did not load on any factors and I will 
remove them from the main study survey.  All of the Army values are addressed by at least one 
question.  The final scale is a 10-item scale.  
The Cynicism scale captures the level of pessimism towards the West Point institution 
and experience.  The Organization Identity scales will measure how much participants identify 
with West Point and the U.S. Army. The Army Values scale measures the extent to which 
individuals have adopted and internalized the seven Army values.  






Pilot Study 2 
I received West Point IRB approval on January 11, 2012.  I delivered consent forms to 
cadet companies during lunch formation from January 15 through February 30, 2012.  I 
explained the study to each company individually while a research assistant passed out 
informed consent forms and collected signed consents.  To follow-up with non-consenting 
cadets, an email was sent out one week later with an option to return consents with a digital 
signature.  I obtained access to ten cadet organizational units (n = 1321).  Of 1321 targeted 
cadets, 59% agreed to participate in the study.  Cadet companies with participation rates lower 
than 50% were dropped from the pilot study (two companies).  The remaining eight companies 
include 717 cadets representing 68% of the target population of 1055 students.  Of the eight 
Table 2.5: Factor Analysis of Army Values Scale 
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companies, two have participation rates over 80%, two with rates between 70-80%, two 
between 60-70%, and two around 50%.   
Social network items included a roster that corresponds to the cadets in each company.  A 
5-item scale measured a person’s perceptions of their own leadership instincts, including 
questions, “I believe I can contribute more to a group if I am a follower rather than a leader” 
and “I am definitely not a leader by nature.”  Response options are on a 5-point scale ranging 
from ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly Disagree’. This scale was modified from an original 9-item 
scale by Chan and Drasgow (2001). 
Moving forward, the data for this dissertation focuses on eight companies.  
Approximately 78% of the cadets are still in their same companies as during the pilot studies, 
accounting for the departure of graduating seniors.  The primary study also includes the 
incoming freshman class.  
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CHAPTER 3: NETWORK POSITION AND LEADER IDENTITY 
DEVELOPMENT 
In Chapter 2, I proposed a new framework for describing organizational leader identity 
development.  This chapter builds upon this structure and attempts to further explain the 
developmental stages of organizational members.  From my own familiarity with West Point, 
and through ethnographic research and survey data, I identify and describe cadets in six different 
classifications dependent upon their network positions and level of leader development.  
Interviews and observation provide insight into the leader development of cadets occupying 
these classifications.  Categories are determined by leader identity and network centrality.  I label 
each category with a colloquial term as used by cadets at the military academy. 
 
The Cadet Leader Identity and Network Survey 
I conducted the leader identity and network study, titled “Cadet Leader Identity and 
Network Survey”, or CLINS, in two parts.  The first round (known as CLINS1) was a single 
survey of eight cadet companies taking place during the 2012 academic year, and the second 
round (CLINS2) was two surveys of seven companies taking place during the 2013 academic 
year.  Participants received online surveys for CLINS1 on April 20
th
, 2012, and were given four 
weeks to complete them.  The first CLINS2 survey was sent on January 8
th
, 2013 (after return 
from winter break) and the second survey was sent on April 15
th
, 2013.   
The study sample was not completely random, but I believe it is an accurate 
representation of the population in part because cadet companies are themselves designed to be a 
proportionate mix of ethnicity, gender, class year, athletic team participation, grade point 
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average, and academic major.  Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1 shows the hierarchical structure of the 
Corps of Cadets and the placement of the eight companies surveyed in the first round of the 
study: D1 (meaning D Company, 1
st
 Regiment), H1, A2, C2, C3, E3, F3, A4.  The result is quite 
close to a stratified random sample, in which the researcher divides a population into subframes 
and takes an unbiased random sample (Bernard, 2011).  Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the consent and 
response rates for both rounds of surveys. 
 
Table 3.1: Consent and Response Rates for CLINS Round 1 (Academic Year 2012) 
 
Company # Consented % Consented # Responses 
Response 
Rate 
% of Total Target 
Population 
A2 87 67% 87 100% 66.92% 
A4 71 55% 68 96% 52.71% 
B3 92 73% 88 96% 69.84% 
E3 110 81% 109 99% 80.74% 
F2 73 55% 73 100% 54.89% 
F3 91 79% 91 100% 79.13% 
H1 78 61% 78 100% 61.42% 
I1 99 74% 98 99% 73.13% 
Total 701 68.13% 692 98.75% 67.25% 
 
 
Table 3.2: Consent and Response Rates for CLINS Round 2 (Academic Year 2013) 
 
Company # Consented % Consented # Responses 
Response 
Rate 
% of Total Target 
Population 
A2 78 63.41% 77 98.72% 59.23% 
A4 59 51.75% 55 93.22% 44.72% 
C2 81 69.23% 63 77.78% 50.00% 
D1 81 67.50% 71 87.65% 59.17% 
E3 73 60.33% 68 93.15% 54.40% 
F3 97 84.35% 81 83.51% 64.29% 
H1 111 92.50% 84 75.68% 66.14% 
Total 580 69.86% 499 87.10% 56.85% 
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The majority of the data I obtained in the survey is from Likert scales (Likert, 1932), and 
is therefore ordinal.  In most cases it is coded 5 = strongly agree, 4 = agree, 3 = neutral, 2 = 
disagree, and 1 = strongly disagree.  Being ordinal means that a response of 5 is stronger than a 
response of 4, but I cannot say that a subject responding with a 5 is 25% more likely to “trust in 
the U.S. Constitution and believe it is worth protecting” (for example) than a subject responding 
with a 4 on the same question.  The responses may only be treated as being ordered, and thus a 
linear regression model may not be the best statistical approach to analyzing the survey results 
(Baum, 2006).  Consequently I use an ordered logistic (ologit) estimation when modeling an 
ordinal dependent variable with more than two categories as a function of a set of explanatory 
factors.   
It is important to note that the construct of leader identity is more complex than I am able 
to capture in this more quantitative portion of the dissertation.  While my literature review, 
ethnographic research, and subsequent discussion of leader identity explore the concept more 
thoroughly, the CLINS surveys limit its form to questions pertaining to motivation to lead.  
These survey questions draw upon the applied psychology work of Chan and Drasgow (2001) 
and my pilot studies.  Readers of this section of the dissertation should understand that the 
CLINS data treats leader identity (or my variable leader) as an organizational member’s self-
described motivation to lead.  I recognize this as a limitation, and intend to collect a more robust 
interpretation of leader identity in future work.   In the network portion of the survey, I ask 
participants to think of the qualities of an effective leader and then name up to five members 
whom they believe have the most potential to become good leaders.  While this offers an 
interesting network perspective on leadership and future leader ability, it also has its limitations. 
  66 
  
Table 3.3 below shows the codebook, while Appendix 1 displays each question asked in 
the CLINS surveys.  The ten item personality inventory (TIPI) is a hasty method of determining 
measures of the big five personality measures (Gosling, et. al, 2003).  
 
Table 3.3: Cadet Leader Identity and Network Survey Codebook 
 
Variable Name Variable Description Values Length 
id Subject Identification Number 11001-91134 5 
age Current Age       18-26 2 
usma_grad_yr Graduation Year (class) 2012-2016  4 
gender Gender    M=Male   F=Female 1 
gpa 
Cumulative Academic Quality Point 
Average (i.e. grade point average  
on a 4.0 scale) 
0.000- 4.333 4 
usma_stat_cd USMA Status Code 
A=Admin Leave                                             
C=Active Cadet                                               
G=Graduated                                                   
S=Separated 
1 
company Cadet Company A2, B3, etc. 2 
milgrade1 Military Grade 1st Semester 1 = A, 2 = B, 3 = C 1 
milgrade2 Military Grade 2nd Semester 1 = A, 2 = B, 3 = C 1 
redcat Racial Ethnic Descent Category 
B=African American                         
C=Caucasian, M=Asian                                       
R=American Indian                      
S=Hispanic, X=Other                                           
1 
value1- value10 
10 variables from the Army values 
scale 
1= Strongly Agree, to 
5= Strongly Disagree 
1 
values 
Average of value1-value10                         
(accounting for reverse coding) 
1-5, with higher averages 
indicating a stronger 





5 variables from the motivation to 
lead scale 
1= Strongly Agree, to 
5= Strongly Disagree 
1 
leader 
Average of motive1-motive5 
(accounting for reverse coding) 
1-5, with higher averages 
indicating a stronger 
motivation to lead 
7 
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auth1- auth16 
16 variables from the authentic 
leadership scale 




Average of auth1-auth16 
(accounting for reverse coding) 
1-5, with higher averages 
indicating a stronger 





17 variables from the self-
monitoring scale 
1= Strongly Agree, to 
5= Strongly Disagree 
1 
selfmon 
Average of monitor1-monitor17 
(accounting for reverse coding) 
1-5, with higher averages 
indicating a stronger 




10 variables from the ten item 
personality inventory (TIPI)  
1= Strongly Agree, to 
5= Strongly Disagree 
1 
cohes1- cohes8 
8 variables from the group cohesion 
scale 
1= Strongly Agree, to 
5= Strongly Disagree 
1 
cohesion 
Average of cohes1-cohes8 
(accounting for reverse coding) 
1-5, with higher averages 
indicating stronger group 
cohesion 
7 






7 variables measuring 
organizational identity with West 
Point 
1= Strongly Agree, to 
5= Strongly Disagree 
1 
orgid_wp 
Average of oi1-oi8 (accounting for 
reverse coding) 
1-5, with higher averages 
indicating stronger 
organizational identity 
with West Point 
7 
oi8- oi14 
7 variables measuring 
organizational identity with the 
Army 
1= Strongly Agree, to 
5= Strongly Disagree 
1 
orgid_army 
Average of oi8-oi14 (accounting for 
reverse coding) 
1-5, with higher averages 
indicating stronger 
organizational identity 
with the Army 
7 
cyn1- cyn7 
7 variables measuring 
organizational cynicism 
1= Strongly Agree, to 
5= Strongly Disagree 
1 
cynic 
Average of cyn1-cyn7 (accounting 
for reverse coding) 
1-5, with higher averages 
indicating stronger 
organizational cynicism 
toward West Point 
7 




10 variables measuring shared 
leadership within the company 
1= Strongly Agree, to 
5= Strongly Disagree 
1 
shared 
Average of share1-share10 
(accounting for reverse coding) 
1-5, with higher averages 
indicating that leadership 
and decision making are 
shared in the company  
7 
 
 Tables 3.4 and 3.5 below display summary statistics for key variables collected in the 
CLINS surveys. 
 
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics of Key Variables, CLINS 1 
 
   Variable  |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |       754    21.25729    1.406007     18.573         27 
         gpa |       754    3.049286    .5382713      1.191      4.273 
      leader |       757     3.78362    .6355817          1          5 
      values |       734    4.226839    .4298883          1          5 
        auth |       704    3.949929    .3454303      2.875          5 
     selfmon |       711    3.080996    .4514273      1.470      4.529 
    cohesion |       713    3.654804    .7144161          1          5 
      likeco |       723    1.344398    .5922454          1          3 
    orgid_wp |       714    2.343337    .7772827          1          5 
  orgid_army |       712    4.051565    .7747233          1          5 
       cynic |       712    3.443018    .7135966          1          5 




Table 3.5: Summary Statistics of Key Variables, CLINS 2 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |       538      20.832      1.4122         18         26 
         gpa |       538       3.056     .561752      1.333      4.198 
      leader |       539       3.707    .5971459        1.6          5 
      values |       533       4.108    .4359049      1.571          5 
        auth |       509       2.051    .3411806      1.062          4 
     selfmon |       515       3.077     .422308      1.941      4.176 
    cohesion |       525       3.788    .7067696          1          5 
      likeco |       526       1.399    .6534301          1          3 
    orgid_wp |       528       3.750    .7082559          1          5 
  orgid_army |       517       4.141    .6457408          1          5 
       cynic |       520       3.528    .7483903          1          5 
      shared |       522       3.560    .7301395          1          5 
 
 




Table 3.6: Tabular Statistics of Gender and Racial Ethnic Descent Category (redcat),  
CLINS 1 
 
       |                     redcat 
gender |   B       C       M       R       S       X |  Total 
-------+---------------------------------------------+------- 
     F |  13      82      13       0       6       0 |    114  
     M |  45     473      44       7      61      10 |    640  
-------+---------------------------------------------+------- 
 Total |  58     555      57       7      67      10 |    754 
 
In Tables 3.6 and 3.7, B = African American, C = Caucasian,  
M = Asian, R = American Indian, S = Hispanic, X = Other 
 
 
Table 3.7: Tabular Statistics of Gender and Racial Ethnic Descent Category (redcat),  
CLINS 2 
 
       |                     redcat 
gender |    B       C       M       R        S       X | Total 
-------+-----------------------------------------------+------ 
     F |   14      59       7       1       11       3 |    95  
     M |   29     330      32       6       40       6 |   443  
-------+-----------------------------------------------+------ 
 Total |   43     389      39       7       51       9 |   538 
 
 
The ordinal nature of the variables also impacts correlation calculations.  Pearson’s 
correlation (r, the linear association of two interval variables), commonly used in the social 
sciences, is not applicable.  I therefore use Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho).  This 
non-parametric statistic is calculated on ranks, as opposed to means, and therefore useful when 
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Tables 3.8 and 3.9: shows Spearman correlations (rho) for key 
variables and level of significance (p value).  Starred correlation 
coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Network Measures, Analysis, and Categorization 
The CLINS surveys asked three network questions using a fixed choice roster method 
(Wasserman & Faust, 2009): 
 
1. Name up to 5 people you consider to be a friend (someone you choose to spend your time 
with and go on pass with). 
2. Think of the qualities of an effective leader. Name up to 5 cadets you think have the most 
potential to become the best leaders (consider all four classes). 
3. Name up to 5 cadets you trust (not necessarily a friend, but someone you deem 
trustworthy). 
 
After each question the subjects were given a pull-down roster of every cadet in their 
company, from which they selected a maximum of five cadets.  Within each cadet company of 
approximately 120 cadets, roughly eight individuals serve out of company, meaning their 
academic year position has them living outside the geographical setting of the majority of the 
company in order to work on a higher level staff.  For example, three cadets from Company B3 
worked on battalion staff, three worked on regimental staff, one worked on the brigade honor 
staff, and one cadet was spending a semester at a foreign university.  I chose to leave these cadets 
in the pull-down menu to be selected as friends, effective leaders, or trustworthy individuals 
because in most cases they had established relationships with the more permanent members of 
the company, and typically continued interaction with their company peers despite physical 
separation.  
Initially developed by Bavelas (1948), the concept of centrality is a measure of the 
connectedness of an actor.  Knoke and Burt (1983) argue that the importance of an actor in a 
network is tied to what they term prominence, a combination of centrality and prestige.  Central 
actors have many ties to others.  A prestigious actor is the receiver of many directional ties (has a 
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high indegree).  Sociology and management scholars have also treated prestige as a measure of 
status (e.g. Zeleny, 1940a; Harary, 1959c). 
Network centrality is commonly measured in terms of degree, closeness, and 
betweenness.  Degree is the number of nodes that a node is connected to; therefore, the degree is 
also a measure of the involvement of the focal node in the network (Opsahl, et al., 2010).  
Degree does not measure the ease of flow between nodes, meaning that a node of high degree 
may not easily reach others to access resources or information.  It simply relates the 
connectedness of an actor, or how many other actors are adjacent to it.  Closeness centrality 
addresses this issue, as closeness is defined as the number of connections between nodes, or the 
inverse sum of connections to all other nodes from a focal node.  Central actors can reach all 
other nodes in the network with a minimum number of steps (Wasserman & Faust, 2009).  A 
node with high closeness likely encounters less resistance trying to access resources or spread 
information throughout the network.  Betweenness is a measure of how the node may influence 
information being passed through the network.  To be precise, across all node pairs with a 
shortest path containing node v, the betweenness centrality of v is the percentage of these pairs 
that pass through v (Freeman, 1979).   
By laying along the shortest route of information or resource flow, a node can exert 
control or influence on the flow, and is therefore a key player in the network.  These three 
measurements of network centrality help to evaluate a node’s influence and position within the 
network and allow comparison of nodes within a network.  In cases of ambiguity, degree is often 
better than closeness and betweeness.  Two key limitation of the CLINS surveys are use of the 
fixed roster (subjects are limited to selecting five names from a pull-down menu) and a 
participation rate under 70 percent.   
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The choice of which network measure to use also has a theoretical motivation.  For one 
kind of theoretical issue, it may be that betweeness matters for one and closeness for another.  
Rarely would a researcher want to use all three.  For example, betweenness matters most in 
power and brokerage relationships, where information can change as it passes through nodes.  In 
the case of a cadet company, cadets are interacting regularly (in person and through electronic 
mediums) and a member is unlikely to miss information because someone withholds it.  
Closeness is about efficiency of information flow.  Someone can more easily reach others; it is 
less strained than betweenness but still requires assumption that a zero (lack of nomination by a 
subject) means there’s no possibility of a connection.   
Degree centrality is just the number of people who nominate a member, thus it is most 
directly interpretable (I do not need to make assumptions about where information can flow).  
Additionally, it is important to note that the CLINS network variables are directional, and I 
therefore focus on indegree measurements of centrality across the friendship, trustworthiness, 
and effective leadership networks.  An actor with a high trustworthiness indegree (trust_indeg), 
is one whom many other cadets nominated as being trustworthy. 
 
Table 3.10: Summary Statistics of Key Network Variables 
 
 
       Variable  |      Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.     Min      Max 
   --------------+----------------------------------------------------- 
    leader_indeg |      671    .0770179     .118612       0         1 
     trust_indeg |      671    .1480419    .1528304       0         1 




Being primarily concerned with leader identity development, I treat leader as a dependent 
variable.  The leader variable is constructed from Likert scale questions pertaining to motivation 
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to lead and self-identification as a leader (e.g. “I am the type of person who likes to be in charge 
of others,” and reverse-coded: “I am definitely not a leader by nature,”).  Tables 3.11 and 3.12 
indicate that leader is surprisingly consistent across cadet year groups. 
 
Table 3.11: Summary of leader by Year Group, CLINS 1 
 
 
       Grad Year|     Obs      Mean    Std. Dev.     Min      Max 
     -----------+-------------------------------------------------- 
           2012 |     153     3.839     .6593        1.8        5 
           2013 |     174     3.797     .5982        1.6        5 
           2014 |     199     3.789     .6165          1        5 
           2015 |     227     3.735     .6570        1.2        5 
 
 
Table 3.12: Summary of leader by Year Group, CLINS 2 
 
 
       Grad Year|     Obs      Mean    Std. Dev.     Min       Max 
     -----------+--------------------------------------------------- 
           2013 |      93     3.696     .5638        2.4         5 
           2014 |     116     3.737     .5982        1.8         5 
           2015 |     155     3.749     .6215        1.6         5 




 Leader identity is also consistent along cadet age, race, gender, and grade point average.  
I now focus statistical analysis on the CLINS 1 data to avoid repetition.  An ordered logistic 
regression accounts for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, as discussed earlier.  The 
















Table 3.13: Ordered Logistic Regression of CLINS Data 
 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        598 
                                                  LR chi2(7)      =     102.37 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -606.20657                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0779 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      leader |     Coef.    Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       cynic |  -.8752419    .654011    -1.34   0.181     -2.15708    .4065962 
      values |   4.764177   1.082244     4.40   0.000     2.643018    6.885337 
    orgid_wp |  -1.987479   .5818388    -3.42   0.001    -3.127862   -.8470961 
  orgid_army |   2.417634   .5795122     4.17   0.000     1.281811    3.553457 
leader_indeg |   3.258547   1.070408     3.04   0.002     1.160587    5.356508 
 trust_indeg |  -1.562259   .8834695    -1.77   0.077    -3.293828    .1693092 
friend_indeg |   1.652088   .4570979     3.61   0.000     .7561925    2.547983 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /cut1 |  -1.136234   1.193245                     -3.474951    1.202482 
       /cut2 |   1.107919   .9903424                     -.8331166    3.048954 
       /cut3 |   4.010083   .9853383                      2.078855     5.94131 






Ordered logistic coefficients are in log-odds units and cannot be interpreted as regular 
ordinary least squared coefficients.  Post-estimation is necessary through looking at marginal 
fixed effects.  A z-value greater than 1.96 (for a 95% confidence) indicates that a variable has 
significant influence on leader identity.  The higher the z-value (positive or negative), the greater 
the impact on leader.  Two-tail p-values, or P > |z|, are testing the hypothesis that each 
independent variable’s coefficient is different from zero.  A p-value less than 0.05 (given the 
large sample size, I choose to use an alpha of 0.05) indicates that the variable is statistically 
different from zero and therefore has significant influence on leader.  In Table 3.13, cynic and 
trust_indeg do not appear to be significant.  Examining marginal effects through post estimation 
yields a better understanding of the independent variable coefficients. 
 
 





Table 3.14: Marginal Fixed Effects After Ordered Logistic Regression of CLINS Data 
 
 
   variable |   dy/dx     Std. Err.    z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
      cynic | -.0986869    .0741    -1.33   0.183  -.243919  .046545   .689775 
     values |  .5371795    .1267     4.24   0.000   .288842  .785517    .84796 
   orgid_wp | -.224096     .0666    -3.37   0.001   -.35462 -.093572   .468514 
 orgid_army |  .2725977    .0664     4.10   0.000   .142421  .402774   .813808 
leader_indeg|  .3674139    .1222     3.01   0.003   .127809  .607018   .080254 
 trust_indeg| -.1761508    .1001    -1.76   0.079  -.372386  .020084   .150818 





 The marginal fixed effects allow calculation of probabilities of change in the dependent 
variable based on changes in independent variables.   
 
 
Table 3.15: Probabilities of Leader Identity (leader) Scores Based on Values (values) Scores  
(all other independent variables held constant at mean) 
 
 
                      values=1   values=2   values=3   values=4   values=5     
     Pr(leader=1|x):   0.0486     0.0307     0.0075     0.0029     0.0011        
     Pr(leader=2|x):   0.2765     0.1995     0.0593     0.0240     0.0094       
     Pr(leader=3|x):   0.5726     0.6147     0.4992     0.3078     0.1519       
     Pr(leader=4|x):   0.0956     0.1443     0.3903     0.5594     0.6026       




 Table 3.15 above provides a more meaningful understanding of the impact of an 
independent variable on leader identity.  The variable values, which has the greatest impact of 
any independent variable in the model, clearly has a positive relationship with leader.  With a 
high values score of 5, for example, it is likely that a cadet will self identify as a leader (60.26% 
chance of leader = 4 and 23.49% chance of leader = 5 when all other independent variables are 
held constant at their means).  Lower values scores show an increasing likelihood of lower leader 
identity scores.  Academy leaders (and anyone interested in West Point creating leaders of 
character, such as U.S. taxpayers) would likely be heartened to see the positive relationship 
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between values and leader.  Based on the CLINS questions regarding values, those with a high 
values score have internalized the honor code, respect the Army values, will stand up against 
unethical behavior, etc.    
  
 
Table 3.16: Probabilities of Leader Identity (leader) Scores Based on  
Leadership Indegree (leader_indeg) Scores  
(all other independent variables held constant at mean) 
 
 
                indeg=0   indeg=.2   indeg=.4   indeg=.6   indeg=.8   indeg=1 
Pr(leader=1|x):  0.0030    0.0016     0.0008     0.0004     0.0002     0.0001  
Pr(leader=2|x):  0.0247    0.0131     0.0069     0.0036     0.0019     0.0010  
Pr(leader=3|x):  0.3143    0.1985     0.1160     0.0645     0.0348     0.0185  
Pr(leader=4|x):  0.5551    0.6066     0.5796     0.4841     0.3547     0.2317  




 Table 3.16 is a similar method, here looking at the impact of leader indegree.  A higher 
leader_indeg value (shortened to indeg along the top axis of the table) means that a large number 
of peers identified the cadet as one of their five company members when asked: “Think of the 
qualities of an effective leader.  Name up to five cadet you think have the most potential to 
become the best leaders (consider all four classes).”  The ordered logistic regression shows that 
cadets with higher leader indegree are more likely to have stronger leader identity, and Table 
3.16 is a useful means of making sense of the output.  For example, in moving from leader 
indegree of 0.6 to 0.8, a cadet is 16.1% more likely to have a leader score of 5 (60.83% - 44.73% 
= 16.1%).  While the ordered logistic results are more statistically rigorous, a standard regression 
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Table 3.17: Standard Regression of CLINS Data 
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     598 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   590) =   14.63 
       Model |  47.7782331     7  6.82546187           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  275.245178   590  .466517251           R-squared     =  0.1479 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1378 
       Total |  323.023411   597  .541077741           Root MSE      =  .68302 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      leader |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       cynic |  -.3406807   .2247108    -1.52   0.130    -.7820112    .1006498 
      values |   1.616916   .3617102     4.47   0.000     .9065197    2.327312 
    orgid_wp |  -.6907041   .1963476    -3.52   0.000    -1.076329   -.3050787 
  orgid_army |   .7332687   .1918519     3.82   0.000     .3564729    1.110065 
leader_indeg |   1.157763      .3708     3.12   0.002     .4295147    1.886012 
 trust_indeg |  -.5703812   .3102885    -1.84   0.067    -1.179786    .0390231 
friend_indeg |   .5764532    .159987     3.60   0.000     .2622398    .8906666 




 The regression in Table 3.17 shows similar results as the ordered logistic regression.  
Values is highly significant and has the greatest impact of all independent variables.  Cadets who 
are highly identified as having leadership potential also self-identify as leaders.  Organizational 
identity with West Point has a negative effect on leadership identity, while organizational 
identity with the Army has a positive effect.  This result is interesting, but also fitting with my 
ethnographic research.  As previously mentioned, the majority of cadets are optimistic about 
their futures as Army officers.  
 Even those harboring great cynicism for the academy can be eager for the relative 
freedom and responsibility of being a lieutenant.  Sophomore cadet Sebastian Marks said, “I’ve 
been here less than two years, and I’m already feeling pretty bitter about the whole experience.  
Yuk year isn’t much better than plebe year like I thought it would be.  I like my friends, and I 
know I’m getting a good education and all, but I just don’t enjoy my life or really feel connected 
to this place like.  I just want to be an officer and lead, and the sooner I can get there the better.”  
I find this quote representative of several other cadets I interviewed, and I believe it helps 
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explain the opposite effect of orgid_wp and orgid_army on leader identity.  Marks clearly has 
high leader identity and occupies the leader identity development phase (he views himself as a 
leader and continues self-development), yet his organizational identity with the academy is low.      
The cynic and trust_indegree coefficients are both interestingly negative, but not 
statistically different from zero.  The trustworthiness variable is still of interest, however, and 
also significant if using an alpha of 0.1.  From the CLINS survey, subjects are asked, “Name up 
to five cadets you trust (not necessarily a friend, but someone you deem trustworthy).”  Why 
would trust indegree have a negative relationship with leader identity?  I will return to this 
question after describing a categorization of organizational members.   
There was some asymmetry in the reporting of friends, trustworthiness, and good leaders.  
A reported connection, such as selecting someone as a friend, could be induced by a triad (e.g. a 
cadet spends time with cadet X because he wants to be with cadet Y.  58% of cadets selected as a 
friend returned the selection.  When you have imperfect measures (binary) it does not mean 
members cannot be friends.  This makes it difficult to motivate betweeness centrality.  If 
friendship could conceivably exist along a path that I fail to measure then it is invalid.  Centrality 
is predicated on the assumption that if a connection is not identified then information cannot 
flow through that path.  This is invalid if information could flow, and I simply fail to capture the 
connection.  This is further reasoning for my focus on indegree centrality.  As a robustness check 
I assume there is a non-response.  There may be missing data (I missed the return report from the 
named friend) because subjects are limited to five names and did not have a free name to 
respond, or the target noted did not take the survey.  With symmetrized ties (assuming that 
whenever i chooses j, j also chooses i) I get the same story.  As an additional robustness check, I 
found that roster position (the order of names on the pull-down menu in the CLINS survey) does 
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not impact indegree.  Thus, names at the top of the pull-down menu are not selected more often 
than names further down the list.   
I categorize cadets in the network by their levels of leader identity and network centrality.  
I use three levels of leader identity (low, moderate, and high) and two levels of network 
centrality (low or high).  The first group exhibits low leader identity and low network centrality.  
These cadets have generally not had the experience or development necessary to identify 
themselves as leaders, or they have not been inspired to view themselves as leaders.  Low 
network centrality means they either do not have many connections within the network, they are 
on the periphery of the network, or they cannot exert control over information flow in the 
network.  The cause of low network centrality may be their lack of formal leader positions within 
the network, an inability or lack of desire to obtain an informal leadership position in the 
network, or simply being socially reclusive or unliked.   
 











Ghost  Slug  Tool  
High Network 
Centrality  
Bro  Likable  Good Dude  
 
 
A colloquial term at the military academy for cadets that fall into this category is a 
‘ghost’.  Ghosts at West Point, according to the organization’s culture, are rarely seen by other 
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members of their companies, implying that they have few network connections.  Underclassmen 
will struggle to recognize the ghost as a member of their company.  When asked about such a 
cadet in his own company, freshman cadet Christopher Lee responded, “[the ghost] even goes to 
West Point?”  Two other cadets in the company failed to recognize the ghost despite having lived 
on the same floor of the same building for nearly four months. 
The next category of cadets exhibit low leader identity, but have high network centrality.  
Cadets in this group do not identify themselves as leaders.  However, having high network 
centrality would suggest that they hold an informal leadership position, as they can influence 
information within the network.  Alternatively, they could simply be liked socially, and are not 
necessarily viewed as good leaders.  These cadets are often referred to as ‘bros’.  A bro, as the 
slang implies, would be seen as a less developed leader, but still a likable person.  Cadets 
typically see bros as good people, but they recognize their low leader identity by saying that they 
do not enforce or abide by the regulations and standards of the organization.  Bros may have 
unique leadership potential through leveraging of network position.  
A third group is those with moderate leader identity and low network centrality.  Cadets 
in this group typically have had some development as a leader, but do not strongly self-identify 
as leaders.  Low network centrality suggests that they share some of the same social habits as 
ghosts, as they have little network capital that they can leverage to influence information or 
resources in the network.  I assign the term ‘slug’ to this group.  Slug is a commonly used term at 
West Point that can have an abundance of meanings, being both derogatory and complimentary, 
as slang terms often depend on context.  For the purposes of this study, the definition of slug is 
based on interviews with cadets.  The consensus of cadets from all four classes is that a slug is “a 
cadet that participates in minimal physical activities, company events, and duties,” as explained 
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by one senior cadet.  From this definition, the moderate leader identity is evident, as slugs 
participate in mandatory leader development events such as company intramural athletics, but 
they do not exhibit high leader identity.  
The most highly populated group is that with moderate leader identity and high network 
centrality.  Cadets in this group would say they are nearly ready to take on the responsibility of 
leading a larger group of cadets such as a platoon or company, but not ready to become an 
officer and lead a platoon in the Army.  They typically identify themselves with multiple 
different groups, whether those groups are military organizations such as their company, or 
athletic teams and clubs.  High network centrality often follows from their identity with these 
groups.  These ‘likable’ cadets are often easy to get along with and well respected, but not 
necessarily the cadets that others want to see occupy a leadership position. 
The final two classifications of cadets exhibit high leader identity.  These cadets identify 
themselves strongly as leaders and are often granted leadership positions in their network, 
whether it be a formal or an informal position.  The first group, the ‘tools’, are self-interested and 
patronizing.  They have low network centrality, as their self-interest and “brown-nosing” 
character makes them unattractive to peers.  Tools are particularly harmful to networks in spite 
of their low centrality.  When tools are placed in formal leadership positions, which often occurs 
due to their high leader identity, their attitude impacts other cadets that are obligated to interact 
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The Cadet Leader Identity and Networks Survey asks respondents to select five cadets 
whom they view as being effective leaders, trustworthy, and friends.  The nature of these 
questions may therefore cause a tool to score very low in centrality measures, but still have a 
large impact based on a formal leadership position.  For example, a tool may be a cadet company 
commander, and therefore integral to the information flow and operation of a 120-person 
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organization, but still not be trusted, regarded as a good leader, or thought of as a friend.  For this 
reason I collected the formal chain of command structure for each of the companies surveyed 
during both rounds of the CLINS study.      
As mentioned above, 58% of the nodes selected as a friend returned the friendship 
connection.  Members occupying the colloquial categories tend to establish friendships with 
similar others, with the tool friendship connection being stronger than any other group (tools 
befriend other tools at a higher rate than do members of other categories).  Having only 67.25% 
(CLINS1) and 56.85% (CLINS2) of the cadet companies as participants makes it difficult to 
propose concrete claims about friendship, trust, and leadership networks within my chosen 
categories, and this represents another limitation of the current study. 
Leaders described as tools cause frustration in other cadets when they see through the 
façade and recognize that the tools are at the top, not because they are competent or have good 
character, but because they have been able to showcase particular abilities to other leaders within 
the network, most often the tactical officers (TACs).  TACs have significant power in deciding 
which cadets will occupy chain of command positions.  Sophomore cadet Paul Shepherd 
remarked, “My platoon leader is a total tool.  All his leadership bravado is about looking good to 
the cadet commander and the TAC.  He doesn’t care about really developing us at all.”  
Frustration evolves into feelings of cynicism and builds until cadets have stated that they feel 
discouraged from developing as a leader.  This group is responsible for much of the diffusion of 
cynicism at the academy. 
While tools are a prime contributor to the spread of cynicism, the ‘good dude’ is actively 
influencing positive attitudes and perhaps increases leader identity across cadets within their 
networks.  A good dude is a cadet with high leader identity and high network centrality.  These 
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cadets have conformed to the in-group and identify strongly with it.  They have been reinforced 
as a leader through a claiming and granting process and exert considerable influence over their 
network.  Other cadets view them as capable leaders and trustworthy friends.  Good dudes 
establish the prototype that most other cadets belonging to the in-group will strive to achieve, 
and they typically are in leader identity construction.  When placed in formal leadership 
positions, the morale of other cadets in the network increases, and their will to develop 
themselves as a leader increases.  The healthy environment created in the network around a good 
dude fosters development and efficient flow of information and resources. 
How a cadet self identifies alters how they react to others.  For example, a cadet with a 
low or moderate leader identity will typically classify themselves as discouraged or frustrated 
when they encounter a tool.  Conversely, those same cadets consider themselves to have a 
greater ability to develop their leader identity when led by a good dude.  The implication of West 
Point’s mission statement and the West Point Leader Development System is that every cadet is 
consistently placed in situations where development as a leader of character is possible.   
Upon encountering a tool or a poor leader, cadets are encouraged to use the situation as a 
challenge to become better leaders.  Some cadets will use their interactions with a tool as a 
learning experience, while others that have not identified with or established loyalty toward the 
organization will associate the negative experience with the organization.  This negative 
association can breed frustration and cynicism, as cadets feel discouraged to participate in 
leadership development opportunities. 
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Categorized Members in the Network 
Figure 3.1 shows cadet company A2’s friendship network.  The circled node is the cadet 
with the largest number of others claiming him or her as a friend.  In total, 12 people claimed this 
cadet as a friend.  Cadet X, as she will be referred to, had the highest indegree centrality in the 
friendship network (the greatest number of A2 cadets selecting her as a friend).  In this network, 
Cadet X has the highest friend indegree centrality of 0.094, with the second highest being 0.079. 
 
Figure 3.1: Company A2 Friendship Network. 
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While Figure 3.1 shows the friendship network of the company, to accurately classify 
Cadet X into one of the previous mentioned six categories, I look at her leadership identity.  
Figure 3.2 is the leadership network map for the same cadet company.  Again, Cadet X is the 
circled node.  The leadership network is more centralized around a small number of nodes, 
unlike the friendship network that was somewhat separated by class year.  The highest leadership 
network indegree centrality was 0.205 (selected by 26 other cadets as being an effective leader), 
but Cadet X has a value of 0.024.  Her CLINS leader score is well below the mean at 2.25.  
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Applying this data to the claiming and granting process that leaders in an organization 
experience while building their leader identity, it can be seen that a relative minority within the 
company grant Cadet X a leadership role, whether formal or informal.  In turn, she has a 
relatively low ability to claim an informal leadership role, yet she may be able to claim a formal 
leadership position in the organization based on class year and rank.  Cadet X falls into the 
classification of a ‘bro’, or a cadet with high network centrality and low leader identity (as 
confirmed by her leader score of 2.25). 
I now return to the question raised by the negative relationship between trust_indeg and 
leader.  The ordered logistic and linear regression analysis shows that cadets with lower leader 
identity are more likely to be selected as being trustworthy.  The answer to this conundrum may 
be the ‘bro’.  These cadets are deemed trustworthy by peers despite surprisingly low leader 
identity.  For some, the complete lack of interest in leader development is a character hallmark.  
Senior cadet Steve Campbell remarked, “Yes, I know some people consider me a bro.  It has to 
do with not really caring about everything stressful around there.  You just focus on having a 
good time whenever you can, and taking care of people.”  Despite a lack of interest in 
institutional requirements, I can see why Campbell is trusted.  Cadets may view trustworthiness 
from a more personal perspective than leadership; a ‘bro’ is someone they are more likely to trust 
with moral conflict or private issues.   
This explanation of the negative relationship between trustworthiness and leadership 
identity also holds when looking at the opposite end of the categorization: the ‘tool’.  In speaking 
about a tool classmate, junior cadet Clarence Holdings said, “I avoid that guy at all costs.  I know 
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he’s so fired up about looking like such a great commander, and he’ll sell anyone out to keep that 
image.”  The tool cadet will score high on leader identity yet low on trustworthiness.    
What can happen when a ‘bro’ cadet, such as Cadet X, is put into a formal leadership 
position within the company hierarchy?  Based on the survey data from her company, few other 
cadets think of Cadet X as a leader, yet many view her as a friend.   It is therefore likely that if 
Cadet X was placed into a formal leadership position where she had the opportunity to claim a 
leader role in the organization, her support network of friends would help her grow and develop 
a stronger leader identity, accelerating her towards the ‘good dude’ category of high network 
centrality and high leader identity.  When asked about the potential of this situation, senior cadet 
Kyle Pressley said, “Yes, I’ve dealt with that before.  My old roommate was first sergeant last 
semester.  He hated it and didn’t want the job, but the TAC said he was the man… Most of us 
got behind him and helped get the under classes on board even when he messed something up.”   
This may not be the case for other cadets placed in a formal leadership position. 
To examine the phenomenon of a ‘ghost’ (a cadet with low leader identity and low 
network centrality) being placed into a leadership position, I look to a second cadet, Cadet Y.  
Figure 3.3 is the same friendship and leadership network shown prior, however Cadet Y is now 
circled.  Cadet Y has a friendship indegree centrality value of 0.008 and leadership indegree 
centrality value of 0.016.  Indegree centrality in the company’s trust network (not shown) is 
0.000.  Cadet Y likely does not identify with the in-group’s culture or values (additionally, 
orgid_wp = 1.85 and orgid_army = 2.65).  He is not the prototypical group member that would 
attract others and lead them to conform more to the prototype of the in-group. 
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Academy leaders are concerned about organizational members like Cadet Y.  Ideally, 
every cadet in the Corps of Cadets would have high leader identity by the time of their 
graduation.  In order to encourage development of a strong leader identity, West Point requires 
that all cadets are given formal leadership positions within the Corps at some point during their 
cadet careers.  If leader identity is low, cadets with high network centrality, like Cadet X, are 
able to rely on their friends for support and to help them work through the challenges of holding 
a formal position.  Their claim to leadership is likely to be reciprocated despite having low leader 
identity.  Sophomore cadet May Booker said, “If I respect someone, like if they’re my friend or I 
know they care about me and are trying their hardest, I’ll work for them even if they’re screwing 
things up.”  Cadet Y does not have that support network of friends, and appears to lack the trust 
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of his company peers.  Few may be willing to grant him a leader role, even if West Point officers 
place him in a formal hierarchical leadership position.   
Ghosts such as Cadet Y are often still placed into a developmental position, where they 
are forced to claim a formal leader role, such as a platoon leader.  Tactical officer Gregory 
Johnson remarked, “Obviously you’d love to put your super stars in the leadership positions and 
just let the company operate smoothly, but then you’re doing a disservice to future soldiers by 
allowing weaker leaders to skate by and still graduate.  We have to challenge even those who 
would rather hide in the back of formation, even if it causes growing pains for a squad or 
platoon.”  Officers and non-commissioned officers tend to identify members such as Cadet Y 
and focus their attention and mentorship efforts on assisting them through the challenges of 
formal leader roles.  I view this as an effort to intervene during the relational recognition cycle of 
leadership claiming and leadership granting (DeRue & Ashford, 2010) (see also Figure 1.1 in 
Chapter 1), and push the cadet toward a phase of leader identity construction.    
In his formal leader role, Cadet Y’s performance and development would likely suffer 
without a relatively large change to his identity and network centrality.  Platoon leaders are 
responsible for a large portion of their platoon member’s daily lives.  Therefore, if Cadet Y is 
performing poorly and not improving, the cadets in his platoon will feel a negative impact from 
his actions.  Van Maanen’s (1979) work would suggest that the cadets who identify with the 
values of and are loyal to the organization would not have their organizational loyalty or identity 
affected by this negative interpersonal relationship.  The majority of the cadets in Cadet Y’s 
platoon are members of the lower two classes who have spent anywhere from three to twenty 
months at the academy.   
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In this amount of time, some will have identified with West Point and the Army.  The 
effect of Cadet Y’s leadership, according to Van Maanen’s (1979) argument, would be seen most 
greatly on the ones who do not identify with the parent organization, and who have low leader 
identity themselves.  These cadets would see their single interpersonal relationship with Cadet Y 
as typical of the academy and the Army and become unmotivated to develop and internalize the 
values of the organization.  I saw this clearly in Paul Cooper, the freshman cadet grappling with 
the decision to stay or quit.  Six months into his time at West Point he said, “I’m just shocked at 
how terrible a few of my cadet leaders are.  My squad leader and platoon leader don’t understand 
me, and I would never follow them in combat.  I can’t believe they’re going to be lieutenants in 
about a year and a half.  It makes me want to quit because I don’t want to be around them.”  
Despite having several great cadet and officer leader examples in his life, he associates a few 
weak leaders with the parent organization, and this significantly impacts his occupation of the 
leader identity destruction phase of development and his eventual decision to leave the academy.   
The cadets negatively affected by Cadet Y’s leadership are of concern to the 
organization.  When a member becomes unmotivated to develop and internalize the values of the 
organization, they begin to become part of the out-group and have less centrality in their 
network.  As these members progress in rank and responsibility, they eventually gain leadership 
roles of their own.  Suddenly, they are in the same position as Cadet Y with low network 
centrality and possibly low leader identity.   These cadets in turn influence others and perpetuate 
a cycle of poor leadership.  I see this as a root cause of cynicism at the academy.  Cadets develop 
negative and pessimistic notions with regards to the Army and West Point because of a few weak 
leaders.  Until they internalize the values of their organization, their interpersonal relationships 
affect their view of the organization as a whole, leading to feelings of cynicism and pessimism.  
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One cadet stated that when he encounters a bad leader, he felt, “discouraged with the system as a 
whole.”   
The third interesting cadet I examine is Cadet Z, the ‘good dude’.  As previously defined, 
a good dude has high network centrality and high leader identity.  Cadet Z has high indegree 
centrality values in the friendship, leadership, and trust networks.  As seen in Figure 3.4, Cadet Z 
appears to have a high degree of friendship network centrality.  His total indegree centrality 
values are 0.063 for the friendship network, 0.056 for the trustworthiness network, and 0.165 for 
the effective leader network.   
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To be a good dude, Cadet Z must also have high leader identity.  Using DeRue and 
Ashford’s (1985) theory of claiming and granting and the deviation amplifying loops that result 
from the process (Masuch, 1985), a node in the leadership network that is identified by many 
followers as a leader is likely to self identify as a leader.  While not as high in leadership network 
indegree centrality as some cadets, Cadet Z fits this category based on CLINS scores (leader = 
4.45).   
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Network analysis shows that Cadet Z is well liked within his company, and that he is seen 
as a strong leader.  Cadet Y’s low leader identity and lack of friends may lead some cadets 
around him to grow unmotivated to develop as leaders.  Cadet Z more likely inspires cadets to 
grow and develop as leaders and he fosters a healthy, trusting environment (indegree centrality 
value of 0.056 in the company trust network).  Sophomore cadet Dan Wittaker said that when he 
encounters a cadet that is well liked and seen as a strong leader, “I use his example to make my 
own leadership style and I go to him for help with problems.  There’s a firstie in my company 
right now like that.  He’s not a PL or anything, but I seek him out because he seems to have 
given really good advice in the past, and he’s just a good dude.  He’s pretty inspiring.”  Good 
dudes as leaders, either formally or informally, possess the networks to give advice and help 
others, and perhaps push organizational members into leader identity construction.   
Organizational members with low leader identity and network centrality are likely to 
struggle and negatively impact other’s motivation, development, and attitude when placed in 
leadership positions.  The ensuing cycle of failed leadership claiming and granting breeds 
cynicism and stunts leader development throughout sub-organizations.  Countering that 
phenomenon is the effect that cadets with high leader identity and network centrality have on 
their network when placed in a formal leader position.  Their leader identity and network 
centrality make them valuable assets for the organization as they help develop others within the 
organization.   
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CHAPTER 4: LEADER IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT IN COMMUNITIES OF 
PRACTICE 
Introduction 
In this chapter I examine the development of a social networking technology that ties 
together multiple communities of practice (CoP) to shape organizational leader identity.  
Through the creation and distribution of knowledge, the MilSpace technology creates value for 
its parent organization, the U.S. Army.  Founded as a grassroots movement to enhance 
communication among junior military officers, the technology has retained many of its original 
qualities despite institutionalization within the military bureaucracy and recognition as a Harvard 
Business Review Top 20 Business Idea of 2006.   
A gap exists in management literature pertaining to the creation and use of social network 
technologies for identity development in organizations.  This line of research shows promise for 
bringing individual agency into network analysis and for explaining institutionally-embedded 
learning and identity development networks. 
The community of practice (CoP) is a social technology that facilitates knowledge 
creation and learning.  Powell, et al. (1996: 142), who find that innovation in fields of rapid 
technological change occurs more frequently in learning networks rather than individual firms, 
note, “Learning occurs within the context of membership in a community and may require 
different kinds of organizations and organizational practices to access that community.”  Brown 
and Duguid (2001: 203) write of CoPs, “Mediating as they do between individuals and large 
formal and informal social structures, and between organizations and their environment, they are 
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where a good deal of the work involved in knowledge creation and organizational learning gets 
done.”   
Brown and Duguid (1991) propose that the CoP is able to create tacit knowledge that 
resides in a social distribution among members, tools, and practices.  The CoP is therefore more 
than a learning tool, but a means of member identification.  They write, “Sociocultural accounts 
of knowledge and the firm generally turn on the relationship between individual learning and 
social identity.  Learning is inevitably implicated in the acquisition of knowledge, but it is also 
implicated in the acquisition of identity,” (Brown & Duguid, 2001: 200).  Wenger (1998) 
proposes that learning is integral to member identity, and that CoP participants benefit from 
learning and knowledge transfer while continuously building a shared identity.   
Though MilSpace provides some of the services found in popular social network sites, it 
is important to distinguish a CoP from the more prevalent social platforms.  Boyd and Ellison 
(2007) define social network sites as internet-based products that allow members to, “(1) 
construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other 
users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and 
those made by others within the system.”   
Though knowledge is exchanged and learning certainly occurs, the context of such sites 
is generally limited to interpersonal relationships.  Communities of practice, however, are 
depicted as a group of people with common interest who connect informally and responsibly to 
promote learning, solve problems, or develop new ideas.  Membership in the CoP implies, 
“participation in an activity system about which participants share understandings concerning 
what they are doing and what that means in their lives and for their communities,” (Lave & 
Wenger, 1991: 98).   
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Wellman, et al. (1996) describe similar community characteristics under the term 
computer supported social networks (CSSNs), but CoP better describes the focus of this chapter 
on a population that often shares face-to-face communication, though most information flow is 
computer mediated.  In reviewing much of the organization knowledge literature, Brown and 
Duguid (2001: 202) conclude that, “For a variety of reasons, then, communities of practice seem 
a useful organizational subset for examining organizational knowledge as well as identity.” 
The term community of practice may encroach on the sociological concept of a boundary 
object (Star & Griesemer, 1989) in that the community represents a variety of meanings for 
                                                          
10 Active Officer Corps population data is from Department of Defense Personnel and Procurement Reports and 
Data Files. Retrieved June 10, 2013 from http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm. 
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multiple organizational members.  The concept aligns closely with what is often termed a trading 
zone, or “boundary-spanning coordination work in conditions of high speed, uncertainty, and 
rapid change,” (Kellogg, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2006: 22; Galison, 1999).  Drawing on Knorr-
Cetina’s (1999) work, the CoP represents a specific organizational structure that composes an 
epistemic setting.   
Social technologies are becoming increasingly pervasive (or invasive, depending on your 
perspective on the technology).  Four of the most popular social networking websites, Facebook, 
Google+, LinkedIn, and Twitter, have over 1,966,000,000 active users alone.
11
  Younger 
segments of the current workforce are generally familiar with networking technology, yet 
business organizations have rarely capitalized on this potential source of knowledge creation and 
technical proficiency.  As a CoP, MilSpace serves a more knowledge-based purpose than social 
network sites, yet its position in the middle ground of computer-based networks allows it to draw 
on the increasing prevalence of web-based and mobile social technology in the lives and identity 















                                                          
11
 Business Insider (2013, May).  Retrieved June 01, 2013, from http://www.businessinsider.com/google-plus-is-
outpacing-twitter-2013-5.  
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Figure 4.2 depicts the variation in function of several prevalent 
online and mobile networks.  Technologies range in purpose from 
the predominantly social (Facebook and Twitter) to the purely 
informational (online libraries), with CoPs defining a space in 
between.  There is often some variation in purpose, such as 
LinkedIn’s professional information purposes, or a social element 
to creating knowledge through repeated interchange on 
Wikipedia’s encyclopedic entries.   
 
 
In looking critically at the case of networking technology in the U.S. Army through 
inside access to documents and the people who created and currently manage the CoP, I am able 
to comment on the impact of such communities on leader identity development. 
 
  102 
  
Research Setting 
In March of 2000, four Army captains working as professors at West Point used their 
spare time to launch the website www.CompanyCommand.com, “as a means of connecting past, 
present, and future company commanders in an ongoing conversation about leading Soldiers and 
building combat-ready units,” (Dixon, et al., 2005).  Use of the website by junior military 
officers (lieutenants and captains) grew rapidly, and the team started www.PlatoonLeader.org to 
cover topics focused on lieutenants.  After two years of expansion, military leaders recognized 
the value of these websites and reassigned the founding members to earn their doctoral degrees 
and return to West Point in order to run the newly created Center for Company-level Leaders 
(CCL), now renamed the Center for the Advancement of Leader Development and 
Organizational Learning (CALDOL). 
 
Figure 4.3: A Screen Shot from Company Command on MilSpace 
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Having grown beyond the capacity of their personal resources, and requiring institutional 
support to continue, the founding team donated their websites to the Army in 2003, after which 
they were shifted to military servers and given “.army.mil” internet addresses.  After on-line 
content was directly quoted in the media, the websites were restricted to military use only and 
membership reached approximately 26,000.  Access was restricted not only for security 
concerns, but because members would be less likely to share their stories and knowledge if they 
thought it was going to be published in print, and not merely shared by the community.  In May 
of 2006, use was restricted to officers and cadets, and membership stands at approximately 8,000 
for PlatoonLeader and 10,000 for CompanyCommand.  In their third major platform change, 
both websites were updated with Web 2.0 technology and incorporated into a single virtual 
environment known as MilSpace.  The fourth (and most recent) upgrade consolidated all 
MilSpace applications under an Army-wide technology suite known as MilBook.   
Two of the founding members, Pete Kilner and Tony Burgess, now manage MilSpace as 
part of their responsibility as directors of CALDOL.  Despite its humble origins as a basic 
website technology with no operational funding and minimal institutional support, the MilSpace 
community of practice has become a fundamental component of the Army’s organizational 
structure that incorporates multiple innovative technologies such as social tagging, i-Link, wiki, 
RSS feeds, and dynamic content rating.  Within two years of its launch, the technology was 
recognized by national newspapers and was presented the Army’s Knowledge Management 
Award.  The Harvard Business Review recognized the website as one of the top 20 business 
ideas of 2006.  In addition to running the online networks, Kilner and Burgess have a number of 
other responsibilities, including the development of material for Army Magazine, a monthly 
hardcopy publication with a distribution of over 120,000.  The MilSpace directors select a 
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pertinent discussion, collaborate with online members to improve their writing, and then submit 
a collection of postings to the magazine.   
 
Figure 4.4: A Screen Shot from Company Command on the Most Recent Upgrade,  
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Figure 4.5 shows the opening portion of the end product of a 
monthly iterative process.  A topic of interest begins in the online 
forum.  Organizational members with popular submissions (those 
voted most helpful by the community of practice) are contacted by 
CALDOL and asked to refine their writing for publication in Army 
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Participation 
 Why do organizational members participate in the community of practice?  Kilner and 
Burgess attribute some of the success of CompanyCommand and PlatoonLeader to the attention 
given to their members by CALDOL leadership.  Kilner says, “I agree that giving attention to a 
new contributor can help bring them quickly toward the center of the community.”  Social 
networking technologies tend to facilitate an early ‘honeymoon’ period where new adopters 
constantly check the site as they rapidly build connections, are tagged in photos, have multiple 
wall comments (“so glad you’re finally on here!”), etc. that generally build a sense of self-worth.  
Kilner has found that it helps to comment visibly on a post, and follow up with a personal note 
encouraging new members to post pictures, find valued members, and continue their posting.  
Even after the period of high-volume contribution fades, the member has a base of involvement 
and a large enough profile to warrant subsequent involvement. 
 Participation in a CoP takes time, and thus competes with work and recreation outlets.  
CALDOL has found anecdotally that MilSpace is often viewed either when a member has a 
specific Army-related question or when the employee needs to be in the office but does not have 
pressing work to complete.  It is atypical to access the site outside of work hours during leisure 
periods.  Kilner states, “I think with the new technology you have the opportunity to interest 
members in building a larger profile that taps into status, friendships, etc.  An obvious concern 
may be the direction that this takes the community.”  The fear is that including more social 
technologies may detract from the professional purpose of the community.     
Some cadets and junior officers, particularly those who would contribute to MilSpace, are 
proud of their profession and would welcome an opportunity to broadcast their status and 
organizational identity without being socially sanctioned.  Publically displaying the signs of a 
  107 
  
strong military identity is viewed as norm-breaking by many organizational members, 
particularly among younger populations of the Army.  Cadet Mark Workman, interviewed during 
ethnographic research, made this point when recounting a situation in which he displayed his 
Facebook profile picture wearing combat equipment and holding a rifle.  He was hassled for 
days, both on Facebook and in person, despite removing the picture within 24 hours.  The 
strongest sanctioning came from his West Point peers.   
It is not socially acceptable to project an image in certain public venues that says a 
member defines herself as an Army officer (even though many do, at least partially), but on 
MilSpace it is the norm.  On MilSpace, members are expected to fill out a profile and include 
military education, completed training, feelings on leading troops, and pictures while serving in 
the military.  This holds great value in encouraging membership and participation, and in 
strengthening leader identity.   
 
Learning, Knowledge, and Identity 
 The MilSpace community provides an interesting application of a learning and 
knowledge transfer community to identity development.  Argote and Ingram (2000) build a 
theoretical framework for understanding knowledge transfer through the movement and 
modification of knowledge reservoirs and networks.  They additionally contribute through the 
summary of multiple important factors influencing knowledge transfer, and write, “Although 
adapting to differences in people across contexts poses challenges to knowledge transfer, 
people’s ability to adapt knowledge they possess facilitates transfer,” (Argote & Ingram, 2000: 
164).  Organizations develop subnetworks of elements (members, tasks, and tools) that adapt to 
current conditions, yet may not perform optimally when circumstances change.   
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In a similar approach to knowledge adaptation, Barnett and Pontikes (2008) (following 
March, 1991) articulate the two forms of change generally found in organizational theory, 
exploration (moving into new areas) and exploitation (adaptation in an existing environment).  In 
line with ecological theories, exploitation evolves out of competitive dynamics.  Competition 
drives organizational constraint and resource scarcity, reducing performance and encouraging 
management to seek alternate means of enhancement.  Once performance is restored, competing 
firms are now lagging, and the competition continues in a cycle.  Argote and Ingram (2000: 164) 
write, “The knowledge reservoirs or subnetworks imported from one context must be compatible 
with or fit the new context.”  Barnett and Pontikes (2008) are focused on learning within a single 
firm while Argote and Ingram (2000) are concerned with the broader topic of knowledge transfer 
both within a firm and between firms, but the findings certainly support each other.   
Hansen (1999) focuses on organization subunits, and points to the benefit of weak ties in 
transferring knowledge that can be codified, while strong ties appear more necessary for non-
codified knowledge to spread through a firm.  This important theoretical and empirical 
application of social network theory to the organizational learning literature helps further 
delineate the process of knowledge transfer within an organization, and concludes, in part, that, 
“Weak and strong inter-unit ties have their respective strengths and weaknesses in facilitating 
search for and transfer of useful knowledge across organization subunits,” (Hansen, 1999: 105).  
 The community of practice is a social technology that facilitates knowledge creation and 
learning.  Powell, et al. (1996: 142), who find that innovation in fields of rapid technological 
change occurs more frequently in learning networks rather than individual firms, note, “Learning 
occurs within the context of membership in a community and may require different kinds of 
organizations and organizational practices to access that community.”  Brown and Duguid (2001: 
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203) write of CoPs, “Mediating as they do between individuals and large formal and informal 
social structures, and between organizations and their environment, they are where a good deal 
of the work involved in knowledge creation and organizational learning gets done.”  Brown and 
Duguid (1991), propose that the CoP is able to create tacit knowledge that resides in a social 
distribution among members, tools, and practices.   
The CoP is therefore more than a learning tool, but a means of member identification: 
“Sociocultural accounts of knowledge and the firm generally turn on the relationship between 
individual learning and social identity.  Learning is inevitably implicated in the acquisition of 
knowledge, but it is also implicated in the acquisition of identity,” (Brown & Duguid, 2001: 
200).  Wenger (1998) proposes that learning is integral to member identity, and that CoP 
participants benefit from learning and knowledge transfer while continuously building a shared 
identity.  Based upon this understanding of organizational learning and identity I propose: 
 
Proposition 1: Members of a community of practice experience a greater sense of identity 
with the larger parent organization than non-members. 
 
Proposition 2: Community of practice participation encourages members to enter identity 
construction, rather than stagnation or destruction. 
 
Proposition 3: Communities of practice enhance identity development with the larger parent 






Continuing the discussion of network research begun in Chapter 1, I turn to network 
research relevant to MilSpace and identity development.  Burt (1987) raises the importance of 
social capital in an economic environment, which may not directly relate to identity, but provides 
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insight into the continuation of MilSpace.  Through network relationships come opportunities to 
create economic profits from human and financial capital.  Within certain ranges of ability, many 
organizations possess comparable amounts of human and financial capital, thus social capital is 
often the discriminating factor for determining economic superiority.  Burt (1987) goes on to 
detail networks as a conduit to specific resources.  Social networks exist as capital in their own 
right, with size being the predominant measure.  Networks offer information on and access to 
opportunities, referrals, and resources.  Larger networks are more likely to offer more 
information and resources, but the density of the network is important as well.  Dense networks 
are inefficient, but a sparse network with non-redundant contacts will often prove more fruitful.   
Burt’s (2005) concept of structural holes, which separate nonredundant information 
sources, offers a fascinating bridge between the worlds of economics and sociology in describing 
aspects of competitive capitalism.  When someone is connected to two other nodes that are not 
connected to each other, that person has the ability to act as a broker and share information 
between the two nodes.  This is built upon Granovetter’s weak ties, though Burt clarifies that, 
“the causal agent in the phenomenon is not the weakness of the tie but the structural hole it 
spans.  Tie weakness is a correlate, not a cause,” (Burt, 2005: 73).  Control is negotiated as 
players in a competitive environment alter their social structures to garner resources.  Social 
capital is vital for gaining access to resources.  He also develops the concept of legitimacy in 
regard to becoming a trusted source of information.   
The MilSpace managers recognize the importance of developing trust between 
themselves and the junior officers they serve.  They build rapport with individual contributors by 
thanking them for sharing insights or being an active member of the CoP.  Particularly dedicated 
members of the network may be asked to serve as topic leads and take on the responsibility of 
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recruiting contacts, sending newsletters, conducting surveys, facilitating conversations, sending 
welcome letters, etc.  These are all means of continually reconnecting to community members.  
Kilner commented, “Someone with the internal drive and dedication to craft a thoughtful 
response on a topic is generally someone who also wants to play a more active role in the 
community.”  These members are typically engaged in leader identity construction, and can 
encourage others through their example.  In addition to fostering the growth of the network size 
and its knowledge generation, topic leads are well positioned within the network to direct 
resources to members in need of information or leader identity development.   
Some of Burt’s proposals are supported by Padgett and Ansell’s (1993) analysis of 
political parties and network elites in Renaissance Florence.  The Medici network remained 
sparse through calculation.  By tying his family through marriage to elite, geographically 
separated patriarchs, and via economics to lower-status ‘new men’ within the neighborhood, 
Cosimo de Medici became “an awesomely centralized patrimonial machine” and “the only 
bridge holding this contradictory agglomeration together,” (Padgett & Ansell, 1993: 1285).  
Through the establishment of few elite network ties, particularly in comparison to other high-
status families, the Medici family was able to leverage its position as a broker between many 
disparate groups from all economic and social status levels.  This matches well with Burt’s 
thoughts on structural holes and their ability to generate rates of return.   
The MilSpace directors have similarly placed themselves in a position to connect a 
variety of organizations and community members. Kilner and Burgess in particular are able to 
act as brokers of information as they connect those with information needs with those who 
possess the knowledge to handle a specific situation.  In 2008 Kilner was asked by the Army’s 
Chief Information Officer to spend three days in Boston conducting field tests on new software 
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known as Cognitive Edge.  The new technology may be used to analyze the After Action 
Reviews (reports from military units detailing mission successes and failures) that can be 
examined to more quickly change doctrine.  Kilner’s position within the military’s academic 
community, as an active duty officer and a professor in the department of philosophy, allows him 
to move beyond the CCL and bring his assets to bear in multiple environments.   
The MilSpace founders provide another vivid example of this in a book they published in 
2005 titled Company Command: Unleashing the Power of the Army Profession.  By highlighting 
the ability of the network to connect people and distribute knowledge, the authors relate the story 
of a personnel officer in Iraq whose Army unit has lost its first soldier.  Recognizing that she 
lacks the information to carry out a litany of casualty-related tasks, she connects to 
CompanyCommand.  Within hours, she is connected to leaders with experience in this situation 
and she has a toolkit for handling casualty affairs, an article and a community discussion on 
coping with a soldier’s death, and links to information from the Adjutant General school on 
Army reporting requirements.  Additionally, she was in contact with two experienced chaplains 
and a former battalion commander who provided first-hand experience about dealing with the 
situation and a copy of a bereavement letter that she could use as a model.  These connections 
and informal mentors provide not only useful knowledge and information, but also opportunities 
for leader identity development and encouragement for maintaining leader identity construction. 
Because Kilner and Burgess have interviewed hundreds of lieutenants and captains in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, monitored and led professional discussions for over 15 years, and been 
deeply embedded in the epistemic culture of the organization, they are profoundly well-
connected and capable of bridging important structural holes.   
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Proposition 4a: A community of practice director’s structural position drastically shortens the 
average path length of the network, facilitating knowledge transfer. 
 
Proposition 4b: The structural positions of key discussion facilitators shorten the average 
path length of the network, facilitating knowledge transfer. 
 
 
MacKenzie and Millo’s (2003) investigation of the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
demonstrates that the organization did not succeed because of neo-classical economic market 
theory.  They write, “The very agents who performed option theory were not and did not become 
atomistic, amoral homines economici: if they had, they could not have constructed the market,” 
(MacKenzie & Millo, 2003: 109).  The authors go on to expand the theory of performativity, but 
profess a reliance on network theories to describe the organization, particularly Granovetter’s 
embeddedness.  The research additionally addresses the social pressures of making fair options 
trades, as the community of traders is capable of rejecting an individual if his behavior is deemed 
deviant.  This concept is echoed in Greif’s (1991) analysis of the Maghribi traders’ coalition of 
the 11
th
 century, thus indicating that network structures are not merely a contemporary 
development in social organizational structure.  Like many social networking technologies, the 
members of MilSpace have been known to police themselves and make corrections on group 
members who share false information or deviate too far from standard practices.     
 
Proposition 5: Deviation from norms face sanctioning by community members. 
 
 
 Recent work has been important to expanding network theory.  Stark and Vedres (2006) 
propose a future for network structures, though they alter the conventional means of network 
analysis.  They criticize conventional network analysis on three grounds.  First, as other critics 
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have agreed, they fault the theory’s static nature.  Second, they believe it often forces 
organizations to be grouped into separate communities unnecessarily.  Third, they view 
entrepreneurism as existing not in structural voids, but in intercohesive positions.  They 
introduce new analysis tools from contemporary physics to uncover temporal network traits, and 
note that sociology has a long tradition of emphasizing the strength of groups over time, but that 
recent network analysts have focused far more on network structure (Vedres & Stark, 2008).  Of 
particular interest is the concept of trust.  They make the effective criticism that many 
researchers focus on trust within their network computations, but duration of the networks are 
not considered.  When trust is built upon repeated interactions, how can you avoid considering 
time? 
 
Proposition 6: By allowing repeated interaction among geographically dispersed 
organizational members, communities of practice facilitate trust creation and 




 Burns (1963) offers a slightly different take on organizational design via an analysis of 
the flux of industrial design and his categorization of such into mechanistic systems, appropriate 
during stable conditions, and organismic, appropriate in changing conditions.  Referring to the 
rational bureaucracy of Weber (1968 [1921]) as the “social technology which made possible the 
second stage of industrialism,” Burns (1963: 42) places mechanistic systems firmly in the 
outdated realm of early industrialization.  Excited by his then-current research into the UK 
electronics industry, he lauds the benefits of the highly adaptable organismic form, an approach 
with numerous parallels to some modern sociological research dedicated to heterarchy. 
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 Galison (1999) provides research of a similar nature in discussing the war-time 
integration of scientists from varying backgrounds who were forced to work together at places 
such as MIT’s Radiation Laboratory.  He writes, “Under the gun, the various subcultures 
coordinated their actions and representations in a way that had seemed impossible in peacetime; 
thrown together they began to get on with the job of building radar,” and, “one can see the 
visible manifestations of the new modes of exchange.  Rooms are established with movable 
walls… the laboratory with its ‘model shop’ had delivered $25 million worth of equipment,” 
(Galison 1999: 152).  The effect of this new distributed interaction within the community 
impacts the building of future organizations, and construction of a large physics laboratory is 
undertaken with the radiation lab in mind, to include avoiding paneled offices for senior 
members.   
 Much of this echoes the heterarchy work of Beunza and Stark (2004) discussed in the 
literature review on network research.  The social network platforms of MilSpace serve as a 
means for flattening structures and supporting lateral communication between heterogeneous 
actors.  Given this examination of heterarchical network structures in the context of the U.S. 
Army’s hierarchy, I propose the following: 
 
Proposition 7a: Communities of practice facilitate the flattening of hierarchical structures 
within organizations. 
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Boundaries, Identity, and the Production of Knowledge 
 New technologies pertaining to the community of practice may broaden our 
understanding of organization theory literature pertaining to boundaries, identity, and the 
production of techno-scientific knowledge.  Star and Griesemer’s (1989) analysis of boundary 
objects at the Berkeley Museum of Vertebrate Zoology effectively expands work on actor 
network theory.  Rather than a single translation, they see the possibility for multiple translations 
through boundary objects.   
Multiple network entities make connections to create interest.  Individuals make an input 
through the process of enrollment, and a language is created that can reach certain audiences.  
Museum managers are able to control diverse populations and coordinate efforts through the 
analytic concept of boundary objects, or scientific objects that exist in multiple overlapping 
social networks and fulfill information requirements for all of them.  They hold different 
meanings depending upon the user, and can adapt to the particular needs of various network 
entities.   
 MilSpace represents a highly versatile boundary object that effectively coordinates the 
efforts of multiple heterogeneous actors, and its continuous management by the Center for 
Company-Level Leaders directors is essential to its success.  As Star and Griesemer (1989: 393) 
write, “The creation and management of boundary objects is a key process in developing and 
maintaining coherence across intersecting social worlds.”  In order to expand the museum’s 
collections, the curators are reliant upon amateur collectors who are “often on the front line, 
making contact with a host of other social worlds,” (Star & Griesemer, 1989: 402).  Similarly, 
the MilSpace staff depend upon junior officers to engage the outside world and then donate their 
experiences to the community.  Just as many amateur collectors desired legitimacy for their 
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efforts, the MilSpace managers recognize that many officers respond positively to signs of 
legitimacy, such as appreciative email responses or token gifts of appreciation like a hat or 
baseball bat bearing the Company Command logo.   
As a final point of comparison, the museum’s most pivotal director was able to establish 
order and accuracy by propagating methods of collection and subtly disciplining members of the 
collection network.  Without overly influencing content, the MilSpace creators are similarly 
successful at directing the method by which information is shared, thus increasing its impact 
across the community.  In many ways, the MilSpace technology mirrors Galison’s (1999: 138, 
146) concept of the trading zone as the site “where the local coordination between beliefs and 
action takes place,” and which serves as the “social and intellectual mortar binding together” 
segments of a culture.  The networking technology serves to highlight the heterogeneity of 
practice that exists within the military’s sub-culture of junior officers.   
 Knorr-Cetina (1999) makes an important extension of sociology to study the epistemic 
machinery of science, rather than just the creation of scientific knowledge itself.  She lauds the 
sociological perspectives of Giddens (1990), but faults his approach of being concerned with 
only the output of expert systems.  Giddens (1990) treats the producers of knowledge as black 
boxes, and fails to consider their development and inner workings.  The exploration of MilSpace 
contributes to the existing literature by examining a specific case in which network technology is 
created, grows, and is integrated into a large organization.  Knowledge is typically viewed as 
scientific belief, but Knorr-Cetina (1999: 8) writes, “The definition I advocate switches the 
emphasis to knowledge as practiced- within structures, processes, and environments that make 
up specific epistemic settings.”  The Army’s CoPs thrive on the very concept of knowledge as 
practiced.  The Army’s contemporary operating environment is the epistemic setting, and the 
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junior officers on deployments and in training exercises can sit down at a computer and share 
their knowledge in real time based on exposure to changing threats and evolving best practices.   
 Drawing parallels to much of the work on new institutional theory, Knorr-Cetina (1999: 
10) also addresses the concept of culture and symbols, and writes, “Symbolic structuring will 
come into view through the definition of entities, through systems of classification, through the 
ways in which epistemic strategy, empirical procedure, and social collaboration are understood.”  
This view can be strongly seen in MilSpace’s repeated representation of three officers 
conversing on the hood of the military’s general multi-purpose vehicle, typically called the 
‘Humvee’.  This location holds value in Army culture, and MilSpace employs its image as a 
means for encouraging community members to gather, share knowledge with each other, and 
build a shared identity.  Another example can be seen in the very name MilSpace.  Though 
thought of by David Axe, a reporter from Wired magazine who was writing a story on the CCL, 
Kilner and Burgess decided that it made sense to try and link their community to the popularity 
of the MySpace social networking site.   
 
Proposition 8: Communities of practice offer information for a variety of purposes for 
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Figure 4.6: The Cover of a CCL Publication and the Culturally-Significant Image of the 








 Bowker and Star (1999) observe studies showing that college students have a propensity 
to cite only information that is available online.  Current and rising generations of young officers 
are accustomed to conducting information search with computers.  The military leaders 
responsible for the support of MilSpace perhaps understood this when they latched onto the 
CompanyCommand model for creating and distributing knowledge.  The use of internet 
technologies to conduct search goes beyond the simple availability of conventional knowledge 
online, as demonstrated by the relatively low use of the Army’s Reimer Digital Library 
(https://rdl.train.army.mil/), a source of Army field manuals and training manuals.   
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Lieutenants and captains, the youngest cohorts of Army officers, would rather access the 
information and advice of members in a CoP than attempt to meet their information needs in 
dense manuals.  Bowker and Star (1999) also address the issues of classification and the 
overwhelming abundance of information available on-line.  Part of MilSpace’s success can be 
linked to its ability to categorize data in a meaningful way that enables users to search for 
accurate information quickly.  Echoing this categorization work, Kahl (2008) advocates the re-
conceptualization of categorization as a dynamic system that members use epistemically to 
create knowledge.  With some of the newer Web 2.0 technologies now incorporated into the site, 
members are shown potentially useful information without conducting a search, thus offering 
knowledge without user input.   
 
Proposition 9: For some purposes, a community of practice is able to meet information 




 Organization theory research also addresses the impact of social influence on firm 
boundary and identity.  Porac, et al. (1995) frame their paper within the competition literature, 
arguing that they fill a void left by population ecologists (Carroll & Hannan, 1989) and 
transactionalists (Burt, 1992) by addressing the ability of individual firms to shape competitive 
relationships.  By taking into account the “social reality of rivalry,” Porac, et al. (1995: 204) 
include “the constitutive role of the managerial mind in making markets.”  Industry borders are 
socially constructed through a rivalry process in which managers conduct constant comparison 
with competing firms.   
Being cognitively incapable of comparing all firms along multiple aspects, managers 
“define market boundaries using the summary features of organizational types as reference 
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points around which market structure evolves.”  Socially constructed categories, created by 
necessity to simplify the organizational comparison process, evolve to define industry boundaries 
and shape how managers perceive their own firms.   
Following the work of new institutional theorists, Zuckerman (1999) shows how borders 
are at least partially defined by the constraints placed on managers to conform to recognized 
organizational forms: a mechanism termed the categorical imperative.  This concept is echoed by 
Polos, Hannan, and Carroll (2002: 90, 112), who write, “An identity constrains what an entity 
would/could be and what is expected and not expected of it… violations of the default 
assumptions have the price of lowered valuation.”  While the argument to conform in order to 
gain legitimacy follows closely the new institutional theory work of DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) and Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zuckerman (1999) makes an important contribution to the 
literature by concretely identifying both the penalty placed on those who fail to conform and the 
source of the social judgment that implements said penalty.  Polos, Hannan, and Carroll (2002) 
expand on this concept when describing how core features determine an organization’s 
membership, while peripheral features can be altered to differentiate without risking exclusion 
from the larger social form.  Agreed-upon classifications link the social form to an organization’s 
identity.   
Market candidates are faced with the challenge of conforming enough to be within a zone 
of legitimacy in the eyes of the audience, yet must differentiate themselves enough to be selected 
over competitors.  Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) strengthen the theoretical framework for this 
process, provide scope conditions, and support their ideas through empirical analysis of 
securities analysts and Silicon Valley law firms.  They conclude with the theoretical implication 
of ascription with achievement: “Whereas the notion of conformity would seem to imply a static 
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social order, we have pointed out that there must be some prospect of (at least, downward) 
mobility for an actor to feel pressure to conform,” Phillips and Zuckerman (2001: 422).  
Movement within the status hierarchy is also dependent upon an actor’s prior identity.  This 
explains the variation within approaches to conformity.   
Kilner supports this first point in saying, “I feel we are highly regarded by the leadership 
around here [West Point] and in the Pentagon, but we’ve always had to sing for our supper.  If 
we’re not providing quality services and linking officers to the information they need then we’ll 
lose our funding.”  In order to continue linking young officers, MilSpace has to attract them and 
keep their interest.  They accomplish this in part by being a source of innovation and a platform 
for important discussions, but they also attract members through conformity with other popular 
social media outlets.   Phillips and Zuckerman’s (2001) second closing point regarding ascription 
with achievement reveals itself in MilSpace’s rejection of certain conforming technologies, such 
as the ability to upload and tag multiple photographs, when considering its past identity and 
fundamental purpose. 
 The directors of MilSpace are compelled by market forces to conform to certain norms in 
presenting their technology to the audience: future, current, and past company-level leaders.  The 
means of communication and interaction within the CoP must fit established customs to such a 
degree that members of the broader organization (the U.S. Army) identify MilSpace as a valid 
potential outlet for social and professional relations.  Once the technology falls within this zone 
of legitimacy, it must differentiate itself enough to be selected over alternative outlets. 
 
Proposition 10a: A community of practice will adapt its technology to incorporate 
capabilities offered by competing social and professional outlets.   
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Proposition 10b: Once basic technologies have matched that of competing outlets, 
differentiating capabilities will arise to distinguish the community of practice from 




Innovation Diffusion and New Institutional Theory 
 Rogers (1995: 6) defines diffusion as “the process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system.”  It is 
a change in the social structure of a system, and can occur spontaneously or under external 
control.  Communication is the development of common perceptions as members interact and 
share information.  Rogers (1995: 11) further identifies the four main elements present in 
diffusions research: innovation, communication channels, a social system, and time.  Adoption 
(the decision that employing an innovation in full is the best course of action) or rejection takes 
place through the innovation-decision process: knowledge (learning of an innovation and 
understanding its purpose), persuasion (forming a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the 
innovation), decision (taking action that leads to a decision of adoption or rejection), 
implementation (employing the innovation), and confirmation (pursuing verification that the 
correct decision was made).   
 The innovation-decision process is conducted by a social system in one of three primary 
methods: 1) optional innovation-decisions are conducted by individuals who make independent 
judgments, though norms often influence the process; 2) collective innovation-decisions occur 
with consensus from system members; and 3) authority innovation-decisions reject or adopt 
based on the resolve of few individuals with decision-making power.  Following previous 
decisions, a contingent innovation-decision can be made through a combination of the previous 
three mechanisms.  The decision to adopt CoPs within organizations is often a contingent 
  124 
  
decision, as individuals within a community must choose to participate, while authority figures 
approve the institutional support necessary for technological support.   
 
Proposition 11: Organization-specific communities of practice require both institutional 
support from authorities and grass-roots support from members in order to survive. 
 
  
Homophily (individuals who share common interests, reside or work close-by, or participate 
in similar groups) provides the basis for enhanced communication and innovation diffusion.  
Rogers (1995: 19) writes, “When they share common meanings, a mutual subcultural language, 
and are alike in personal and social characteristics, the communication of new ideas is likely to 
have greater effects in terms of knowledge gain, attitude formation and change, and over 
behavior change.”  The barrier of heterophilous participants is significantly reduced, particularly 
in communities of employees who work for the same organization or within the same job field.   
In reviewing past research Rogers (1995) finds that varying rates of adoption are 
explained predominantly through the characteristics of innovations: relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability.  The greater the advantage perceived by 
individuals along each of these dimensions, the faster the adoption.  Familiarity of organizational 
members with social networking technologies may translate directly into increased perceived 
advantage.  For example, the technology of an organization-specific CoP will likely be deemed 
more compatible (consistent with current norms, member experience, and member requirements) 
and less complex (degree of difficulty to perceive and implement) as social network technology 
is used more often and by larger proportions of organizational members.   
 
Proposition 12a: The more familiar and comfortable an organizational member is with social 
networking technology, the more likely he or she is to join an associated community of 
practice. 
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Propositon 12b: The more familiar and comfortable an organizational member is with social 
networking technology, the more likely he or she is to participate in an associated 
community of practice.  
 
 
New institutional theory, which finds it origins primarily in the works of Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983), is predominantly a sociological model that 
relates organizations to the environments which surround them.  Institutionalization, which 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) developed in great detail, “involves the process by which social 
processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule like status in social thought and 
action,” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 341).  These rules, or myths, provide a cognitive framework for 
decision making, and supply actors with the means for interpreting the behavior of other 
members.   
New institutional theory extends this definition to organizations.  Within this context, 
organizations are heavily influenced by rationalized institutional rules that can differ 
significantly from efficient economic pressure.  Adhering to the rules and integrating the myths 
into organizational structure provides legitimacy, which Suchman (1995: 574) defines as “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.”  
 Kilner notes that many senior leaders, when evaluating the MilSpace technology, place 
great emphasis on awards such as the Harvard Business Review’s Top 20 Business Ideas of 
2006.  Lacking the means to evaluate the benefits of distributed community, these leaders rely on 
an external source of legitimacy.  Interestingly, the CCL makes an effort to not publicize such 
accolades to their users, as the junior officer community does not view such awards as sources of 
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legitimacy, but rather as indications that the community may not be as grassroots as they would 
prefer.      
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) framing of isomorphic change within new institutional 
theory applies directly to the technology of MilSpace.  Institutional isomorphism (meaning 
identical or similar in form or structure) is achieved via three mechanisms: coercive, mimetic, 
and normative isomorphism.   New institutional theory is effective at explaining the long-
standing survival of organizations which are deeply embedded in societal structure, such as 
schools, hospitals, and firms that rely heavily on government contracts.  These organizations are 
highly resistant because the institutional environment protects them with rules and legal 
regulations.   
Thus, even if the changing environment dictates that a defense company’s product is no 
longer necessary, it can survive because of existing guaranteed contracts, or it may provide 
ineffective services and still endure because it was awarded on a cost-plus contract.  By 
maximizing legitimacy through adoption of rationalized elements, an organization achieves 
stability and increased access to resources which allow it to endure (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
Because they are not as institutionalized as other such organizations, the CCL must consistently 
maintain its legitimacy through the services it provides the organization and the connections its 
directors make throughout the community. 
 Fligstein (2001) describes the importance of social skill in the alteration of institutional 
environments.  The new institutional concept of local orders is linked to an actor’s ability to 
interact with symbols and myths to induce cooperation.  Fligstein (2001: 108) writes, “The 
process of institution building takes place in the context of powerful actors attempting to produce 
  127 
  
rules of interaction to stabilize their situation.”  Fligstein (2001) is criticizing the more traditional 
new institutional theorists for treating actors as passive executors of institutional norms.   
A skilled actor will adapt to the environment and engage in bricolage: gathering the 
surrounding elements and changing the institutional environment through brokerage and 
negotiation.  Skilled social actors become the means of establishing a new institutional 
environment, just as the creators of Company Command have created a new means for creating 
knowledge and sharing ideas in the military. 
In a series of three experiments, Zucker (1977) shows that (1) transmission of culture 
from one generation to another occurs, (2) maintenance of the culture takes place, and (3) the 
persistence of culture is dependent upon resistance to change.  When institutionalization is high, 
culture is more effectively transmitted, maintained, and defended against alteration.  Swidler 
(1986: 284) expands upon the impact of culture, which provides “resources for constructing 
strategies of action.”  The MilSpace technology may witness further growth and expansion 
throughout the military as generations of junior officers rise within the military hierarchy and 
extol the advantages of taking part in the community. 
It is also possible that MilSpace has succeeded in part because it serves as a source of 
legitimacy for its larger parent organizations.  Recognizing that younger generations desire social 
networking technologies, West Point and the larger Army may benefit from MilSpace as a means 
of becoming better aligned with the institutional environment.  Many who view the military as a 
domineering, hierarchical bureaucracy are surprised to learn that the Army has not only 
permitted, but promotes use of a fairly unrestricted CoP.  As social network sites become more 
prevalent, particularly among younger generations of employees, I predict: 
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Proposition 13: The increased use and legitimization of social networking technology will 




The Costs of Connectivity 
 While much research has demonstrated the benefits of CoPs to organizations, it is vital to 
note the potential costs of such network structures.  In her discussion of the role of organizations 
in the production of workplace techno-scientific knowledge, Vaughan (1999) highlights a 
paradox in that the very structures designed to coordinate action often create uncertainty.  Social 
networking technology can increase horizontal and vertical information flows and unite disparate 
meanings systems.  Through sharing the organization’s dedicated language and culture, barriers 
can be taken down.  But is this only a best-case scenario?  Can the opposite occur, such as 
individuals communicating within a closed space and thus further reinforcing uniformity of 
thought and structural secrecy?  Potential downsides such as these deserve more attention and 
research. 
 Kogut (2000: 408) writes, “If benefits of identity are to lower the costs of communication 
and coordination, they come at a cost.  For identities represent a norm which indicates avenues of 
exploration; by implication, they also prohibit certain path.”  Is it possible the MilSpace 
facilitates path dependence?  Discussion areas and the categorization of topics provides a 
framework for organizing information, yet it may also inhibit the generation of new knowledge 
boundaries.  Following this argument I propose: 
 
Proposition 14: An organizational community of practice can contribute to path 
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 Perhaps the incorporation of CoPs into organizational structures is but a management fad, 
destined to fade as social network sites either fade in popularity or become fully take-for-granted 
(Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999).  Abrahamson (1996: 261) considers short-lived management 
fashions and numerous other concerns posed by Rogers (1995) via the pro-innovation bias, and 
turns the focus of innovation diffusion to the dynamic processing of management fashion and 
rational management techniques, which are “labels that denote for organizational stakeholders 
both certain managerial goals that effective managers should pursue, as well as the means to 
pursue these goals efficiently.”  For example, he writes, “Alternatively, the belief that a 
management technique is either innovative or an improvement may be inaccurate,” (Abrahamson 
1996: 265).   
Benders and Van Veen (2001) contend that Abrahamson’s supposed focus on beliefs in 
specific management fashion definitions is a dilemma.  They propose that management fashion 
be redefined in order to incorporate the flexibility exercised by management practitioners when 
employing new techniques.  They write, “Interpretive viability increases the size of the potential 
market because different buyers may recognize their own situation in the description,” (Benders 
& Van Veen, 2001: 37).  The creators of management fashion maintain ambiguity in order to 
broaden the appeal of their work.   
 Does MilSpace have the negative effect of transmitting faulty information, or of creating 
excessively homogenous sub-units within the military?  While few would argue against the 
benefit of transmitting proven best practices throughout an organization, others may point to the 
value of heterogeneity among a conglomerate’s sub-organizations.  The sharing of knowledge 
does not mandate that transmissions be best practices.   
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CHAPTER 5: FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS 
 My research revolves around the development of leader identity in organizations.  
Through this dissertation I have proposed a nuanced understanding of how organizational 
members move in and out of phases of leader identity development.  The following sections 
address my other research interests related to the topic of organizational leadership identity.  The 
most fundamental, interesting, and important question I wish to answer with my future work is 
“Does leader identity spread through social networks?”   
I further conjecture that mentorship plays a crucial role in guiding organizational 
members into and through the leader identity development stage.  I make some final comments 
regarding communities of practice, and in the final section of future work I spend some length 
applying leader identity to an earlier research interest of mine: employee turnover.  I conclude 
with some final comments regarding this dissertation and the direction of leader identity 
research. 
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FUTURE WORK 
Leader Identity Contagion 
An early draft of my dissertation proposal centered around the research question, “Does 
leader identity spread through social networks?”  Applying the proposed stages of the 
development framework, I sought to ask, “If an individual is surrounded by organizational 
members engaged in leader identity construction (or leader identity stagnation or leader identity 
destruction), is she more likely to also enter this stage?”  Research surrounding this question 
could lead to a better understanding of propositions such as: 
 
Proposition A: Organizational members connected to peers undergoing leader identity 
construction are more likely to themselves engage in leader identity construction.   
 
Proposition B: Organizational members connected to peers undergoing leader identity 
stagnation are more likely to themselves engage in leader identity stagnation.   
 
Proposition C: Organizational members connected to peers undergoing leader identity 
destruction are more likely to themselves engage in leader identity destruction.   
 
The primary network data collected during my study has only two solid points of time.  I 
believe that with additional time and data collection this research question could be addressed, 
and deserves examination. 
 
Mentorship and Leader Identity Construction 
Mentor programs at the U.S. Military Academy force cadets with particular deficiencies 
(rules infraction, honor violation, academic/physical/military shortcoming) into a phase of leader 
identity construction; the individual sees himself as a future officer and is actively guided 
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through leader identity construction.  Many deviations from expected leader norms result in 
cadets with poorly developed leader identity.  Mentors can be effective for altering an 
organizational member’s referent other (Adams, 1963), or the target of his self-comparison.  
Rather than comparing himself to a peer in a civilian college, a cadet will compare himself to a 
recently graduated lieutenant, and alter his self perception and identity.  As a private sector point 
of comparison, an organization may similarly desire leaders who identify with the parent 
company, and those leaders may be more inclined to do so if paired with a mentor who has 
internalized organizational values. 
 
Communities of Practice and Professional Identity 
During an interview with Pete Kilner, one of the founders of CompanyCommand, he 
remarked, “I believe that the evolution of community members could be the most interesting 
concept.”  Kilner and the MilSpace administrators have noticed a pattern of behavior among 
many members.  Cadets and junior officers wishing to join MilSpace must apply through the 
CALDOL.  Part of the application asks, “Why do you want to join MilSpace?”  Many join for 
the purpose of connecting with peers in the larger organization (i.e. reasons related to making 
connections or having social interaction).  MilSpace is not designed like social media, however, 
as described in Chapter 4.  Some members change their patterns of interaction from social to 
more professional participation.   
I propose identifying a group of officers who state social reasons for joining MilSpace 
and then trace their online behavior and categorize it, potentially showing an increase in 
“professional” activities.  This would require defining different types of interaction: e.g. 
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uploading or downloading of important files and active participation in professional discussion 
would be classified differently than other interactions that deal less with being an Army officer.   
I think the management field is interested in these concepts because it can show how 
organizations can exploit the potentially lucrative employee skill sets of online social networking 
and use of virtual communities of practice as a way of influencing professional identity 
development.  I have found little academic research on this topic, and I see that more can be done 
to investigate distributed communities of practice and their impact on professional identity. 
 
Community of Practice Administration and Participation 
In Chapter 4, I described how MilSpace directors select a prominent discussion from 
within the CoP and collaborate with the authors of noteworthy posts to enhance their 
submissions.  These are then published in Army Magazine, a hardcopy publication with a 
monthly distribution to over 120,000 people.  In 2010 I began a study that focused on the authors 
of these published submissions.   
The MilSpace directors worked together to create a monthly discussion, known as the CC 
Jam (Company Command Jam, or discussion).  Examples of past topics include: the platoon 
leader – platoon sergeant relationship, working with JIIM (joint, interagency, intergovernmental, 
and multinational) partners, developing military expertise, handling a crime scene during combat 
conditions, and company-level innovation in Afghanistan.  My original approach to this study 
was to examine one calendar year of these discussions and parse two populations: 1) prominent 
contributors (with prominence being determined by length of postings and number of ‘likes’ by 
other members) who were selected for publication in Army Magazine, and 2) prominent 
contributors who were not selected for publication.  I could then compare the pre- and post-
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publication behavior of those selected for recognition in the print magazine, as well as compare 
their behavior to those not featured.   
Based on my understanding of communities of practice and member behavior I proposed: 
 
Proposition D: Featured organizational members within the CoP experience a greater sense 
of identity with the parent organization. 
 
Proposition E: Featured organizational members within the larger external organization 
experience a greater sense of identity with the parent organization. 
 
Propositions F: Featured organizational members, either within the CoP or the larger 
external organization, increase their participation. 
 
Proposition G: Featured organizational members bring their social group with them to the 
CoP. 
 
Proposition H: CoP participation enhances member professionalism. 
 
 
Leader Identity and Turnover 
A vital component of the U.S. Army’s organizational structure is its base of captains.  At 
this rank, officers have completed several years of training and have served successfully for three 
to eight years.  Sometimes referred to as the private sector’s equivalent of middle managers, 
captains are also eligible to leave the military at the expiration of their terms of service.  Officers 
are commissioned from one of three sources: Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (conducted at 
civilian colleges), West Point, or Officers’ Candidate School (where enlisted soldiers are trained 
to become officers).  Completing each of these training opportunities confers a commission as a 
second lieutenant and incurs a commitment to the Army, typically three to eight years in length.   
As an all-volunteer force, officers have the option of leaving the Army at the completion 
of these commitments.  As was the subject of many media stories around 2007, unprecedented 
percentages of officers were selecting to leave the military, and the Army was in desperate need 
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of more middle managers to fill voids within its structure.  The problem of officer shortages was 
exasperated by Congress’ call to expand the Army by 65,000 soldiers.  This added six combat 
brigades to the already existing 42, and brought the active duty organization to over 540,000 
people.     
Loss rates from USMA classes at the time showed an increasing trend.  In 2005, 35% of 
the West Point Class of 2000 left the Army.  In 2006, 46% of the Class of 2001 left, and an 
unprecedented 58% of the Class of 2002 exited in 2007 at the end of their obligation.  These 
percentages were actually reduced artificially as officers who intended to leave the organization 
were unable due to stop-loss (being held in place for deployment or because of special needs), 
being deployed, or from completing extended commitments (such as an eight year commitment 
in return for pilot training).   
Officers cannot simply be hired from outside with no specialized training, as a private 
sector corporation may do if growing appreciably.  The only way to add senior officers where 
none were planned for several years ago (when they would have been commissioned as 
lieutenants based on projections for X number of majors, lieutenant colonels, etc.) is to promote 
at higher rates and reduce promotion timelines.  The Army has done this; for example, the 
amount of time until new lieutenants reached the rank of captain was reduced from 48 months (in 
1999) to 36 months (in 2007), and promotion rates to captain in 2007 exceeded 98%.  A well-
known joke, which also held at least some truth, was, “Don’t get a DUI or kill anyone and you’ll 
make major.”   
While there are a number of explanations for the shortage of young officers, the primary 
reason is that officers are leaving the Army at a higher rate than expected.  What caused this 
increase in voluntary turnover?  The majority of officers who leave the Army prior to retirement 
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do so at the end of their first term of commitment.  For officers commissioned out of the Reserve 
Officer Training Corps, this is generally after four years of service, while United States Military 
Academy graduates owe the Army five years of active duty service.  The military extended some 
of these commitments through mandatory stop-loss, in which selected military units or 
occupational specialties were not permitted to leave or retire.   
Others were forced into staying due to deployment windows: periods of time either 
slightly before or during deployment rotations in which soldiers were not allowed to transfer 
between units or exit the Army.  These were only temporary measures, however, and those 
committed to leaving were generally able to within a year of their desired departure date.   
Numerous factors affect an officer's decision to remain in the military, but fundamental in 
the decision making process is the perceived ability to quickly attain a job of equal or near-equal 
responsibility and compensation, or to gain entry into a graduate program of choice.  Tied to this 
is the concept that officers are induced to remain in the military because the value of their work 
experiences is significantly greater in the service than in the civilian sector.  An officer who 
spends three years in Iraq and Afghanistan knows that her evaluators, and the Army as a whole, 
place tremendous value in the experience she gained while deployed.  A civilian company, 
however, will give such experiences a lower value, particularly in comparison to the officer's 
peers in the civilian sector who spent those three years working successfully in their career 
fields.  This makes it less likely that an officer can transition from the military into a comparable 
job elsewhere.   
It is a general perception that deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan provides intangible skills 
and leadership experience that may be valued by corporate institutions or graduate programs, but 
that deploying more than once does not add significantly to one’s resume or acceptance packet.  
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By the fourth year of service, most officers have spent six months to a year in military schools, 
approximately two years training at a home base, and at least one year deployed overseas.  They 
are approaching the end of their commitment, they have the experience that is valued by external 
agencies, and they foresee that future military service will not add significantly to their 
competitive statistics.  Thus, at approximately the four year point in their military service, 
officers decide that their uniformed service has reached its maximum value to private sector 
business and graduate school programs.   
In order to add to this discussion, I interviewed two associate directors for MBA 
admissions from Columbia Business School, Robert Shea and David Keefe.  They confirmed 
that the majority of MBA applicants with military backgrounds are generally high performers, 
and that extensive deployments are not necessarily more valuable than a single combat 
experience.  Shea said, “Historically we’ve had really good experience with military people.  
Their competitive and collaborative nature are not at odds, similar to varsity athletes.  They are 
almost universally incredibly impressive.”  Keefe stated that when the admissions committee 
meets to review applications, the “leadership element is just checked off.”  Those with military 
backgrounds have “performed under pressure and a great amount of responsibility at a young 
age.”  Both interviewees agreed that corporate recruiters love military backgrounds as well.   
A not uncommon point of discussion among young officers, particularly those on 
deployment, is “What would a civilian corporation have to pay a middle manager to live in a 
foreign country for 14 months, carry out enormously stressful workloads, work every weekend, 
suffer through harsh living conditions, brave life-threatening scenarios daily or weekly, and be 
separated from family with limited phone and internet access?”  The obvious counter to those in 
the military who have such heartache with deployment conditions as this question captures is, 
  138 
  
“Sorry buddy, you signed up for this.”  This is a valid point, and I hypothesize that many officers 
bid adieu to the military for exactly this reason.  At the end of their commitment, they do not 
have to be “signed up” anymore, and so they leave.  The construction (or stagnation or 
destruction) of a leader identity clearly impacts these turnover decisions. 
The U.S. Department of Defense service academies maintain an online business 
networking resource for service academy alumni, known as SABRD, for the Service Academy 
Business Resource Directory.  A basic analysis of the data entries reveals that the preponderance 
of officers leaving the Army are entering the corporate community or attending graduate school, 
particularly business, engineering, and law programs. 
In 2007, the Army emplaced organizational policies to stem the flow of captains out of 
the service.  Approximately 16,000 captains were offered their choice of a Critical Skills 
Retention Bonus (a cash payment of $25,000 to $35,000), relocation to a different Army post, 
reassignment to a new job function, or possible participation in military schooling or a two-year 
graduate degree (Wardynski, et al., 2010).  Officers who accepted these incentives incurred an 
additional service commitment.  While several thousand captains accepted one of these offers, 
many captains who were “on the fence” claim that the choices were not good enough to 
significantly impact retention, and that most accepters were already planning to remain in the 
Army for 20+ years (military retirement is offered beginning at service year 20).  As one former 
captain stated in an interview, “I’m being offered $30,000, which after taxes maybe amounts to 
$25,000, and in return I’ll owe three years and probably end up staying through 20.  It’s simply 
not enough money.  Down the road I could make that up in one year in the business world.”   
How can organization theory help address these issues?  The work of Mitchell, et al. 
(2001) and Lee, et al. (2004) has added to traditional work on employee turnover through the 
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development of a construct termed job embeddedness.  Fit (employees perceive themselves to be 
compatible with the organization and the community in which they reside), links (employees 
have strong ties to others in the organization and the community), and sacrifice (employees thing 
that quitting the organization would carry high costs, such as professional ties and a meaningful 
social life) are the three main components.   
In addition to finding support in the private sector, job embeddedness is appealing in a 
military context because it accounts for multiple dimensions outside of the workplace.  The 
military lifestyle is often viewed as “all consuming,” and more traditional predictors of job 
turnover, such as job satisfaction and organizational commitment, often fail to consider several 
important factors in a military setting.  Job embeddedness, which draws clearly on the work of 
Granovetter (1985) and Uzzi (1996, 1997), captures some of the network effects that influence 
Army turnover.   
A bulk of the voluntary turnover literature stems from March and Simon’s (1958) 
landmark book Organizations.  Key factors to their turnover model were an employee’s 
perceived ease of transferring jobs and the desire to do so, which have generally been modeled 
through job alternatives and job satisfaction.   
Equity theory predicts that an employee compares the ratio of his inputs to outcomes to 
the ratio of someone else, termed a referent other or a target of comparison (Adams, 1963, 1965).  
The referent can be anyone, but is most often someone of comparable status: a co-worker of 
equal education and experience, for example.  If the referent has a higher ratio of inputs to 
outcomes (e.g. their work to compensation ratio is greater than one’s own) then the person 
making the comparison feels guilt.  If the ratio is lower, the feeling is one of anger.  Equity 
theory predicts that the individual will then change his behavior or alter his perception of inputs 
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and outcomes to even the ratio by a number of different means, thus removing the source of 
cognitive dissonance.  For example, an employee may lower inputs by skipping work more often 
in the case of negative inequity, or increase inputs by staying late at the office in the case of 
positive inequity.  An employee may also rationalize that his skills are more valuable than he 
previously gave himself credit for, etc.   
Organizational research has typically focused on inequality in salaries, and the resultant 
effects on employee performance and loyalty (Greenberg, 1990).  Limited research has been 
conducted on voluntary employee turnover as a result of perceived inequity, despite the fact that 
Adams (1963, 1965) predicted it to be a potential means for eliminating employee discontent.  
Goodman (1974) also focused on pay issues, but expanded the equity framework by answering 
the following questions, “What kinds of referents do people use in evaluating their pay? How do 
these referents relate to pay satisfaction? How does one explain the differential selection of these 
referents?”  He examines three classes of comparison targets (other, system, and self), and an 
individual will experience pay dissatisfaction if input/outcome inequity is sensed in any of the 
three (Goodman, 1974).   
Recent research has shown the varied effects of equity related to internal versus external 
referent choice.  Selection of an internal referent is often a better predictor of perceived 
organizational support and motivation in the workplace, while choosing an external referent is a 
better indicator of turnover intention (Shore, et al., 2006).  Prior to this, Ronen (1986) showed 
that external referents are more important than internal referents when predicting job attitudes 
and behavioral propensities.  This suggests that the abundance or lack of external job 
opportunities plays a mediating role on the effect of equity on turnover.  This seems logical; an 
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officer with dim hopes for a good civilian job is likely to stay, even if dissatisfied with 
deployment schedules, pay, etc.    
Equity theory is a special case of Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory.  When 
a referent’s input/outcome ratio does not match one’s own, the subsequent discomfort can be 
alleviated by altering inputs and outcomes or changing the target of comparison (Festinger, 1957; 
Adams, 1963).  In the 1970s, Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973) added to the discussion by 
introducing the concept of psychological equity, in which individuals change their mental 
perceptions of inputs and outcomes, as opposed to altering actual behavior.    
 Past studies have indicated that pay inequity with external referents is more predictive of 
turnover intention than is pay inequity with internal referents (Shore, et al., 2006), as the sense of 
inequity when comparing self to external referents is greater than when comparing to internal 
referents.  I predict that this effect will carry over to comparisons of factors other than pay.  
Based on these expectations, I propose the following: 
 
Proposition I: External pay and lifestyle comparisons by organizational members will be 
more strongly related to turnover intentions than will internal pay and lifestyle 
comparisons.  
   
 
Relating this further to my dissertation research, I see the importance of organizational 
identity in reducing turnover intention.  If a member has a strong leader identity (in the case of 
Army officers), he is more likely to compare himself to others within the organization, and is 
therefore perhaps less likely to leave.   
 
Proposition J: The stronger the organizational identity, the more likely a member is to 
select an internal versus external target of comparison. 
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A hole exists in the literature in regard to applying the dynamics discussed above to the 
military.  While this is certainly understandable given the narrowness of scope, turnover in the 
military has recently become a topic of national interest, primarily due to the increased attrition 
rates from the Army’s junior officer corps at a critical point in time.  In one of the earliest studies 
of military turnover, Norman (1971) concludes that an officer’s decision to stay or go is “based 
not so much on what his actual situation is as on what he thinks it is.”  Norman (1971) does not 
delve into organization theory, and the research is primarily an analysis of survey data, but the 
above statement is applicable to the retention issue; even if an officer imagines a carefree civilian 
lifestyle where he swims in cash and hardly works, if he believes it to be valid then it will factor 
into his stay/leave analysis.  
Research related to the Army’s conversion to an All Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973 
relates to officer loss due to sudden competition with the civilian job market, and indicates that 
minority and female officer retention in the Army was higher than for white males due to equal 
pay among ranks (Stewart & Firestone, 1992).  Gotz and McCall (1983) developed a model to 
research what they termed “the stay/leave decisions” of Air Force officers.  Unfortunately, much 
of their work is inapplicable to junior officers in the current Army force structure.  Two of the 
model’s fundamental factors are promotion probability and mandatory separation and retirement 
probabilities, neither of which can compare to the Army at present because promotion rates are 
exceptionally high and forced retirement is not a concern for captains.   
 In the 1960s, Butler and Bridges (1978) developed a scale for measuring intent to remain 
in or leave the Army, based on research that intention to stay or leave an organization is strongly 
related to turnover.  Known as the Military Career Commitment Gradient (MCCOG), the scale 
was a single question given to newly commissioned officers with four-year mandatory 
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commitments to the Army.  Seven years later, the authors analyzed the pool of participants and 
showed that their intent to stay as new second lieutenants was highly predictive of their actual 
stay or leave decision (Butler & Bridges, 1978).    
After an exhaustive review of organization theory and the concepts of job embeddedness, 
retention, and status, I developed two surveys for distribution to several hundred current and 
former Army captains.  The content of the surveys was adjusted based upon the responses to two 
rounds of initial surveys.  The final surveys were created using computer software on the 
Qualtrics website (www.qualtrics.com) and were distributed via email to members of the West 
Point graduating class of 2001.  The email distribution list was obtained from the USMA 
Association of Graduates, and was incomplete.  Of the 985 graduating members of the class, it is 
unclear how many individuals received the message.  The email message read: 
I’m doing some work related to Army retention, and it would be very helpful if you 
could fill out a survey for me within the next few days. It does not take long to 
complete.  
 
-If you are still in the Army, please take the survey located at: 
http://columbia.qualtrics.com/SE?SID=SV_6QICtvGBVkvlqzq&SVID=Prod  
 





293 subjects successfully completed a survey (164 still in the Army, 129 no longer in 
service).  The sample is not a random selection of Army captains, but it does offer many insights 
into current organization policies and the thought processes of many who remain in service, plan 
to leave shortly, or who have already left.   
In using this sample to represent the group of Army captains, additional bias in the survey 
may stem from the following: I identified myself via email address and signature block; officers 
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currently deployed are less likely to receive the email, and therefore may be under-represented in 
the sample; those with strong feelings about Army retention and organizational policies are more 
likely to respond.  I gathered additional data by conducting six in-person interviews and 12 
telephone interviews with current and former Army captains, and two in-person interviews with 
MBA admissions directors at Columbia Business School. 
 Research in the area of family size generally attempts to relate social and environmental 
factors to the decision to procreate and may influence someone’s decision to join or leave an 
organization.  Common variables throughout past work include parental age, education level, and 
income (individual, household, or net assets).  Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990) raise the 
concepts of opportunity costs of children when they write, “Higher wage rates, due perhaps to 
greater human or physical capital per worker, induce a substitution effect away from fertility by 
raising the cost of children.”  The authors conclude that investments in human capital strongly 
affect economic growth, noting education appears to be a major contributing factor.  They 
disregard age as a primary factor, however, by using a simplified model that assumes everyone 
lives for two periods, childhood and adulthood.  Mathematics eventually predicts values for the 
marginal utility of producing children, which are based upon fixed time and goods spent 
investing in them. 
 Similar research was conducted by Moffitt (1986), who agrees that the cost of a child is 
the foregone earnings, and is therefore based on a wage rate.  Some variables used in the paper 
include level of permanent initial wage and level of exogenous wealth (consisting of the 
husband’s income stream plus household assets).  This generates some difficulty when applied to 
the unemployed, who have no income.   
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 Conger and Campbell (1978), in attempting to “capture the dynamic nature of household 
decision-making,” found that “certain variables, however, especially education and income, 
proved to have greater explanatory power than anticipated.”  The authors employed a Female 
Participation Rate Equation because of the generally accepted logic that salaried work has a 
negative impact on birth rates.  They include information on private medical expenditures during 
delivery and throughout the lifetime of a child to measure maintenance costs of bearing and 
raising children.   
 In addition to incorporating macroeconomic and generation variables, Becker and Barro 
(1998) refer to altruism and utility in regard to children.  There is an equilibrium between child 
utility and consumption of a given set of household goods.  They write, “The marginal benefit of 
an additional child… must balance the marginal cost.”  If this finding holds true, then decreased 
marginal costs for military children should lead to larger families.     
 Military compensation augments families in ways that reduce the costs of children.  Basic 
Allowance for Housing (BAH) is dependent upon local housing costs, rank, and whether or not 
the member has a dependent (usually a wife or child).  Although BAH does not increase for 
additional family members beyond the first, it may have an effect on family size by inducing 
early marriage.  Service members receive higher BAH rates when they have a dependent, thus 
there is an incentive to marry at an early age.  BAH is also not considered taxable income.  
Officers living on military installations do not receive BAH, but are provided housing that is 
determined by rank and number of dependents.  Larger homes are provided to members with 
larger families.  The following was copied from the USMA family housing website
12
:     
                                                          
12
 Available at: http://www.usma.edu/dhpw/Housing/housing2.htm 
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Married Officers in the grade of Colonel will be assigned a minimum of four 
bedrooms.  Soldiers in the grades of Lieutenant Colonel… will be assigned a 
minimum of three bedrooms.  All other personnel will be assigned to quarters by 
number of family members, based on their gender and age.  When an inbound 
sponsor or spouse is pregnant as confirmed by medical authority and is 
accompanied by other family members, the baby will be considered in the 
bedroom count.  
 
Another element of the Army compensation package is a cost of living adjustment 
(COLA).  This is additional pay that service members receive to offset the increases to costs of 
living based on geographical area.  For example, captains with over six years of service with a 
spouse or child who are stationed within zip code 10027 (part of Manhattan) receive an 
additional $407 per month, while those without dependents receive $308.  One other example of 
compensation being driven by family dynamics is Family Separation Pay, a separate payment of 
$250 a month given to military members with dependents who are deployed from home for more 
than a month.   
Discounted food and goods are available to organization members at the Commissary 
(grocery store) and Post Exchange (discount retail similar to Wal Mart), which sell at 
approximately 20% less than commercial markets and are tax free.  These institutions are 
recognized as important and legitimate sources of compensation, and are subsidized by the 
federal government.  The use of such establishments lowers the costs of living and child raising 
for military families.   
 The Department of Defense’s Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) programs are 
designed to bolster military readiness by providing soldier and family support services.  Some of 
its subordinate organizations include Army Emergency Relief (providing immediate-need loans), 
Child Development Services, Autocraft Shop, Armed Forces Community Service, education 
centers, fitness and recreation facilities, and youth services.  MWR improves the quality of life 
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for members and their families and reduces the costs associated with raising a child.  A military 
couple is able to take advantage of free or inexpensive services that help in the care, education, 
and overall well-being of their children.   
 The armed forces have a long history of providing health care for its members.  Most 
dependent family members do not make co-payments for medical services, and have low-cost 
pharmacies and a catastrophic cap that cannot exceed $1,000.  The dental program provides 
affordable and extensive coverage for families that includes general dentistry, orthodontics, and 
anesthesia.  As a family grows, it becomes increasingly economical for it to remain in the Army 
under military healthcare.     
 Although difficult to quantify, many service members appreciate the environment their 
career affords them.  Military communities are quite safe (most have controlled entry at guarded 
gates and patrols by military police).  A couple may be more likely to increase family size if they 
know their home will be in a secure area with good neighbors, and their children will go to a safe 
school with friends from other military families.  Although service members generally have to 
move frequently, there is often a good support network of both old friends and members of the 
gaining organization that reach out to new arrivals.  Knowing this can help families feel more 
comfortable about facing the future challenges of child rearing.  Thus, the Army provides a range 
of organizational programs and incentives that reduce the costs of having children and encourage 
family growth.  How do these factor into a junior leader’s turnover decision.   
 The Army is struggling to retain its captains, and the captains are struggling to maintain 
stable, present relationships.  Organization policies are encouraging them to get married and 
have children, yet they are then asked to train and deploy continuously away from their families.  
When asked why he left the service, one former officer wrote:  
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It comes down to one word: family.  I was married right before I got out of the military 
and couldn't see putting my family (wife and future kids) through the trauma of possibly 
not having a father/husband figure in their lives.  I was an infantry officer that lost many 
good friends in Iraq/Afghanistan and realized that I didn't want to gamble my life when I 
had completed my service to the nation.  I felt I owed it to my family to be there for them 
through everything.  They are my number one priority, not my Army career. 
 
From the survey responses below, current and former officers clearly feel that having a 
family hinders retention: 
 
From Survey of Former Officers 
Question 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Responses Mean 
Being married 
encourages officers to 
remain in the Army. 3 19 27 51 29 129 3.65 
Having children 
encourages officers to 
remain in the Army. 3 27 22 36 40 128 3.65 
 
From Survey of Current Officers 
Question 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Responses Mean 
Being married 
encourages officers to 
remain in the Army. 5 32 34 63 29 163 3.48 
Having children 
encourages officers to 
remain in the Army. 4 37 28 62 32 163 3.5 
 
Note that when interpreting the Mean, “1” corresponds to “Strongly Agree” and “5” corresponds 
to “Strongly Disagree.”  Thus, for example, a mean of 3.65 indicates an average response 
between “Neutral” and “Disagree.” 
Another respondent offered a particularly applicable comment: 
I thought I wanted to have a family and I knew as long as I was in the Army the way 
things are right now, I could never accomplish that.  I've come to find out that I don't 
want a family anymore.  I thought about going back in to the Army, but the Army of the 
past 3 years isn't the Army I knew and loved for the 12 years I served. 
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Here seems to be an officer who perfectly models the conflict described in this paper.  While 
in the organization, he was influenced by policies and social pressure to want a family, yet the 
demands of the job forced him out based on this mental construct.  The normative influence of 
military life is pressuring members to have families, yet the realities of Army life discourage it.   
 Former and current officers were/are generally satisfied with their military compensation: 
From Survey of Former Officers 
How satisfied 
were you with the 
following: 
Very 
Satisfied Satisfied Neutral Dissatisfied 
Very 
Dissatisfied Responses Mean 
Your military pay 23 75 17 13 1 129 2.18 
Your military 
healthcare 32 53 21 20 3 129 2.29 
Commissary, PX, 
MWR, and other 
money-saving 
opportunities 31 54 33 10 1 129 2.19 
 
From Survey of Current Officers 
How satisfied you 
are with the 
following 
Very 
Satisfied Satisfied Neutral Dissatisfied 
Very 
Dissatisfied Responses Mean 
Your military pay 13 112 22 13 3 163 2.27 
Your military 
healthcare 26 85 21 22 7 161 2.37 
Commissary, PX, 
MWR, and other 
money-saving 
opportunities 17 69 44 23 9 162 2.62 
 
What is most interesting about the above statistics is that those who left the Army were 
more satisfied with their military incentives than those still serving (mean is less in all three 
categories for former officers, or closer to Satisfied).  
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 How have the events of September 11
th
, 2001, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
affected the organization?  The following questions attempt to answer that question from the 
perspective of junior officers and their families: 
 
From Survey of Former Officers 
  
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Responses Mean 
It is more difficult for 
an officer to find a 
potential spouse now 
than prior to the 
Global War on 
Terror. 52 43 21 10 3 129 1.98 
It is more difficult for 
an officer to maintain 
a marriage now than 
prior to the Global 
War on Terror. 80 36 6 4 2 128 1.53 
It is more difficult for 
an officer to have 
children now than 
prior to the Global 
War on Terror. 73 39 10 7 0 129 1.62 
It is more difficult to 
be a dual-military 
couple now than prior 
to the Global War on 
Terror. 89 18 17 3 1 128 1.51 
Senior military 
leaders understand the 
strains on junior 
officer social 
relationships and 
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From Survey of Current Officers 
  
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Responses Mean 
It is more difficult to 
find a potential spouse 
now than prior to the 
Global War on Terror. 90 46 17 8 2 163 1.69 
It is more difficult to 
maintain a marriage 
now than prior to the 
Global War on Terror. 122 29 6 4 2 163 1.37 
It is more difficult to 
have children now than 
prior to the Global War 
on Terror. 99 41 16 4 3 163 1.6 
It is more difficult to 
be a dual-military 
couple now than prior 
to the Global War on 
Terror. 101 20 36 3 2 162 1.67 
Senior military leaders 
understand the strains 
on junior officer social 
relationships and 
families. 4 29 23 50 57 163 3.78 
 
Both groups show strong support of the concept that the Army’s operational tempo makes it 
difficult to start a relationship and begin a family.  The last question in this group relates to a 
general perception that senior Army officers are “out of touch” with junior leaders, and do not 
understand the impact of strained family relationships.  One former officer wrote:  
I was burned out on back-to-back deployment cycles and disappointed with 
Battalion and Brigade level leadership.  Senior leaders have a 1990's mindset 
(from when the Army was getting smaller and the nation was not at war) that is 
not conducive to maintaining troop strength. 
 
Another added: 
I wanted to start a family and did not want to see my children grow up in pictures.  
My wife has a professional career and I did not want to have her shoulder all the 
responsibility of raising a family while I was deployed or training. 
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Many of the problems currently faced by the Army stem from the number and duration of 
deployments, and little can be done by the organization to limit the demands placed on it by 
civilian leadership.  The Army must fight where it is called, and in doing so it must call upon its 
young leaders to serve multiple times, sometimes with dire consequences for the families 
involved.  One officer, still serving, wrote: 
Who ever came up with the idea of 15-month deployments is a complete heartless 
<expletive>.  My girls will be five when I return from this deployment and I will 
have been gone for over 3.5 years of their lives; a massive cause of my marital 
problems which are now culminating in my divorce.  Other than that, the current 
leadership is spot on when it come to taking care of its troops (extreme sarcasm).  
I will have tons of experience with two company commands, multiple combat 
deployments and operations in different theaters across the globe, but no family to 
come home to.  What more can a man ask for? 
 
Deployments are likely to slow following the projected exit from Afghanistan by the 
end of 2014.  There is still something to be said about Army policies, culture, and pay plans 
that influence its members to have families.  From interviews with fellow officers, they 
clearly value personal relationships with superior officers who show care and concern for the 
subordinate and his family.  One powerful role model can strongly influence a large group of 
junior officers.  Some of the most disheartened captains in the survey have served in Army 
units where their senior leadership has repeatedly failed them, or simply did not act ethically 
or morally.  
 
From Survey of Former Officers 
  
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Responses Mean 
I had a positive Army 
mentor who encouraged me 
to remain in the Army. 9 42 15 40 23 129 3.2 
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From Survey of Current Officers 
  
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Responses Mean 
I have a positive Army 
mentor who has encouraged 
me to remain in the Army. 18 54 29 43 19 163 2.94 
 
The survey responses above indicate that this could be a factor, as those who remain in 
service tend to agree that they have a mentor, while those who left indicate that on average they 
did not have a positive mentor.  The Army may face problems of inexperience and incompetence 
as it decreases promotion timelines and increases promotion rates.  This could also lead to the 
same feelings of frustration found among surveyed subjects in the Stouffer, et al. (1949) study, in 
which members of a group with high promotion rates felt undervalued relative to those in a 
group with less advancement. 
 Army policies and the military lifestyle have obvious implications for the spouses of 
officers.  I surveyed for this using the following questions:  
 
From Survey of Former Officers 
  
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Responses Mean 
It is difficult for Army 
spouses to have their own 
careers. 55 52 12 9 1 129 1.83 
The Army does a good job 
of supporting spouses' 
careers. 2 5 36 48 37 128 3.88 
The Army does a good job 
of supporting spouses. 3 45 39 29 12 128 3.02 
(If applicable): My spouse is 
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From Survey of Current Officers 
  
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Responses Mean 
It is difficult for Army 
spouses to have their own 
careers. 70 64 13 11 5 163 1.88 
The Army does a good 
job of supporting spouses' 
careers. 0 9 31 74 48 162 3.99 
The Army does a good 
job of supporting spouses. 4 42 57 44 16 163 3.16 
(If applicable): My spouse 
is satisfied with his/her 
career. 10 34 60 24 12 140 2.96 
  
The Army may be able to impact retention through programs that aim to enhance spouse 
employment options and satisfaction with the military lifestyle, which may in turn impact 
organizational leader identity.  Some of my other survey responses and interviews focused on the 
Army’s inability to adapt policies and procedures for those officers in atypical situations.  As one 
former officer wrote: “I had a son, and did not want to deploy and leave him behind.  At the time 
I was also a single parent and the Army has little to no consideration for single parents.” 
This sentiment was echoed throughout the open-ended survey response portions, 
particularly among dual-military couples.  When both spouses are Army officers, it is 
exceptionally difficult to have a family because the Army has no organizational policies for 
addressing when both parents need to be deployed, other than forcing the parents to find child 
care while they are gone for up to 15 months.  This is unacceptable to many officers, and one or 
both parents opt to leave the service as a result.  A female former officer wrote: 
The upper leadership was incompetent.  All they seemed to care about was their 
career.  Plus, a mother cannot deploy every two years for a year and still feel 
positive about her relationship with her children.  It’s too much. 
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The costs and benefits of altering Army policies to accommodate single parents, dual-
military couples, and female officers in general deserve further study.  This section helps 
illuminate the struggle that many officers are dealing with as they wrestle with conflicting 
identities.  Organizational policies and social norms dictate that officers get married and have 
families, yet the lifestyle of an officer at war is hardly conducive to building and maintaining 
relationships with loved ones.  Should it adapt, the Army could potentially improve 
organizational performance.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
 The research contained in this dissertation spans three fields of great interest to me: 
organizational leadership, identity development, and networks.  In Chapter 2, I explore systems 
of leader development, with a focus on those of the Army and West Point.  I then turn to the role 
of identity in leader development.  In examining cadet development I propose that the formation 
and growth of self-identity as a leader is neither sequential nor continually upward.  Rather, it 
can vary significantly over time, and passes through phases of leader identity development which 
I term leader identity construction, stagnation, and destruction. 
Chapter 3 builds upon this structure and highlights statistical analysis of my Cadet Leader 
Identity and Network Survey to reveal insights into leader identity development.  Some 
independent variables (namely those capturing values and organizational identity with West 
Point and the Army) represent components of an individual’s leader identity, while network 
variables capture the perceptions of others.  I further examine the institution in classifying cadets 
by network position and level of leader identity development.  Interviews and observation add to 
the understanding of leader identity development in cadets occupying these classifications.   
Chapter 4 opens with an investigation into the origin and continued success of an 
organizational community of practice.  I then apply management and sociology theories to 
deepen our understanding of these organizations and develop propositions related to identity 
development, knowledge and information transfer, trust, communication, and organizational 
survival.   
In Chapter 5, I present my thoughts on future research pertaining to leader identity 
contagion, mentorship, professional identity development through communities of practice, and 
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employee turnover.  Organizational leadership, being a social interaction between individuals in 
a network, can benefit from further social network analysis and the study of networking 
technologies. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Cadet Leader Identity and Network Electronic Survey  
 
This survey will take approxiamtely 20 minutes of your time. Your participation 











Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. I trust in the U.S. Constitution and believe 
it is worth protecting. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. What is good for the Army and other 
soldiers is important to me. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I strive to do the best job I can in my 
company position. (ex. Team leader, 
Academic NCO) 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I maintain a professional relationship 
with my chain of command above and below 
me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I don’t really trust the company and its 
members. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Thinking about how I can become a better 
officer for my future units is not a top 
priority for me.  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I internalize not just the cadet honor code, 
but the spirit of the honor code, into my 
everyday life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I respect the Army values. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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9. You can count on me to choose the harder 
right over the easier wrong for rules at West 
Point. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I would stand up to a friend for making 
an unethical choice. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
(II. Leadership Identity) 
 





Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. Most of the time, I prefer being a leader 
rather than a follower when working in a 
group. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I am definitely not a leader by nature. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I am the type of person who likes to be in 
charge of others. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I believe I can contribute more to a group 
if I am a follower rather than a leader. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I have a tendency to take charge in most 
groups or teams that I work in. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
(III. Leadership Style, Authentic Leadership) 
 
Instructions: The following sentences refer to your leadership style. 
 
Leadership Actions/Behaviors Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
1. I say exactly what I mean. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I admit mistakes when they are made. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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3. I encourage everyone to speak their mind. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I prefer not telling the hard truth. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I display emotions exactly in line with my 
feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. My beliefs are not always consistent   with 
my actions. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I make decisions based on my core values. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I ask followers to take positions that 
support their core values. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. I make difficult decisions based on high 
standards of ethical conduct. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. I tend to stay away from views that 
challenge my deeply held positions. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. I analyze relevant data before coming to 
decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. I listen carefully to different points of 
view before coming to conclusions. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I seek feedback to improve interactions 
with others. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. I accurately describe how others view 
my capabilities. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I don’t feel it is necessary to ever 
reevaluate my positions on important 
issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I show my understanding of how specific 
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(IV. Self, Self-Monitoring) 
 





Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of 
other people. 1 2 3 4 5 
2.  At parties and social gatherings, I do not 
attempt to do or say things that others will 
like. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I can only argue for ideas which I already 
believe. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I can make impromptu speeches even on 
topics about which I have almost no 
information. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or 
entertain others.  
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I would probably make a good actor.  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. In a group of people I am rarely the center 
of attention.  1 2 3 4 5 
8. In different situations and with different 
people, I often act like very different 
persons. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I am not particularly good at making 
other people like me. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. I'm not always the person I appear to be. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I would not change my opinions (or the 
way I do things) in order to please someone 
or win their favor. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I have never been good at games like 
charades or improvisational acting. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I have trouble changing my behavior to 
suit different people and different 
situations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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14. At a party I let others keep the jokes and 
stories going. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not 
present myself quite as well as I should. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie 
with a straight face if it brings about a right 
end. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. I may deceive people by being friendly 
when I really dislike them. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
(V. Core Self, Five Factor Personality Scale: TIPI) 
 





Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. I see myself as extraverted, enthusiastic. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I see myself as critical, quarrelsome. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I see myself as dependable, self-
disciplined. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I see myself as anxious, easily upset. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I see myself as open to new experiences, 
complex.  1 2 3 4 5 
6. I see myself as reserved, quiet. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I see myself as sympathetic, warm. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I see myself as disorganized, careless. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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9. I see myself as calm, emotionally stable. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I see myself as conventional, uncreative. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
(VI. Cohesion, Group Cohesion) 
 





Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. Members of my company pull together   
as a team. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. The members of my company work 
together to get the job done. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. My company’s members are about each 
other. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Members of my company trust each other. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Leaders of my company pull together as a 
team. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. My company’s leaders work together to 
get the job done. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. The leaders of my company care about 
each other. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Leaders of my company trust each other. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
(VII. Social Network) 
 
Successful training depends on your communication with others in your unit. The next few 
questions ask about your relationships within your Company. 
 
Friend 
4. Name up to 5 people you consider to be a friend (someone you choose to spend your time 
with and go on pass with). 
*list of cadets per company 
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Leader 
5. Think of the qualities of an effective leader. Name up to 5 cadets you think have the most 
potential to become the best leaders (consider all four classes). 
*list of cadets per company 
 
Trust 
6. Name up to 5 cadets you trust (not necessarily a friend, but someone you deem 
trustworthy). 
*list of cadets per company 
 
     4. I like my company: 
 Yes  Neutral No 
 
 
(VIII. Identity, Organizational Identity: West Point) 
 








Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. When someone praises West Point, it feels like a  
     personal compliment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. When someone criticizes West Point, it feels like a 
    personal insult. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I am very interested in what others think about  
   West Point. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. When I talk about West Point, I usually say "we"  
   rather than "they". 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. West Point's successes are my successes. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. If a story in the media criticized West Point, I  
   would feel embarrassed. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am aware that I represent West Point when I 
make decisions.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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(Organizational Identity: Army) 
 
 




Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. Becoming an Army officer is a big part of who I  
      am. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I consider myself an Army person. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. What the Army stands for is important to me.  1 2 3 4 5 
4. I share the goals and values of the Army. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Being an Army officer is important to me.  1 2 3 4 5 
6. I feel strong ties with Army officers. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. If I had an ethical dilemma, I would always 
consider the values of the Army. 




Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. The criteria for success at West Point are consistent 
with what's important in the Army. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The punishments at West Point are proportional to  
    the misbehavior and offenses they are meant to  
   correct. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Ten years after graduation I expect to be proud that  
    I am a member of the Long Gray Line. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Succeeding at West Point directly corresponds to 
future successes as an officer in the Army. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. West Point provides me with the military training I 
need to be  future Army officer. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. The West Point experience is successfully  
     molding me into a future Army Officer. 
1 2 3 4 5 




(IX. Purpose, Shared Leadership) 
 





Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. Members of my company spent time 
discussing our team’s purpose, goals and 
expectations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. My company discusses our main tasks 
and objectives to ensure that we have a fair 
understanding. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Members of my company devise action 
plans and time schedules that allow for 
meeting our company’s goals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. The members of my company talk 
enthusiastically about our progress. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. My company’s members recognize each 
other’s accomplishments and hard work.  1 2 3 4 5 
6. In my company, members give 
encouragement to other members who 
seem frustrated. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. People in my company are encouraged to 
speak up to test assumptions and issues 
under discussion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.  As a member of this company, I have a 
real say in how this company carries out 
work. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Everyone in this company has a chance to 
participate and provide input. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. My company supports everyone actively 
participating in decision making.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
This concludes the survey. Thank you for your participation. 
7. I would recommend West Point to a High School  
     student considering the West Point experience. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 2: Demographic Data of Army Retention Survey Population 
CURRENT OFFICERS   
Age     
26 - 30 144 88% 
31 - 35 19 12% 
   
Gender     
Female 19 12% 
Male 143 88% 
   
Race     
African American 4 2% 
Asian 8 5% 
Caucasian 140 86% 
Hispanic 4 2% 
Mixed 2 1% 
Native American 1 1% 
Other 4 2% 
   
Highest level of education 
completed     
Some College 0 0% 
College Graduate (4 year) 135 83% 
Master's Degree 19 12% 
Professional or Doctoral Degree 9 6% 
   
Current marital status     
Rather not say 0 0% 
Divorced 4 2% 
Living with another 1 1% 
Married 114 70% 
Separated 2 1% 
Single 42 26% 
Widowed 0 0% 
   
How many dependents do you 
have?     
0 70 43% 
1 38 23% 
2 29 18% 
3 24 15% 
4 or more 2 1% 
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FORMER OFFICERS   
Age     
26 - 30 121 94% 
31 - 35 8 6% 
   
Gender     
Female 28 22% 
Male 101 78% 
   
Race     
African American 5 4% 
Asian 3 2% 
Caucasian 113 88% 
Hispanic 3 2% 
Mixed 5 4% 
Native American 0 0% 
Other 0 0% 
   
Highest level of education 
completed     
Some College 0 0% 
College Graduate (4 year) 93 72% 
Master's Degree 34 26% 
Professional or Doctoral Degree 2 2% 
   
Current marital status     
Rather not say 0 0% 
Divorced 6 5% 
Living with another 4 3% 
Married 86 67% 
Separated 1 1% 
Single 32 25% 
Widowed 0 0% 
   
How many dependents do you 
have?     
0 62 48% 
1 33 26% 
2 18 14% 
3 12 9% 
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Appendix 3: Other Factors That Influence Military Retention Rates and  
Their Expected Effect (in parenthesis) 
 
Number of dependents (positive: a soldier with a large family to support is less likely to 
transition to a new job and give up a guaranteed pay check and medical benefits; or negative: a 
soldier with a family will not want a lifestyle of constant deployments), ability to adapt to a 
military lifestyle (positive), fellow soldiers reenlisting (positive), presence of a mentor (positive), 
presence of good leaders (positive), bonus/incentives being offered (positive), number of years 
served (positive: it is logical that as someone approaches military retirement of 20 years, the less 
likely they are to leave; it also may become more difficult to obtain a comparable civilian job the 
longer one remains in service), perceived status of being in the military (positive), patriotism 
(positive), support of current or foreseeable future missions (positive), spouse has a military-
related or easily transferable job (positive: a spouse with a career in nursing or teaching, for 
example, will more likely support the transient military lifestyle versus a spouse with a career 
that requires remaining in one geographical location), personal or family affluence (negative: 
having savings to draw on reduces the anxiety of going a month or longer without pay to find a 
civilian job), education (negative: the perception of not being able to find a comparable civilian 
job is amplified when a soldier lacks a college degree, for example), civilian job opportunities 
(negative: if someone has a civilian job lined up, or a family business to go into, it reduces the 
likelihood of reenlistment), deployed status (questionable), number of months deployed 
(questionable), casualties in the platoon/company (questionable), and spouse being in the 
military (questionable).  
 
